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ABSTRACT
The Government of Botswana has, since 1972, implemented several programmes of
labour intensive work as a complementary effort to alleviate high levels of
unemployment, poverty and rural under-development. This research project describes
and evaluates six of the programmes: the Botswana Labour Intensive District Roads
Programme (LG 34), the Rural Roads Programme (RRP), the Labour Intensive Public
Works Schemes (LG 38), the Labour Intensive Drought Relief Programme (LG 117),
the current National Public Works Programme (LG 1107) and the current Labour
Intensive Routine Road Maintenance Programme. The programmes have been
described and evaluated in relation to their internal objectives as well as against
international literature on labour intensive work in order to determine whether or not
they were successful. The study reveals that the LG 34 was a highly successful
programme as it achieved most of its key objectives and was in conformity with
international literature. The programme created jobs for a significant number of poor
Batswana through the construction of good quality low cost roads. It developed and
established road construction and maintenance units within the District Councils. The
success of the LG 34 was, however, later undermined by a depreciated wage rate
contributing to the eventual demise of the programme.
The Labour Intensive Road Maintenance Programme, although currently in its early
stages of expansion, has been impressive. It has successfully developed and
demonstrated through a Pilot Project a model for the use of labour based small
contractors, managed by a private sector consultant, for routine road maintenance.
This had not been done before in Botswana.
The rest of the programmes were plagued by inefficiencies resulting from poor initial
planning, lack of training and technical supervisory personnel, lack of proper
organisational systems for the programmes and incorporation into drought relief
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activities. Most of these programmes were wound up, and the on-going National
Public Works Programme is struggling to survive.
In sum, the Botswana experience has shown that labour intensive methods could be
successful if attention were paid to initial design and planning, training of technical
supervisory staff and the establishment of proper organisational systems. In addition,
to differentiate proper labour intensive work from drought relief, wages must be paid
at or close to the Industrial Class minimum wage.
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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Definition
“Labour-intensive” is a phrase in economics to describe an operation in which
proportionately more labour is used than other factors of production.1
Labour-intensive construction may be defined as the economically efficient
employment of as great a proportion of labour as is technically feasible, ideally
throughout the construction process including the production of materials, to produce
as high a standard of construction as demanded by the specification and allowed by
the funding available; labour intensive construction results in the generation of a
significant increase in employment opportunities per unit of expenditure by
comparison with conventional capital-intensive methods. There are several stages of
employment intensity depending on the type of project and the parameters used to
define economic efficiencies. The first stage of labour intensity is cost-
competitiveness with conventional capital-intensive methods.
Since the 1970s, “ labour-intensive” has been the term used in the major research and
field studies carried out by the World Bank and the International Labour
Organisation. A serious problem with the phrase “labour-intensive” is that decision
makers tend to focus upon “labour” and its negative connotations of “picks and
shovels” ( and “slave”). This ignores the array of factors which need to be in place
long before any labour can be employed productively. These factors include
appropriate policy, legislation, institution, suitability of project, contract
documentation, sanction, quality and efficiency, organisation and training at site and
managerial levels including that required for proper contractor and sub-contractor
1 Penguin Dictionary of Economics (1972), South African Concise Oxford Dictionary(2002):”needing a large
work force or a large amount of work in relation to output”.
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2development. For these reasons some authors now prefer to use the term employment
intensive.2
Thus the the phrase “labour-intensive” will be used in this study because of its
intellectual pedigree in the 1970s. It was the phrase used during all the path-breaking
research. It is the term used in relation to contract in South African legislation.
1.2. Two pertinent concepts that underpin the theory of labour-intensive
construction
In 1971 the World Bank initiated a research programme called “Study of the
Substitution of Labour for Equipment in Road Construction” later broadened to
“…Civil Construction”. The research was formally completed fifteen years later in
1986, and led to the delineation of several basic concepts including those of technical
feasibility and economic efficiency.
The World Bank study was undertaken in three phases. In the Second Phase the
conclusion regarding the concept of technical feasibility was extended beyond road
construction and qualified labour-intensive methods for a wide range of construction
activities without compromising the level of product quality normally achieved
through the use of equipment-intensive methods.3
While the later phases of the World Bank study did take some account of the lower
equipment productivities in the developing countries, it was mainly concerned with
2 There has been further debate as to the terms “labour-intensive” and “labour-based”. Some authorities prefer to
use the term “labour-based” as opposed to “labour-intensive”. They hold that labour-intensive implies that work
is done entirely by hand whereas labour-based allows the use of equipment where necessary. For this study the
term labour-intensive is preferred for the sense that it conveys the intensive use of labour, while not pre-cluding
the use of appropriate machinery. In the opinion of the author the essential difference is not between these two
terms but between both of them and the term “labour-extensive” where the emphasis is upon the size of the
labour force wih scant concern for either the product or productivity(as occurs during relief projects).
3 IBRD,1974
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3the improvements that could be achieved by advanced labour-intensive methods over
the inefficient traditional ones. Placing more emphasis upon the need to improve the
productivity of labour than delineating the actual productivity of equipment, one of
the major conclusions from Phase Three was that with superior tools, high incentives
and good management, labour productivity could be improved to a point that labour-
intensive methods could be fully competitive with equipment intensive methods at
certain wage rates. Where the wage rates were less than US$2 per day, labour-
intensive methods would be distinctly competitive.
Wherever the basic wage actually paid?is less than?about US$4 per day in 1982
prices, and labour is available in adequate quantities, the alternative of using
labour-intensive techniques should be seriously considered.4
In 2003 the International Labour Organisation stated that US$ 10 had become the
“break even” wage.5
1.3. Context
The Government of Botswana has, since 1972, implemented several programmes of
labour intensive work as a complementary effort to alleviate high levels of
unemployment, poverty and rural under-development. This research project describes
and evaluates six of these programmes. The programmes have been described and
evaluated in relation to their internal objectives as well as against international
literature on labour intensive work.
4 IBRD,1986
5 Majeres, 2003: 1-3
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41.3.1. Work and unemployment
In order to stay alive one needs access to air, water and food. These are the
fundamental requirements for human subsistence, and while air and water are readily
available food is not. One can obtain food by stealing, begging for, growing,
borrowing or buying it. If one cannot grow food and therefore needs to buy, then
work is the most moral alternative to gain access to food.6
Other important needs that we afford through work are sociological and
psychological needs. We meet our sociological needs if we are able to meet important
social commitments such as participating in social clubs or are able to live a certain
lifestyle. Work enables us to achieve a sense of self-esteem, which derives from the
perception that the work we do is important and earns us recognition. Thus we
recreate ourselves and the world around us through work.7
However, although work is so important, it is not so easy to find work and hence
unemployment has become one of the most feared phenomena of our times,
especially in the developing world. High unemployment levels represent a waste of
human resources and reflect an economic inefficiency while causing a disturbing
degree of social distress.8 It leads to other social ills like poverty and crime.
1.3.2. Global Poverty
Poverty is a situation where one cannot afford a minimum standard of living.9 There
is a high incidence of poverty in the developing world.  Of the world’s six billion
6 McCutcheon, 2003 in McCutcheon & Taylor-Parkins: 42
7 Ibid.,
8 OECD,1994:7
9  BIDPA,1997
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5people, nearly half live on less than $2 a day and over one billion on less than $1 a
day.10 Widespread poverty results in social tensions and problems due to inequalities
between the poor and the rich and/or living a tough life. Poverty results in economic
inefficiencies on the part of the affected groups. Hungry children cannot study
properly, a malnourished work force is deficient in productivity and an economy
where the population is poor has a structure of demand that does not encourage the
production and marketing of the needed goods.11
1.3.3. Lack of basic infrastructure
Many people in the rural and urban areas of developing countries do not have access
to such basic infrastructure as housing, access roads, storm water drainage, sewerage,
and sanitation services. People need housing because shelter is a basic need. Proper
access roads in the rural areas increase the mobility of the rural people. It makes it
easier for them to participate in economic activities. The provision of sewerage and
sanitary infrastructure ensures that people live in hygienic conditions especially in the
urban informal settlements where the population densities are high. Availability of
these basic infrastructure uplifts the livelihoods of the people.
While there is a dire need for basic infrastructure, the conventional infrastructure
development programmes have not been able to meet the demand for it and there is a
critical backlog in the provision and maintenance of infrastructure. This has been
alluded to by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning when he presented
the national budget for the financial year 2005/2006. ‘It is the government’s intention
to give priority to the completion of on going projects before embarking on new
10 McCutcheon,2001 in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Employment Creation in
Development:3
11  Mbonini 1996 in  Proceedings of a Symposium on the Quality of Life in Botswana
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6ones’, noted the minister. 12 He also stated that the government is acting to address the
backlog of maintenance of public facilities.
1.3.4. Individual and community capacities
Communities in the developing world need access to basic infrastructure and
employment opportunities, which would contribute to their development process. Set
against these needs is the lack of individual and community capacities in technical
and institutional terms to implement development projects.13 Both the job market and
the development programmes for communities require a skilled labour force.
Furthermore, the planning and implementation of development programmes requires
the participation of legitimate democratic institutions in the local communities.
1.4. Concepts of Labour-intensive Construction
Development theory has failed to solve the above-mentioned problems. It had
suggested that technology transfer through industrialisation and urbanisation would
bring about economic growth leading to reduced unemployment and poverty.
However, despite the rapid industrialisation and economic growth, unemployment
and underemployment continued to rise. It became evident that other means than
growth alone were needed to generate employment opportunities. To that effect, the
International Labour Organisation and the World Bank initiated research to
investigate the technical feasibility and economic efficiency of using labour intensive
methods in the construction of infrastructure. The research concluded that labour
intensive methods were technically feasible and economically efficient for a wide
variety of construction activities and generally produced the same quality of product
12 MFDP,2005:23
13 Ibid.
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7as machine intensive methods. This has been discussed in more detail in section 2.2
of the report.
Many countries in the developing world welcomed this development and went on to
initiate and implement labour intensive public works schemes to help alleviate high
unemployment and achieve rural development. Botswana, the focus of this research,
is one of the countries which have implemented programmes of labour intensive work
and in the following section a brief overview of the country is taken.
1.5. The Case of Botswana
1.5.1. Country background
Botswana is a landlocked country sitting in the centre of the Southern African
plateau, surrounded by Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Botswana has
a relatively large geographical size (582 000 km2) and a small population of about 1.7
million.14
The country has a semi-arid type of climate and a savannah type of vegetation. It
receives an average annual rainfall of about 250-650 mm. Only about 5% of the land
is cultivable.15 The balance of the land is mostly covered with Kalahari sand, which is
poor and infertile. The fertile land is situated in the south eastern part of the country,
which also receives the highest annual rainfall and is the centre of commercial
activity. The combination of the above factors has meant that the population of
Botswana is also concentrated in the south eastern region.
14 World Bank/MFDP,2004:1
15 Ibid.
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81.5.2. Economic overview
Botswana is a success story in terms of economic growth. It stands out in the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and globally as a country
that has experienced remarkable and consistent growth-“the highest level of per
capita growth of any country in the world in the last 35 years”.16
Botswana was a predominantly rural country on being granted independence in 1966
and was ranked one of the poorest in the world. There were less than 5 km of tarred
road and only 3 secondary schools. The majority of the population, 85% in 1971,
lived in the rural areas, where the main source of income was traditional subsistence
agriculture.17 Botswana’s per capita (de facto) GDP was only P68 in 1966 and P305
in 1974.18 Agriculture was the largest GDP earner throughout the independence
decade (1966-1976). It formed 39% and 32% of Botswana’s GDP in 1966 and 1974
respectively.
However, diamonds were discovered in 1967 and their exportation has fuelled
remarkable economic growth. Per capita growth has since averaged more than 7 %
per year allowing the country to move from its position as one of the poorest in the
world to a position as a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of about $ 4
278 in 200319. Diamonds have played a key role in fostering growth and the mining
industry accounts for 36% of GDP, 75% of export earnings and over 50% of
government revenues.
However, Botswana presents a paradox because there are parts of the country where
poverty is endemic and for many, livelihoods have suffered to the extent that some
16 Clover,2003:1
17 ILO/MLGL,1976
18 MFDP,1977
19 World Bank/MFDP, 2004:1
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9are supported by government destitute payments only.20 It was the only country that
recorded a drop in the Human Development Index while it was experiencing a rapid
economic growth in 2001.
Life expectancy in Botswana dropped from 68 in 1995 to 39-45 in 2001.21 Although
this drop has been attributed to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Botswana it is an
indicator for an inequitable distribution of income.
From Table 1.1, the country’s Gini coefficient22 was 63 in 2003.23 This figure is not
reconcilable with the high per capita income of Botswana, $ 4 278 in 2003. It shows
that the distribution of income in Botswana is highly uneven. In comparison with
some of its regional neighbours, Botswana had the second highest Gini coefficient
next to South Africa in 2001. This was despite its second highest per capita income
during the same year.
Table 1.1: Socio and macroeconomic trends: regional comparisons
Country
GDP/capita(PPP
US$)2001
HDI rank
2003
GDP/capita
growth rate (1990-
2001)
Gini coefficient
2003
South Africa 11 290 111 0.2 59.3
Namibia 7 120 124 2.2 70.7
Botswana 7 820 125 2.5 63.0
Swaziland 4 330 133 0.1 60.9
Zimbabwe 2 280 145 -0.2 56.8
Source (Clover, 2003)
Thus the remarkable economic growth has not translated into a significant degree of
socio-economic transformation in Botswana. The benefits of economic growth are
20 Clover, 2003:1
21 Ibid
22 Gini coefficient: a statistical index used in econometrics to measure inter-individual or inter-household
disparities in the distribution of income. A high coefficient is indicative of wide income disparities.
23 Clover, 2003:1
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being enjoyed by a few much more than many. This has been attributed in part to the
fact that the engine of economic growth is the mining sector, which is highly capital
intensive and its share of the labour force is only about 5%. This has led to a situation
of high unemployment and widespread poverty.
1.5.3. Unemployment
The problem of high unemployment levels within the Botswana economy dates as far
back as the pre-independence period. Out of the 206 000 people of working age who
lived in the rural areas only 34 000 were in cash employment in 1976.24 This situation
and high unemployment in the urban centres explained the ‘exodus’ of Batswana
workers to South African mines where the working and living conditions were poor
and remuneration was low. This bears testimony to the hardships of living in rural
Botswana then.
The remarkable economic growth of post-1967 is yet to bring about a significant
degree of socio-economic transformation. The Household Income and Expenditure
Survey of 2004 put the unemployment rate at 23.8%.25 Available data shows that as
the GDP continued to grow the gap between the rate of generation of employment
opportunities and the rate of growth of the labour force has widened. Unemployment
increased from 14% in 1991 to 23.8% in 2004 and the highest rate of unemployment
was among the youth.26 The rate among the youth increased from 31% to 55.9%
between 1991 and 2004. The unemployment problem in Botswana has a gender
dimension as well, with women experiencing the highest incidence of unemployment.
According to Mayer and Gladson (1997), between the years 1991 and 2004 the rate of
unemployment among women increased from 17% to 26.3% while the rate for men
increased from 12% to 21.4% during the same period.
24 ILO/MLGL,1976
25 CSO,2004
26 Mayer & Gladson,1997 in Botswana Development Issues No. 1:4
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1.5.4. Poverty
Botswana is a country where, ironically, the masses are poor amid plenty. A 1997
study on poverty and poverty alleviation commissioned by the Government of
Botswana (GOB) and undertaken by the Botswana Institute for Development Policy
Analysis (BIDPA) reported that 47 % of Batswana lived below the Poverty Datum
Line in 1994.27 It also reported an unevenness of development between the rural and
urban areas with 55% of the rural population found to be below the poverty datum
compared to 46% in urban villages and 29% in urban areas. At the root of the
problem of rural poverty is a structural limitation: lack of agricultural diversity
renders Botswana resources difficult to convert into more sustainable uses, cattle
rearing being the only effective means of attaining wealth above subsistence
income.28
Abject poverty is found mainly in the smallest settlements, decreasing in the larger
rural settlements (villages and towns). The greatest poverty is among ethnic groups
such as the Basarwa, who mainly live in Remote Area Dweller (RAD) settlements
and cattle posts. RAD households are still highly dependent on the rapidly depleting
natural resources of wildlife and veld foods and products.
1.6. Problem Statement
A permanent feature of the development policy planning of Botswana has been the
creation of employment opportunities and rural development leading to poverty
alleviation and a better quality of life. A recent addition to these objectives has been
27 BIDPA, 1997
28 Clover, 2003: 4
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the promotion of private sector development.29 Botswana’s rural areas remain
inaccessible as the rural roads are in a state of disrepair. Thus there is a need to
provide access to the rural areas, which if done labour-intensively could generate a
significant number of employment opportunities. It was in line with these objectives
that the Government of Botswana came up with a number of programmes of labour
intensive construction and maintenance of infrastructure. These programmes were as
follows:
· The Rural Roads Programme (RRP) started in 1972
· The Labour Intensive Public Works Schemes (LG 38) started in 1980
· The Botswana District Roads Programme ( LG 34) started in 1980
o Pilot Project (1980-1982)
o Expanded Programme: District Roads Upgrading and Maintenance
Programme (1982-1992)
· The Labour Intensive Drought Relief Programme ( LG 117) started in 1980
· The current Labour Intensive Public Works Programme ( LG 1107) started in
1997
· The Labour Intensive Routine Road Maintenance Programme started in 1998
Some of the above programmes no longer exist (RRP, LG 38, LG 34 and LG 117)
and it is not clear as to the future prospects of the others.
1.7. Aims and Objectives of the Research
Against that background it is the aim of this research project to evaluate the above
programmes with a view to draw the lessons learned in order to inform decisions on
current and future similar programmes in Botswana and elsewhere. In order to
achieve this aim the research has the following objectives:
29 MFDP,1998
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· To give a detailed description and analysis of each programme
· To identify the major problems affecting or which affected the programmes
· To identify the objectives of these programmes and determine the extent to
which they were or were not achieved
· To review the international literature on good practice in labour intensive
work
· To evaluate the Botswana programmes against the good practice
· To draw the lessons learned from the Botswana experience and make
recommendations for future programmes in Botswana and elsewhere.
1.8. Hypothesis
Some of the labour intensive programmes in Botswana have degenerated into drought
relief-type projects and progressively ceased to be treated as long term development
initiatives. They began to attract an undeserved image of producing poor quality
products at a high cost and too slowly. These perceptions had no basis in technology
and economics but were powerful enough to undermine some of the programmes as
political and bureaucratic support for the programmes also waned. These factors have
contributed to the demise of some of the programmes.
1.9. Research Methodology
The methodology employed in this research comprises:
i. A literature review of the subject of labour intensive construction in general and
previous research on labour intensive work in Botswana
ii. Visits to the relevant participating institutions and libraries to collect data in the
form of progress reports, technical review reports, socio-economic impact study
reports and any other secondary data.
iii. Selective interviews of current and previous officials of the programmes
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iv. A detailed description of the programmes followed by a critical evaluation of
the programmes in relation to their own objectives and in relation to literature
on good practice
v. Conclusions and recommendations will be drawn arising from the above
analysis and evaluation
1.10. Limitations of the research
The research is subject to the following limitations:
· It is confined to only 6 programmes of labour intensive work in Botswana
· It is confined to the time period from 1972 to 2004
1.11. Report Outline
Having reviewed all the programmes, the author considers that, apart from the recent
Labour Based Roads Maintenance Programme, only the LG 34 has been successful in
terms of both internal and external evaluations. Internal evaluations were in relation
to the programmes’ objectives while external evaluations were by comparison with
other programmes such as the Kenya Rural Access Roads Programme (KRARP).
Furthermore there was more complete documentation for the LG 34 than for all the
other programmes. For the above reasons the author decided to first discuss the LG
34 before passing to the other programmes.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 reviews the subject matter of labour intensive construction, discussing the
conceptual and theoretical frameworks. This constitutes a summary review of the
international literature.
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Chapter 3
This chapter contains a detailed description of the Pilot Project to the Botswana
District Roads Programme, LG 34. It details the issues that the Pilot Project
experimented with, or investigated, and identifies the main findings of the project.
Chapter 4
This chapter contains a description of the LG 34, as expanded after the pilot phase. It
identifies any deviations or otherwise from the methods, standards, organisation types
as established and recommended by the Pilot Project. Any new developments during
the expanded phase have also been described here. The chapter closes with an
evaluation of the programme and conclusions.
Chapter 5
This chapter contains a brief description of the Rural Roads Programme (RRP)
followed by detailed descriptions of the Labour Intensive Public Works Scheme (LG
38) and the Labour Intensive Drought Relief Programme (LG 117).The chapter closes
with an evaluation of the programmes and conclusions.
Chapter 6
This chapter contains a description of the current Labour Intensive Public Works
Programme (LG 1107). The description covers such issues as the type work done,
organisational frameworks, sources of funding, employment and wages. The chapter
ends with an evaluation of the programme and conclusions.
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Chapter 7
This chapter contains a detailed description of the recent Labour Intensive Routine
Road Maintenance Programme using Small Scale Citizen Contractors by the Roads
Department. The description involves a discussion of the institutional framework, the
type of organisation for maintenance, source and structure of funding, the type of
work done, employment and productivities. It also contains an evaluation of the
programme and concluding remarks.
Chapter 8
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions drawn by the study and the recommendations for
future and current similar programmes. The chapter concludes with recommendations
for further research.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
In setting out the theoretical framework for this study, the author has drawn heavily
upon the work of McCutcheon who was directly involved in one of the projects and
has written extensively about labour-intensive construction in general and Botswana
and Kenya in particular.The author has also summarised the key findings of the path-
breaking researches and field studies carried out by the World Bank and the
International Labour Organisation in the 1970s. These studies have delineated some
of the concepts which underpin labour-intensive construction.
2.2. Context and Concepts of Labour –intensive Construction
Societies in the developing world have been and continue to be ravaged by high
levels of unemployment, poverty, lack of technical skills and community capacities,
backlogs in the provision of basic infrastructure rendering the quality of life poor.
This is more so for rural communities.
The above problems have defied development theory, which suggested that
industrialization by the economies of the developing world would lead to economic
growth with the latter resulting in the generation of employment opportunities.
Developing nations spent a significant proportion of their scarce foreign resources in
a drive to industrialise. Economic growth was achieved but the problems of
unemployment and underemployment continued to rise.30
30 Rostow,1963
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Clearly there was a need to generate employment opportunities within the existing
economy, through other means than economic growth alone. To that effect two major
international organisations, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) initiated research to
investigate the possibilities of creating employment opportunities within the existing
economy.
In 1969, the ILO started its World Employment Programme (WEP) under which it
carried out part of the above-mentioned research. The ILO started with the
exploration of the reverse substitution of labour for equipment. The inquiry identified
two types of product: one where the production process was not amenable to the
reverse substitution of labour for equipment and another where production process
was amenable to reverse substitution. 31
The ILO concluded that the reverse substitution of labour for equipment was less
likely in process-centred industries and more likely in product-centred industries like
civil construction where the products are time-honoured, involves the mechanical
fitting together of partial products and the machines used are essentially magnified
versions of handicraft tools.
The construction industry was also considered worthy of attention from the
perspective of a number of socio-economic factors.32 It constitutes a significant
proportion of the economy. In the developed world and the modern sectors of
developing nations the construction industry was capital-intensive leaving room for
labour-capital substitution, unlike the building industry.33
31 Lal,1978
32 McCutcheon, 2003 op.cit:24
33 Ibid.
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Civil construction plays a major role in the provision of infrastructure, which in turn
accounts for 50-60% of the Fixed Capital Formation of most countries. Lastly 60-
70% of civil construction in developing countries is carried out through public
funding rendering the industry amenable to influence by public policy. Thus civil
construction was promising.
The ILO then focused on establishing the economic viability of using labour intensive
methods and from a number of studies the following conclusions were drawn:34
· The use of labour intensive methods of construction will go a long way to
reduce inequalities in the distribution of income and achievement of social
justice.
· Labour intensive methods could be competitive with equipment intensive
methods at shadow prices and could be cheaper at shadow prices if labour
productivity could be improved.
· Labour intensive methods are more economically viable than equipment
intensive methods at both market and shadow prices.
In 1971, the World Bank set up a research project called the Study of the Substitution
of Labour and Equipment in Road Construction (later changed to civil construction)
to investigate the technical feasibility and economic efficiency of labour intensive
methods. Initial work started with the reviews of literature on past experiences with
labour intensive methods followed by field studies of on-going projects from which
34 ILO, 1974,1975 & 1978
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initial conclusions were drawn. The World Bank then went on to test the initial
findings by embarking upon test activities in India, Honduras, Indonesia and Kenya.35
The World Bank work culminated in a project completion report whose major
conclusions were as follows:36
· It is technically feasible to substitute labour for equipment for a wide variety
of construction activities and generally produce the same quality of product as
machine intensive methods.
· With superior tools, high incentives and good management labour
productivity could be improved to the point that labour intensive methods
could be fully competitive with equipment intensive methods at certain wage
rates.
· It further stated that where the wage rate actually paid is less than $ 4 per day
in 1982 prices and labour is readily available the alternative of using labour
intensive methods should be seriously considered. In 2003 the ILO revised the
$ 4 to $ 10.
2.3. The Principles of Employment Intensive Construction for Successful Site
Implementation
Based on an evaluation of the literature and his own experience McCutcheon has
proposed the following principles for the successful site implementation of labour
intensive methods:37
35 McCutcheon,op.cit
36IBRD,1986.
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· The work must be treated as proper engineering and careful consideration
must be given to carefully selected socio-economic objectives including
employment generation
· The product must be appropriate to employment intensive methods
· Detailed technical analysis must be carried out
· Designs, specifications and other documentation must be appropriate
· As far as possible work must be based on individual or group tasks
· During preparatory work or the pilot phase work and method studies should
be carried out to reveal:
o The various operations and their optimal sequencing
o The various activities within each operation
o The individual and group tasks appropriate to the different activities
and operations
o The balancing of activities and operations within each operation and
project respectively
· The conditions of employment must be appropriate since the majority of the
work would be carried out by daily or monthly employed labour.
o “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work”
o “A fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage”
· Health and safety issues must be observed: workmen’s compensation
legislation must be applied
· The labourers must not be transported to work
37 McCutcheon,op.cit
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· High quality appropriate tools and equipment must be used and maintained
· The training must be extensive and good at what it sets out to do with
attention particularly paid to the training of the “hands-on” site supervisors. In
the selection and training of candidates as much attention must be paid to
character as to technical competence
· The labourers must accept instructions given by the trained road builders
· There should be close liaison between site work and the local community and
this should not be the responsibility of the site supervisor since he/she has to
be on site all day every day.
· Sites must be well organised
· Strong organisations are required with good management systems
· Labour intensive work is not drought relief
2.4. Reasons for Success of Large Scale Labour Intensive Programmes
Subsequent to the multi site operations carried out on the basis of the findings of the
desk and single site research, large scale programmes were implemented including
those of Kenya and Botswana from which further principles were derived regarding
large scale programme development.
In order for labour intensive methods to be used effectively on a large scale an
approach that leads to a programme of work as opposed to a “once off project is
required.38 On a single project the ratio of professional fees to that of expenditure on
38 McCutcheon,op.cit:33
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skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers will be highly distorted. It takes as much
high level technical expertise for one project as does for a programme.39
Thus large scale programmes, instead of individual projects, were set up and run
revealing that a number of issues required attention for the long term success of large
scale implementation of programmes. The following were identified as the main
reasons for the success of large scale programmes:40
· Major policy and decision makers understood the concepts and principles of
labour intensive work and the principles of long term programmes
· The programmes were long term and national: not ad hoc projects
· There was a sound intellectual assessment of the technical feasibility and
economic efficiency of labour intensive methods: cognizance was taken of the
institutional capacities and the principles of labour intensive construction
were incorporated into the daily site work
· Technical, institutional, organisational, managerial and socio-economic
aspects received attention during preparatory work, continued through pilot
projects, initial training programmes and subsequent national programmes.
Technical matters included design standards, specifications, tools and
equipment and construction methods. Institutional matters included the
decentralization necessary for grass roots success and the centralization
necessary to plan and coordinate a large scale programme. Organisational and
managerial aspects included the type of organisation required, the
management structures, systems and training. Socio-economic aspects
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid
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included the wage rate, conditions of employment, labour legislation and
supply and the role of women.
· Strong organisations were established with good management systems.
· Training was extensive and good at what it set out to do: “hands-on” site
supervisors, multi-site supervisors, clerks etc.
· There was long term political support
· Long term financial commitment was provided by governments and donors
· There was good coordination between government departments, local
authorities, technical assistance and donors
Apart from the World Bank and ILO research, other developments and economic
experiences have unearthed other essential issues to the concept of labour intensive
methods.41
2.5. Other Important Issues to the Concept of Labour Intensive Construction
2.5.1. Technology transfer and the level of technology
The transfer of technology from developed to developing countries was not seen to be
problematic from the on-set but in the event it proved more complicated than
anticipated.42 An immediate response was the development of an appropriate
technology, which again proved difficult to develop contrary to its initial ostensible
simplicity. Within the poor societies requiring such technology there was a lack of
technical skills and a low level of formal education and training, pre-requisites for
any technological transfer or development. Thus for a technology transfer or
41 Ibid.,34
42 Ibid.
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development to take place there must be a local capacity to absorb the new
technology.
2.5.2. Sustainability
This word is open to interpretation in two ways. The first relates to when what is
being done is able to continue without external support. For example, if a business is
able to continue because its products are demanded by the market.43
The second relates to compatibility between what is being done and the factors
affecting it, and this is the most important or relevant to labour intensive construction.
It is not sustainable to use capital intensive methods in a society where there is a low
level of technical skills, foreign resources are scarce and labour is in oversupply.
Employment intensive methods could be more sustainable as they would be in
accordance with the level of technical skills available and would generate more
employment opportunities for the surplus labour.
2.5.3. Training
All successful labour intensive programmes have been linked with long term in-house
training programmes. All levels of management require training to different degrees
of sophistication, orientation and education.44 Programmes expanded at rates at which
the training programmes had been able to produce competent people. Institutional
capacity had been built by training people of various orientations and levels of skill
and incorporating it into the institution so that, as a whole, it functioned in accordance
with its overall objectives.
43 Ibid.,35
44 Ibid.,37
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The “hands-on” site supervisor has been found to be the most critical person as,
without daily supervision, he/she ensures that work is done properly both
organisationally and technically.
The training programme must pay as much attention to character as to technical
competence and a careful selection process must be followed for selecting the
candidates.
2.5.4. Targeting
During the 1970s and 1980s a major objective was to generate employment
opportunities for the poor and no systematic way was put in place to target the
programme to the poor. Thus people from higher income groups could be employed
at the expense of the poor.
In labour intensive programmes, steps must be taken to target poor people including
pitching the wage rate at the appropriate level to enable the programme to be self
targeting. The wage must not be too high as it would take labour away from other
productive activities. It must still be sufficient to allow site supervisors the moral
obligation to insist on strict discipline. Targeting the poor requires attention in both
the recruitment of casual labourers and the selection of potential trainees. The latter
would have distinct individual benefits and would contribute to long term poverty
alleviation for the poor families.45
45 Ibid.,40
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2.5.5. Distinction from drought relief/emergency work
Labour intensive construction should not be confused with relief make-work.46
Labour intensive work entails careful design, planning and documentation. This is not
possible with relief work projects because of the need to show immediate short-term
results.
Labour intensive programmes employ labour efficiently to produce assets through the
setting and achievement of realistic objectives for quality, time and cost. On the other
hand, the main objective of relief work is usually to employ a great number of people
regardless of their productivity and quality of work.
2.6. The need for programmes for success in projects
2.6.1. General
For projects of labour intensive work to succeed they must be part of long term
programmes. The strategy to establish a programme for large scale replication of
innovatory work involves a four phased approach.47
Phase 1: Orientation
This phase involves the orientation and education of all the parties on the policy
objectives, types of projects, methods of construction, conditions of employment and
the concepts and principles of labour intensive work.
46 Ibid.,43
47 Ibid.,48
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Phase 2: Preparatory work
This entails the detailed analysis, design, planning and documentation. In particular,
the aspects determined here include institutional framework (local and national),
organisation for work, funding and staff recruitment policy. Specifications and
training materials are prepared as well as conducting community briefings and
selection of trainees.
Phase 3: Piloting
During this phase demonstration projects and embryonic training programmes are
implemented and expanded into national programmes. The expansion of programmes
is only allowed to proceed at the rate at which:
· The programme can produce trained personnel
· Local and national institutions and the communities have the capacity to
absorb the trained personnel and be able to maintain their roles in the
programme
The phased approach to a programme ensures the requisite individual development
and institution building at all levels. The approach must be located in an appropriate
institutional framework identified early in the process.48 For countries without prior
experience a three-year time period is recommended for the lead-in phases (1-3).
48 Ibid.,49
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During the lead-in phases the overheads are high but they revert to normal ratios once
the institution has been built. In the KRARP the ratio of overheads to direct
construction cost was 84:16 during the first three years (1974-76) but it reversed to
16:84 in the long-term (1974-85) and training accounted for only 1.5-2% of total
expenditure.
Thus through the programme approach, the institution and human resources required
to implement the work are established over time.49
2.7. Small Scale Contractor Development and Employment
2.7.1. General
Until the late 1980s not much attention was paid to entrepreneurial development and
the feasibility of creating a small contractor capacity to service the labour intensive
sector of the construction industry.50.
During the period after the 1980s, two independent efforts were made in South Africa
and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The experience in Sub-Saharan Africa was on rural roads
construction while that in South Africa covered a wide range of civil engineering.
2.7.2. Need for small scale contractors
Within the thrust towards labour intensive construction there was a need to
incorporate small contractor development. This need was given impetus by a number
49 Ibid.
50 McCutcheon &Croswell, 2003 in McCutcheon & Taylor- Parkins, 2003:320
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of factors. First the private sector was seen to make a more efficient use of resources
and thus had to play a greater role. On the other hand, the public sector was seen to be
inefficient in the provision and maintenance of infrastructure.
It was difficult to manage and control the maintenance of large networks of labour-
intensively constructed roads in-house. It was thus considered reasonable to explore
the potential of using small scale contractors.
Maintenance was normally carried out in-house by government departments through
the use of casually employed labourers. This set up has been hindered by employment
legislation which requires that casual labourers must be given the status of permanent
employees after 6 months of continuous employment. The problem with this is that if
they are permanent and pensionable and remuneration is not tied to production then
productivity may suffer.
The above scenario makes it handy to organise maintenance using small scale
contractors because, then, the labourers would not be on the payroll of government
and should the contractors fail to deliver, their contracts could be cancelled.
2.7.3. Lessons from experiences with small scale contractor development
Small contractor development in relation to labour intensive construction must
incorporate the lessons from labour intensive work as a whole.51 The programme
approach should be adopted coupled with the recognition that there exist a lack of
technical skills and institutional capacities. This means the programme must be
formally linked with a comprehensive training programme. The training programme
51 Ibid.,324
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must generate various skills at various levels (technical, management, entrepreneurial
and administrative).
Experience in South Africa52 with the establishment and development of small scale
contractors has revealed that attention must be paid to the following details:
· The complexity and uncertainty of civil engineering contracting
· The need for psychometric testing
· The need to modify the existing contract documentation to suit small
contractors
· After pre-contract training the contractor must be engaged on a series of
consecutive contracts during which they are progressively less mentored until
they have acquired skills.
· The programme must be managed by a single private sector consultant, who
should also be the champion of the programme, advocating for an enabling
environment for it.
The development of small scale contractors using employment intensive methods
should ensure the following:
· A programme approach to implementation
· Continuity of contracting opportunities, training and on-going mentoring
52 Ibid.
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· High level support (“championing”)
· Institutional support
Although progress has been made in large scale implementation in such countries as
Kenya, Lesotho and Ghana, a number of issues have been identified as the major
impediments to the development of small contractors:53
· Lack of contract continuity
· Rigid procurement procedures
· Delay of awards and difficulties in mobilization
· Lack of administrative resources
· Wages and funding
· Delayed payment to contractors
· Difficulties in raising funds and professional indemnities
2.8. CONCLUSIONS
· High levels of unemployment and under-employment gave rise to the need to
generate employment opportunities within the existing economy
· An analysis of the feasibility for the reverse substitution of labour for
equipment revealed that civil construction was promising:
o Major civil construction operations are amenable to reverse
substitution
53 Ibid.
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o Civil construction plays a major role in the economy and the bulk of
its funding comes from the public sector rendering it amenable to
influence by public policy
· Subsequent research revealed that labour intensive methods are technically
feasible for a wide range of construction activities and can produce the same
quality of product as conventional methods
· Under certain circumstances labour intensive methods may be economically
efficient and cost competitive with conventional methods
· From research and subsequent iterative implementation, it was revealed that in
terms of technical and economic efficiency, successful site implementation
depended upon a number of basic principles of labour intensive construction
· Labour intensive methods must be implemented through a programme
approach in order to be successful on a large scale. Large scale
implementation has delineated a number of success factors for large
programmes
· Programme establishment must follow a four-phased implementation strategy:
orientation, preparation, piloting and expansion
· Labour intensive programmes must be sustainable, distinguished from
drought, properly targeted to the poor and linked to a long term training
programme
· Small scale contractor development has become an important aspect of labour
intensive work
· Any effort to develop small scale labour intensive contractors must ensure the
following:
o A programme approach to implementation
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o Generation of continuous contracting opportunities, on-going training
and mentoring
o High level and institutional support
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3. PILOT PROJECT: BOTSWANA DISTRICT ROADS UPGRADING AND
MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME (LG 34)
3.1. Background
In 1980, Botswana had about 7 500 km of gazetted road network and about 11 500
km of non-gazetted road network. Responsibility for the construction and
maintenance of the non-gazetted network lay with the Roads Department of the
Ministry of Works and Communications. As for the non-gazetted network
responsibility was devolved to the District Councils in line with the Government’s
strategy to create an effective local government and establish decentralized planning
procedures.54 The planning decentralization would in part serve to enable the District
Councils to come up with an overall strategy for development within the district.
Thus the District Councils were mandated with the upgrading and maintenance of the
non-gazetted road network, which mainly comprised dirt tracks and was the only link
between villages, cattle posts and lands areas where about 80% of the people of
Botswana lived.
All year round access to these areas was identified by the Government of Botswana
(GOB) as essential for rural development and economic growth, the then major
themes of economic development planning. The District Development Plans had as
one of their top priorities to keep the 11 500 km of track in a usable condition all year
round.55
The responsibility for district roads by the District Councils was exacerbated by the
(fact that there had been) little engineering experience in the District Councils and
virtually none in road construction and maintenance. The GOB wanted an effective
54 McCutcheon,1983:1
55  Ibid
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
36
District Council capacity to improve and maintain non-gazetted roads and deemed it
vital to develop a system that would enable the District Councils to have such
capacity.56
The upgrading and maintenance of rural roads was considered important from the
perspective of rural development and institutional capacity building for the local
government to act effectively in respect to one aspect of rural development. The
standard of upgrading and maintenance of the non-gezetted roads was to be
determined with regard to the national development objectives and budgetary
constraints. The standard of upgrading for roads would then help determine the sort
of capacity required of the District Council to carry out their mandate for roads.
The national financial status quo and the roads sub-sector construction costs then
prevailing called for a minimum standard of upgrading for the tracks. A tarred road
cost a minimum of P75000/km while a gravel road cost between P30000-P50 000/km
(P1 = $1.27 in 1980).57 In 1980, the Central District Council (CDC) budget for
upgrading their non-gazetted network was only P40, 000 and for the whole of
Botswana, the budget was P 184 090.58 Even if the district budgets were increased
substantially it would only be possible to improve a few kilometres of track to gravel
standard. From experience in other countries an engineered earth road was technically
and economically suitable for rural use. “In 1977 it had been estimated that upgrading
a track in Botswana would cost approximately P4000/km to engineered earth
standard and today the figure would be close to P9000/km.”59 In order to stretch the
Pula further, the GOB considered the concept of selected betterment or spot
improvement, that is, construction to engineered earth standard only where it was
essential to allow the passage of a vehicle.
56 Ibid., 2
57 Masalila &Motshidisi,2003:124
58 Ibid.,47
59 Ibid.,1
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The decision on the method of construction was guided by the major themes of
National Development Plan (NDP) 5 (1976-81), that is, the creation of employment
and rural development. The Government of Botswana was interested in exploring the
potential of labour intensive methods, as it was committed to the expansion of
employment opportunities in rural areas. From research and experience elsewhere the
upgrading and maintenance of rural roads was one sector where greater use could be
made of labour intensive methods, thereby generating employment opportunities in
the rural areas. The use of labour intensive methods would lessen the need for
imported machinery and save the scarce foreign currency resources.
There was no prior experience in spot improvement and selected betterment of dirt
tracks to engineered earth standard in Botswana, with the exception of the
unsuccessful Rural Roads Programme in 1972. The methodology to develop a local
authority capacity to handle the above was therefore not obvious. In order to lay the
foundation for such a local capacity the GOB, in collaboration with the Norwegian
Agency for International Development (NORAD) and the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), established a District Roads Upgrading and Maintenance Pilot
Project which was based in Serowe in the Central District of Botswana. The project
took place along the 120 km of track between Shoshong and Serowe. The ILO
provided technical assistance while NORAD and the IBRD funded the construction
activities.
3.2. The Pilot Project
The Pilot Project began in January 1980 upon the arrival of the Project Manager of
the team of experts and consultants, which constituted the Technical Assistance (TA).
The TA team consisted of four full time members, stationed in Serowe (the Project
Manager, Work Study and Organisation Specialist, Training Specialist and the
Associate Expert) and four short term consultants: Tools and Equipment, Labour
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Economist, Rural Development, and Work Organisation. A Rural Sociologist from
the MLGL was seconded to the project as a short-term socio-economic consultant.
The Pilot Project was housed within the existing government structure and the above
mentioned project team made up a Central Government supernumerary team. The
team worked closely with the CDC but was responsible to the Permanent Secretary in
the MLGL. An advisory reference group was set up with representatives drawn from
the Central District Council, District Commissioner’s office in Serowe, Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), Ministry of Local Government and
Lands (MLGL) and Ministry of Works and Communication (MWC).
The Pilot Project was to experiment with all aspects of selected betterment and
maintenance of rural roads, including technology, methods, wage rates, payment in
cash and /or kind and employment of women in order to establish a Road
Maintenance Unit, and a formula for operation which would be turned over to the
CDC and replicated in other Councils upon completion of the project.
While examining the above –mentioned issues the Pilot Project maintained focus on
the following facts: (i) experimentation was to be on labour intensive and
employment generating technologies, (ii) standard of construction was to be the
minimum necessary to keep the improved tracks open and passable all year round by
two-wheel drive pick-ups, and (iii) methods developed should be replicable upon
completion of the Pilot Project.
In summary the Pilot Project was consistent with the aims of efficiently employing as
many people as possible, constructing low cost maintainable roads and the eventual
integration into the CDC operations.
The programme of work adopted was in accordance with the Project Memo and also
tied-in with the expectations of the CDC which were high regarding the
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improvements of the 120 km of non-gazetted track between Serowe and Shoshong. In
the Project Memo commitment had not been made to improve any particular track
and the decision on which track to experiment with was to be bilateral, made by the
project team and the CDC. After consultation, it was decided that the candidate for
experimentation would be the stretch between Shoshong and Serowe. Conditions
along that stretch represented those throughout the CDC.
Early on, the project was misunderstood by those who were not closely involved in
its design. Councillors perceived the object of experimentation as being whether
within the project time frame the stretch between Serowe and Shoshong could be
upgraded using labour-intensive methods and not that the experimentation was to
develop methods suitable to Botswana as a whole. However this misconception did
not change the national perspective in relation to how much of the track between
Shoshong and Serowe could be upgraded. The primary concern was that the
experiments should come up with ways to carry out such upgrading.
It was however pointed out to the Project Manager that, in the eyes of most people,
the success of the Pilot Project would be judged by the extent of the physical results
of experimentation. If more tracks were upgraded the methods would be deemed
successful otherwise, the methods would not be taken seriously by most influential
figures when considering country- wide replication. In the light of the above a
programme was devised which was a compromise between the experimental nature of
the project and the expectations of other project stakeholders such as the CDC
Councillors.
Construction began in July 1980. Between February 1981 and June 1982, 34.8 km of
formation was constructed (including 10 m width of bush clearing and de-stumping
throughout) of which 23.3 km were surfaced. An additional 111 km of bush was
cleared (2.5 m on either side of the track).
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3.3. The Major Issues Examined During the Pilot Project
The Pilot Project examined the supply of labour, wage rate, standard of construction,
methods of construction, tools and equipment, maintenance, organisation, planning,
cost and other socio-economic factors.
3.3.1. Labour supply
Quantity of labour
In order to test the extent of labour supply60 a construction programme was planned
such that simultaneous work would be in progress near seven villages identified along
the route. From August 1981 construction was carried out near at least five villages,
while between October 1981 and April 1982 construction was in progress near six
villages. At any one time during the latter period at least nine sites were in operation.
Employment reached a peak of 235 workers in January 1982 and between July 1980
and May 1982 a total of 182 people were employed in Mogorosi alone. Thus 33% of
the population of Mogorosi (554)61 participated in the project during the above-
mentioned period. Altogether, between July 1980 and May 1982, the project
employed 631 different people between Serowe and Shoshong. The project employed
630% more men than the 70-80 men that the feasibility study had estimated would
avail themselves for work.
It was concluded that ample labour was available for the development of highly
labour intensive methods of construction, about double more than the amount
required.
60 Vaidya,1980
61 CSO,1981:8
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Still under the examination of the quantity of labour the project investigated the
extent to which conditions along the project route were representative of the
conditions in the Central District as a whole. A sample survey was carried out based
on conditions along the 1 365 km of the major non-gazetted roads in the Central
District.
An analysis of the survey results showed that for 65% of the road sections, labour
availability was likely to be more than adequate. For the next 20%, prospects for
recruiting within 20 km looked reasonable while for the remaining 15%, local labour
supply prospects were poor. For 35% of the non-gazetted roads in the Central District
sufficient labour would only be available if workers were willing to travel long
distances to site or set up temporary camps at road sites. It was concluded that
between 55%-75% of the total 1 365 km of road network would have an adequate
labour supply.
Another analysis concluded that the supply of labour in areas initially considered
labour scarce would be less problematic because of the better supervision and
organisational methods subsequently developed.62 The revised methods resulted in:
· Smaller gangs than initially envisaged.
· Additional flexibility in reducing gang sizes below the normal, if necessary.
Furthermore road sections where labour supply was difficult could be given a low
priority in the betterment process thus offsetting the effects of low supply.
62 Vaidya,1981
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Quality of labour
Quality of labour includes such factors as reliability, honesty, willingness and ability.
Preliminary estimates of reliability and ability were necessary in order to determine
whether it would be possible to run a highly labour intensive programme smoothly.
Reliability was tested by maintaining records of absenteeism over the duration of the
Pilot Project. Ability was determined through work studies and the measurement of
production.
During the course of the Pilot Project labour was generally reliable. Between July
1980 and May 1982, 47,022 worker-days were recorded out of a possible 52,312,
giving 89.9% attendance.63 Monthly attendance was 85%. The above figures were for
all casually paid labourers, including Gang Leaders, Assistants and Trainees, but
excluding Cart Drivers as their attendance was dependent upon the availability of
carts and donkeys. If they were included the overall attendance was 88.8%.
The agriculture cycle was initially expected to seriously affect the supply of labour
prompting a recommendation by the Labour Economist that the labour force be kept
at a relatively low level during the first ploughing season. Absenteeism and desertion
were monitored during the first ploughing season with a view to make
recommendations for the future. In the event absenteeism was high but not significant
to cause problems for the project. The effects of the second ploughing season could
not be monitored due to drought in the summer of 1881/82.
It was recommended that the expanded programme should be flexible with regard to
labour requirements for agriculture and be prepared to stop or reduce work during the
ploughing season. People would continue to be given time-off for ploughing and
other agricultural activities.
63 McCutcheon,1983:6
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As for productivity, it was comparable to that recorded in labour intensive projects
elsewhere.
Therefore it was possible to plan a programme of work based on the expectations for
a stable and productive workforce.
3.3.2. Wage Rate
During the initial stages of the project it was decided that the payment of wages
would be in cash in order to distinguish the project from drought relief, facilitate
assessment of results in economic terms and reduce logistical problems inherent in
payment in kind (e.g. food).
Although the project was at liberty to experiment with the wage rate, it did not vary
the wage rate between the different sites in order to assess the response of labour
supply and productivity. This would have disrupted the project as wages are a
sensitive issue. Wages set too low would negatively affect the willingness of and
productivity of workers as well as commitment to the sort of strict discipline required
for labour intensive work.
So it was prudent to pitch the wage as close as possible to the right level at the
beginning. A sufficient wage rate would ensure a sufficient supply of productive
labour under strict discipline.
The problem was studied by the Labour Economist in April 1980 and the study
comprised:
· Comparison of prevailing wages in the private and public sectors.
· Discussing with officials and experts at the local level and in the relevant
ministries (MFDP, MLGL, MA and MHA).
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· Comparison of bush-clearing productivities on the Drought Relief Programme
(DRP) and in the private sector.
Based upon the recommendations of the Labour Economist’s study, the wage rate
was set at P 2.10/day (equivalent to $2.27 in 1980) in 1980.64 At P2.10/day, the wage
rate was 75% of the Government minimum wage for Industrial Class I workers which
was P2.70/day. However, later that year, the Government minimum wage was
increased to P4.10/day. The wage for the Pilot project could not be increased to
maintain the 75% margin to the public sector wage as it had not been pegged to the
public sector wage from the onset. The wage had now fallen to 51% in proportion to
the public sector wage.
Attempts by the project management to lobby for an upward revision of the wage
were not entertained by senior Government officials who cited the following reasons:
i. There was an adequate supply of labour.
ii. The statutory minimum wage in the public sector was too high and
uneconomic and therefore could not be used as a benchmark
iii. Labour intensive methods would not be cost-competitive with equipment
intensive methods
iv. With the wage rate at P2-10/day, motivation, productivity, morale and
discipline were adequate.
v. Avoiding confusion between labour intensive work and drought relief was
not a compelling argument.
vi. It was solely up to the government and not the project to decide on matters
of public employment.
vii. It would be preferable to employ more people at a lower age.
viii. It would be difficult to find funds for high wages
64 Vaidya,1980
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ix. Wages too high would disrupt the rural economy.
x. P2-10/day would be too high a wage during the off-season.
3.3.3. Standard of construction
The standard of construction required for the non-gazetted network was that which
would keep the roads open and passable all year round, by two-wheel drive pick-ups.
The GOB had adopted the concept of selected betterment or spot improvement with
the majority of the road to receive little or no maintenance.
The GOB had anticipated a low cost of such upgrading, and the financial budget was
slim. According to the MFDP the cost of an engineered earth road was P4000/km. In
1980/81, the total budget for the upgrading and maintenance of the non-gazetted
network in the Central District Council was only P40000.
Thus, in order to upgrade as much track as possible it would be necessary to device as
low a standard of construction as possible which would also withstand conditions
during the rainy season. Achieving the above would also shed light on the concept of
selected betterment.
Standard of constructed sections
Track upgrading on the Pilot Project involved carrying out the following activities:
· Re-alignment
· Bush-clearing
· Formation construction (ditching, sloping, camber formation)
· Interception ditches and mitre drains
· Spreading/surfacing of formation
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· Hand packing of stones on formation
· Minor water crossings
· Dry stone drifts
· Spreading calcrete in the ruts of heavy sand
According to the Rural Sociologist65, the people felt that the roads had facilitated their
movement between Serowe and other villages. Sections that were once impassable
during the rainy season were now passable. There were, however, complaints about
the standard of the upgraded roads on the part of the local people, local and national
officials and a Minister. The concerns were about design characteristics particularly
that the road was narrow and not tarred, side ditches were too close and the minor
drifts were too steep. From the Rural Sociologist’s perspective, the alleged low
standards were blamed on labour intensive technology.
It was recommended that a public relations exercise be carried out to highlight such
issues as the cost of a tarred road per kilometre and the cost implications of a wider
road. The purpose and standard of upgrading for the roads would also be explained.
Another recommendation was for continued experimentation during the expanded
programme to improve the design standards while maintaining their simplicity, low
cost and ease of maintenance.
Selected Betterment: Selection criteria
The Pilot Project undertook, inter alia, to identify and quantify the characteristics of
the concepts of selected betterment and spot improvement.66 Running conditions of
tracks in the CDC were difficult because of:
65 Ibid.
66 Mould,1981
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· Excessive tracking of loose material surfaces
· Excessive depth of loose material causing slip
· Poor alignment of tracks
· Excessive erosion leading to an uneven surface
· Flooding and water logging
A sample survey of conditions along the 1 365 km of track in the Central District
revealed the following:
· 20% of tracks required no upgrading at all
· 38% of the tracks required bush clearing and re-alignment only
· 22% of the tracks required re-alignment and bush clearing. Vehicles would
not get stuck but the running surface was not smooth.
· 20% of the tracks required re-alignment and bush clearing. Road construction
was required, as vehicles would get stuck.
· On average 10 km of major drift construction was required per km.
Experience along the Pilot Project route combined with results of the survey led to
the following policy regarding selected betterment.
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Table 3.1 Selected betterment stage one
Soil type Operations Average length per km
Clay and sandy clay Realignment, bush clearing and de-
stumping ( 10m width):
Formation construction ( 5.5 m width) ;
surfacing (4 m width);
Surfacing ( 4 m width) and minor
drainage drifts
200 m
Water courses Construction of dry stone drifts ( 6 m
width) 10 m
The remainder Realignment where necessary and 2.5
m bush clearing on either side of the
track
600 m
Source (McCutcheon, 1983)
The above type of selected betterment would make the tracks passable only and
would not lead to a continuously smooth ride.
Where it was required that a vehicle may drive in safety under more uniform
conditions it was recommended that in addition to Stage One, Stage Two upgrading
be carried out, generating 70% more work than Stage One upgrading. Stage Two
upgrading provided a continuously smooth ride in addition to vehicles not getting
stuck. Stage One upgrading only required that vehicles should not get stuck anywhere
along the upgraded track.
The criteria for the determination of the required standard of upgrading would be
developed during the expanded programme. Upgrading to Stage Two would create
more employment and smoother roads lessening the scepticism about labour intensive
methods.
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In western Botswana conditions were different from those in the Central District.
They called for a new set of criteria and upgrading operations. In addition to bush
clearing and de-stumping, reshaping of loose material on tracks using a metal drag
was essential. Thorough extensive experimentation under local conditions was
necessary in these Districts. The mode of operation would follow the approach
adopted on the Pilot Project: labour intensity, lowest possible cost and the replication
of results.
Route selection criteria
For the expanded programme there were more tracks than could be upgraded in a
five-year period. Thus it was necessary to select the tracks to upgrade. The Pilot
Project in consultation with the Central District Council proposed a selection system
that not only took account of the status quo but more importantly respected equity
and furthered positive development objectives.67 The system for prioritizing the tracks
for upgrading was based on the following:
· Population density within the catchment area
· Remoteness from services
· Productive potential and linkage to Arable Land Development Programme
(ALDEP)
· Traffic density
· Condition/cost of upgrading required
The above ranking system was adopted for testing in the Central District. The system
would then be turned over to other Districts if the outcome was positive. In the
interim, other District Councils were advised to take inventories of the roads
67 Ibid.
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proposed for upgrading in order to facilitate the development of a five-year
programme.
3.3.4. Methods of construction
Methods
Given the adequate supply of labour it was feasible to consider introducing and
developing highly labour intensive methods of construction. The quality of labour
experienced during the Pilot Project was adequate leading to the recommendation that
labour intensive methods should be used for all the construction activities.
Justification for the construction methods adopted by the Pilot Project and
recommended for the expanded programme.
General: In order to counter any change of opinion against labour intensive methods,
it was necessary to show that the methods not only generated employment but that
they were also technically feasible.
During the Pilot Project, the organisation of the construction operations had been
sound, the productivities on par with those achieved previously and the wage rate
well below $ 4 per day. Thus the operations were technically efficient. The operations
were small scale and dispersed and thus labour intensive methods would be more cost
effective than alternative methods.
Consideration was given to the use of donkey carts for material haulage. This was
given impetus by a number of favourable factors. Donkeys were plentiful and in
widespread use for the transportation of people and goods. The use of donkeys was
thus, not going to be culturally incompatible with local practices. The Arable Lands
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Development Programme (ALDEP) and National Development Bank (NDB)
encouraged the productive use of donkeys.
A system of donkey-drawn haulage was developed on the basis of extensive
observation, time studies and analysis. A comparison between the donkey based
system and various tractor and trailer alternatives showed that the donkey drawn
system cost about P 1 590/km, which compared favourably with the $ 1 285 reported
in 1980 on the KRARP, which used tractors and trailers.68
Productivities
General: The project was also given free rein to find out which system of wage
payment resulted in the highest productivity: daily, task or piece rates.
Experiments had shown that productivities significantly increase in the following
order of wage payments: daily, task and piece work rates. The project concentrated
upon developing a system based upon a combination of the daily and task rates
workers. This was due to consideration that the resources, training and effort required
to achieve the necessary level of supervision to control work were reasonable but
those required to administer piecework rates were too great. Two types of
productivities were required to control the work.
Productivities for each activity: Time studies were conducted on the haulage
operation concentrating upon the development of a system to control haulage. Table
A1 in the appendix shows the productivities that were determined from the limited
amount of activity sampling and the time studies carried out on the haulage operation.
See Table A2 in the appendix for the number of cart trips required for different ranges
of haulage distance.
68 McCutcheon,1985
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The task rates used to control daily activities were derived in part from work studies,
observation and certain accurate production data over the period of the project. Table
A3 in the appendix shows the detailed productivity data for the operations: bush
clearing, ditching sloping and camber formation. It also shows the task rates used
during the Pilot Project and recommended for the expanded programme.
Overall productivities for each operation: The initial (September 1980)
productivity results were disappointing: 2 386 days/km for formation construction.
However with improved organisation and control the productivity rates also increased
and the following figures formed the basis of the 1981 plan for production.
Table 3.2 Overall productivity for each operation
Operation Productivity (days/km) Productivity(cart-days/km)
Bush clearing and de-stumping
112.5 (300-1200)
Basic formation
construction 400 (880-1 275) 90 23
Dry stone drifts 1 802.5 (1 180-1 575) 23
Surfacing 1 470.0 (840) 480
Except for drift construction there had been significant improvements in productivity
during the course of the project. The average figures for animal-drawn haulage
proved once more that it was an economically efficient system. The average days per
km (283 and 117 cart days) compared more than favourably with those reported on
the KRARP (840 worker-days).
A check was carried out on the general level of production since 1981. A comparison
was made between the amount of labour recorded in the muster rolls and the amount
of labour obtained by multiplying the total amount of construction by the average
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productivities listed above. It showed that the average productivities reflected the
overall levels of productivities to be obtained over a long period of time under
prevailing conditions of small scale and dispersed operations. These productivities
could be used as the basis for future planning. It was, however, emphasized that
further field studies had to be carried out to determine productivities for all the
operations under various conditions, in order to improve the definition of task rates
and to refine the overall planning criteria.
3.3.5. Tools and equipment
General
Previous experience in labour intensive methods had shown that the correct choice of
tools and their adequate standard is essential to achieve the required productivity. The
Tools and Equipment Consultant carried out an assessment of the quality and
availability of suitable tools in Botswana. He also evaluated the manufacturing
capability in respect of tools and light equipment.69
Required tools and Equipment
The tools and equipment required on the Pilot Project were based on the following
considerations:
· Field conditions
· The nature of the upgrading activities
·  The need to maximize the use of local resources in the manufacture of tools
· The need to maximize the efficiency of labour intensive methods
69 Howe,1981
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· The resources likely to become available for improvement of the roads.
Inventory and control of equipment
The control of tools and equipment on the Pilot Project was run from the Central
Stores of the CDC. Project stocks were not integrated with those of the Central Stores
but the same procedure was followed. The recording procedure enabled the cost,
number and location of each item to be determined rapidly. Stocks were initially
issued to storemen at the main camps along the route of the project from where they
were collected and returned by workers each day. The collection and return of tools
consumed an unacceptable amount of working time and a more decentralized system
was developed. Implements were stocked at each work site in a padlocked toolbox.
The box was transported by donkey cart from site to site.
Maintenance of tools and equipment
A team technician maintained the tools and equipment. After several months of use
on the field each toolbox was returned to the Central Store and the gang issued with a
fresh set of tools while the old set was reconditioned or replaced by the technician.
The technician also made field trips to maintain the donkey carts. Those that were
beyond the technician’s capacity were taken to Serowe for repair by one of the local
enterprises.
Assessment of the quality and availability of tools
There were no local hand tools or simple items of equipment suitable for road
construction and maintenance. The market was dominated by South African
implements with only a small proportion of poor quality tools originating from
elsewhere. Botswana maintained an open economy and the setting up of a new
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competitive tool industry was difficult as foreign companies could set up legal
commercial practices to protect their position. There was a government concession
which favoured local manufacturers if they produced goods for not more than 12.5%
above the tender price of foreign companies.
However, because of proximity to the South African market, the general standard of
tools and equipment was higher than in most developing countries. The quality
ranged from excellent to poor with many of the tools below the quality acceptable for
use on labour intensive work. In order to obtain tools of an acceptable quality the
tools consultant developed guidelines for tools selection.
Local manufacture of tools and equipment
Some prototype tools and equipment were produced such as, hand tongs, tree hooks,
crow bars, hand rammers, donkey drawn rollers, donkey harnesses. It was difficult to
find organisations with the capability and willingness to undertake the manufacture of
prototype tools especially if the numbers of implements were not encouraging.
Liaison was made with the Rural Industries authority for assistance with identifying
local sources.
There were six donkey cart manufactures. Amongst them, N.Stoneham Brothers sold
for a good price and the workmanship was good. They were reliable in terms of
supply and delivery and ready to assist. Various types of two and four-wheeled carts
were built and tested under site conditions with the two-wheeled tipping carts
receiving particular attention. Final modifications were made and orders were made
for the manufacture of three types of the two-wheel tipping carts.
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Procurement
During the Pilot Project exploration was made of the various avenues of procurement
available: local manufacture, private suppliers and the Department of Supplies
(DOS). The Tools Consultant concluded that for the project it was not sensible to
source supplies of the most important construction tools through any of the above-
mentioned procurement options since it would be against the aim of securing
implements of the appropriate quality. Tender regulations specified award to the
lowest price but for tools, one has to link lowest price to a clearly defined
specification.
Although the tools consultant reckoned that the supply and quality of tools was not
satisfactory, he later advised that they be sourced through the DOS. DOS had agreed
to consider the use of the technical specifications for the production of the tools.
The consultant recommended that prior to the expanded programme MLGL must take
up the issue of technical specifications, acceptance testing and tendering procedures
with the DOS in order to improve the quality of tools and equipment.
Future work
It was observed during the Pilot Project that the expanded programme would require
work in connection with the following:
· Research and development of tools and light equipment
· Stimulation of local manufacturing
· Improvement of procurement and marketing of local tools and equipment
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3.3.6. Maintenance
After construction, a road must not be left until it deteriorates to a state where only
rehabilitation can restore it to its original and usable condition. Maintenance began as
soon as formation construction was completed and opened to traffic. It was carried
out by one of the construction workers and consisted of raking to fill the ruts formed
by traffic. Formal maintenance by maintenance workers began as soon as the
construction team had progressed too far away for the deployment of a construction
worker. The allocation of maintenance work per person was about one and half
kilometres of completed road.
Maintenance personnel were required to develop the need to maintain each section in
good shape and generally carried out the following duties on constructed sections:
· Filling in of potholes and depressions
· Raking of loose surfacing material into the correct camber
· Clearing of ditches and drains
· Grass cutting and bush clearing
· Replacement of missing stones in drifts
· Maintenance of traffic signs
· Improvement of existing and construction of new drains
· Erosion control
· Keeping of bushes and trees at least 2.5 m away from the edge of the road
· Continuous checking and maintenance immediately after heavy rains
including rains after hours, during weekends or holidays
To carry out their work on constructed sections maintenance workers were normally
equipped with a wheel barrow, spade, mattock, rake, grass slasher, hand rammer, pick
eyed axe and a water bag.
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While construction activities went on in the area maintenance workers were recoded
as normally in the muster rolls and paid according to days worked, and Gang Leaders
were responsible for maintenance. New maintenance personnel were monitored to see
if they worked competently and were able to work competently without direct daily
supervision.
The road was inspected once every month for quality and labour attendance before
payment. Maintenance personnel worked full time and were paid P 2-10 /day for
nineteen days a month. Full time employment aided control, as workers were
expected to present themselves for work every working day except on the Monday
after pay weekend. Payment was withheld if maintenance was unsatisfactory and
workers were given one month to get the road to an acceptable standard.
When the construction activities had ceased in the area maintenance personnel
operated according to a system whereby their payment was not related to the number
of days worked but to whether or not the road had been maintained to an acceptable
standard.
Existing labour legislation needed to be changed to accommodate the above aspect.
Given the major maintenance emergencies likely to occur from the unpredictable
nature of rainfall in Botswana, the Pilot Project observed the need for continued and
refined experimentation with maintenance methods during the expanded programme.
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3.3.7. Organisation
Labour
Labourers were responsible for executing the work under the supervision of trained
Gang Leaders.70 Recruitment of labour was in various ways as shown below:
·  Through formal contact with the Headmen and the Kgotlas, at which people
were informed of the days on which work would start, followed by random
selection amongst the applicants on the appointed day.
· Formal contact between the Headmen and the kgotlas was followed by
recruitment of the casual labourers through the offices of the headmen and the
kgotlas
· Recruitment by the Technical Assistant from amongst the applicants at the job
site
· Recruitment by the Gang Leaders by searching for potential workers from
amongst the villagers
Although the above methods led to a sufficient number of people being employed, the
Pilot Project recommended the extension of the recruitment methods to include the
Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Extension Staff to ensure that more
people were reached and women were particularly informed of their full eligibility for
employment.
70 Gang Leader: later termed a “Road Builder” and now (in RSA) “a Construction Processes Site Supervisor”
(informally) and “Hands-on Site Supervisor” (formally).
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Supervision
Gang Leaders: Initially there was a shortage of trained Gang Leaders, Store men,
etc. The level of production was lower than that indicated by the level of reliability
and effort by workers. While a tighter definition of working procedures improved the
situation there were other reasons for low production of which lack of trained Gang
Leaders was one.
The operations were of a dispersed nature and organisational based upon gangs of up
to twenty five labourers depending upon the nature of the upgrading activity. It
proved difficult to achieve higher productivity with larger groups of workers. The
rules of operation for the gangs were clearly defined and discipline was strict. Gang
Leaders reported to the technical assistant (TA). Gang Leaders were expected to be:
· Technically competent and capable of understanding instructions
· Willing and able to issue instructions to the gang
·  Capable of setting out and controlling the work of about up to 25 labourers
· Able to give accurate and oral reports to the TA
·  Able to instil discipline
Daily muster rolls and tools records were kept as well as daily progress records.
Construction activities were carried out either on a daily or task basis with the task
based system preferred for its higher productivity.
Assistant Gang Leaders demonstrated working methods to new workers. Thus Gang
Leaders did not have to start with completely inexperienced workers from each
village. Assistant Gang Leaders marked the muster roll and daily tool record and
oversaw bush clearing. Liaison was made with the Headmen through which free
accommodation was obtained for Assistant Gang Leaders in every village.
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Technical Officers (TO) and Technical Assistants (TA): A TA reported to a TO
for the supervision of five to ten Gang Leaders. The TA was the vehicle for
instructions from the TO to the Gang Leaders and information from site to the TO.
The duties of the TA were as follows:
· To set out new sections of construction
· To recruit labour
· To prepare the weekly plan for Gang Leaders and to issue the record forms
· To issue tools to new work sites and to collect the old ones when work was
completed
· To check and sign the muster rolls
· To collect the completed forms every week
·  To ensure that the daily reports were compiled
· To do the daily planning
·  To collect the weekly reports
· To ensure that work was done correctly
· To collect broken tools and issue replacements
· To take care of disciplinary issues between the casual labourers and the Gang
Leaders and to report disciplinary issues between the Gang Leaders and the
TA to the TO
· To prepare the monthly progress reports
The TA spent at least four days of each week out on site doing supervisory work.
During the Pilot Project the TA was responsible to the Site Engineer. In the expanded
programme the TA would report to the TO, who would have responsibility for a
District Council Road Unit. Duties and responsibilities of a Technical Officer have
been described in the following chapter.
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3.3.8. Planning and cost
Planning
The Pilot Project developed planning systems that were adequate for the various
levels at which they were used. The Council Engineer (assisted by a Technical
Officer) carried out the long-term forward planning in consultation with the Council.
To ensure sufficient time for the TO to carry out liaison and detailed planning for
each construction operation, the Engineer would work at least one year ahead of the
construction activities of the DCRU. The definition of criteria for route selection
would aid long-term planning.
On the basis of the proposed organisation and the average productivities which led to
certain planning criteria, a DCRU, consisting of seven Gang Leaders and a casual
labour force of about 150 workers would be expected to construct about 22 km of
complete road per year. Thus about 110 km and 52 km of track could be upgraded to
Stages One and Two respectively of selected betterment.
The TO would come up with a detailed construction programme based upon a survey
of the route combined with the use of planning criteria evolved during the Pilot
Project. The TO would break the construction programme into weekly plans for each
Gang Leader. By monitoring the progress reported, the TA would adjust the weekly
plans to adhere to the overall construction programme. The Gang Leader would in
turn make detailed plans for each day’s work adhering to the weekly plan and record
any deviations from the plan.
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Cost of construction
Based upon the operational productivities quoted in Table 3.2 in section 3.3.4, the
average cost of construction was derived. The average cost for the different formation
profiles would be as shown in Table A4 in the appendix.
The figures in the above-mentioned tables took account of tools and supervision by
the Gang Leaders but not senior supervision and office overheads. Based upon the
proposed organisational structure, normal overheads (office administration, stores,
TA, TO, vehicles and drivers) would amount to a further P 1700/km.
Experience between Serowe and Shoshong combined with the results of the sample
survey of the major non-gazetted tracks in the Central District led to the formulation
of a policy as to where selected betterment should take place along any particular
route section. On the basis of the amount of work required to upgrade a track the
average site construction cost in upgrading a network of tracks was calculated (See
Table A5 in the appendix).
It was considered that the figures in the above-mentioned table were obtainable
during the expanded programme as long as the overall organisation was good,
training programme was effective, supply of tools and equipment was regular and site
and office management was good.
3.3.9. Training
General
Training requirements had been developed in relation to 4 distinct levels of
personnel:
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
64
· Gang Leader
· Office administration, stores and maintenance of tools
· Technical Officer and Technical Assistant
The small scale and dispersed nature of the operations meant that the Gang Leader
would not be amenable to daily supervision by the TA, neither would the TA be
amenable to daily supervision by the TO. Thus at all levels the persons responsible
for the activities of others had to have the right character. As much attention had to be
paid to selecting people with the right character as was paid to technical competence.
Gang Leaders
The nature of work in Botswana meant that trained personnel were required at a
lower level than on the KRARP. It was thus necessary to put would-be Gang Leaders
through a rigorous course of site and class training. The Training Officer prepared
modules for use in class and in the field.
Candidates were sourced from the villages where construction took place and were
accepted if they met the following criteria:
· There was evidence of work on the project for at least six months
· They possessed basic numeracy and literacy skills
· Evidence of interest, initiative and responsibility
Candidates from outside were accepted if they possessed the following:
· Junior certificate of education or had passed standard seven and had relevant
work experience
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· Evidence of interest, initiative and responsibility during a shorter period of
time than that required for village candidates
Various courses were run for Gang Leaders. Despite the minimum standard 7
required of the recruits, in relation to measurement and reporting, difficulty was
experienced during training. The pass rate amongst the candidates who were recruited
from the villages was lower than for those recruited from outside. Village candidates
were less educated and less experienced than their foreign counterparts.
While local recruitment continued, it was recommended from the point of view of the
need for rapid expansion, that greater emphasis be placed on the recruitment from
other sources. Advertising and screening of the candidates were also called for during
the expanded programme. Attention would be paid to other suitable sources like
retired policemen, veterinary workers and others with extended field experience.
The training of Gang Leaders was mostly carried out using the facilities available in
most of the villages. Trainees and instructors were housed in huts provided from the
villages. Instruction took place in a school classroom, hut or under a tree. For
practical training, tents were set up next to the construction training sites.
During the project, training was integrated into production, requiring more flexibility
on the part of the Training Officer. It was considered suitable to separate training
from production in the expanded programme. A stretch of track was selected near
Serowe for training. Courses were run for three months comprising in aggregate four
to six weeks of theoretical training and six to eight weeks of site training. Originally
the training took place in the morning and field site work followed in the afternoon.
Later it was changed and trainees alternatively spent one day in class and the
following day on the field doing practical work. Successful trainees would become
Gang Leaders after serving up to six months probation. The Training Officer in
consultation with the DCRUs set the length of the probation period.
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Gang Leaders who proved to be competent over a long period of time would be
recommended to be employed as Industrial Class workers. They were recommended
for further training as Technical Assistants if they displayed particular initiative and if
they possessed the necessary academic qualifications they were further recommended
for training as Technical Officers.
Office administrators, Store men and Tools Technicians
Training in this category was mainly on-the-job. Four Storekeepers were given
intensive training in the maintenance of tools by Serowe Brigades. A team technician
received training in welding techniques carried out to maintain the carts. It was
carried out on the premises of N.Stoneham Brothers, the biggest single source of carts
for the project.
Training in these types of skill would continue to be on the job but advertising and
screening were used in order to attract a high calibre of candidates. Liaison with
appropriate institutions would be required to formalize this form of training.
Technical Assistant
The Technical Assistant received the same training as the Gang Leader plus the same
standard course run by the Roads Training Centre (RTC).The existing two-year
course at the RTC had been modified to include site and class training in labour
intensive methods. The Roads Training Centre, part of the official Government
training establishment, was already in place when the Pilot Project started.
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Technical Officer
As it has already been mentioned, the Pilot Project did not have Technical Officers.
The Technical Assistants operated under an expatriate Site Engineer. The production
of trained Technical Officers started at the beginning of the expanded programme. In
order to develop the first trained Technical Officers three trainees from the RTC’s
three-year technicians’ course were sent to the Pilot Project for site training. They
completed an accelerated Gang Leaders’ course and were introduced to various
aspects of the project. Upon completion of the course at RTC, the suitable ones would
be seconded to the DCRU in the CDC for intensive practical and theoretical training.
The trained TOs were responsible to an Engineer and controlled the operations of a
DCRU. After some years into the expanded programme, a Technical Officer attended
the full three year course at the Roads Training Centre, which had been modified to
include site and class training in the supervision of labour intensive construction and
maintenance of roads. A trained and competent Technical Officer controlled the
activities of two Technical Assistants.
3.4. Other Socio-economic Considerations
3.4.1. Genera
Besides the socio-economic aspects of labour supply, wage rate, standard of
construction, route selection and methods of construction, consideration had also
been given to related socio-economic matters and to issues which were liable to
become more important in relation to an expanded programme.71
71 Vaidya, 1983
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These issues included:
(i) Liaison
(ii) Employment of women
(iii) Socio-economic benefits:
- A field survey
- An analysis of the economic benefits of an expanded programme
- A cost-benefit analysis of an expanded programme
- Direct benefits and traffic surveys
(iv) Investment in complementary rural infrastructure and linkages with other rural
development projects
3.4.2. Liaison
National: Upon initiation of the Pilot Project formal contact was made with officials
in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of Local Government
and Lands, Ministry of Works and Communications, Ministry of Home Affairs and
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Norwegian Agency for International Development,
Botswana Trade Union, Botswana Employers Federation, Botswana Enterprise
Development Unit and the Swedish International Development Authority. Formal
liaison was maintained with most of the above bodies. At various times visits were
paid to the project and tours were arranged, inter alia, for the ministers and senior
officials of the above-mentioned organisations. At three-monthly intervals the Project
Manager briefed the Reference Group.
The visits were meant to address a major problem. The initial understanding of labour
intensive work and the Pilot Project was very low and therefore it was necessary to
explain the project in detail in order to overcome the misconceptions held prior to
visiting the project sites. The Project Manager was once summoned to the House of
Chiefs to defend the Pilot Project at a meeting chaired by the Vice President. It was
often necessary to top up the discussions and slide shows with exposure to the
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physical reality of the project in order to further the understanding of the project by
the visitors. During the tours down the route of the Pilot Project groups of workers
were observed actually working hard in the absence of high-level supervision.
However, there were still indications that apart from those who had actually had
contact with the Pilot Project, there was a basic lack of understanding about labour
intensive work. This prompted a recommendation for an extensive public relations
exercise for the expanded programme linked to the training programme.
District:  Upon initiation of the Pilot Project, formal contact was established with the
Central District Council, the District Commissioner’s office, the Tribal
Administration Office and the Land Board. Reciprocal liaison was maintained
throughout the project and this benefited the functioning of the project.72 The District
Commissioner, the Council Secretary and the Council Engineer promptly and
effectively solved any problems arising. The Project Manager briefed the relevant
officials at the regular reporting meetings of the Central District Council, the District
Development Committee and the Council Works Committee.
At the local level, initially, there was more resistance in relation to the project on the
grounds that the roads built by labour intensive methods were second-class products
compared to their machine-built counterparts. More exposure to physical results of
the Pilot Project and large groups of hard working labourers reduced the negative
attitude of local officials and Councillors. At the end of the Pilot Project, scepticism
about the methods employed was far less than at the beginning.
Village: Liaison was established and maintained throughout the project with the
village Headmen, the Kgotlas, the VDCs and teachers at the village primary schools.
72MLGL, 1980 & McCutcheon,1980-1982
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In terms of project progress there was a high degree of cooperation on the part of the
local communities. However, villagers still did not understand the nature of labour
intensive construction and the standard of road to be built. They envisaged a road
built by machines and topped by a wide layer of tar.
It was recommended that more should be done to inform the villagers of the nature of
the work to be done. However, the high degree of cooperation on the part of the
communities was good for the future of the expanded programme.
3.4.3. Employment of women
Despite a recommendation for the use of male labour by the report on the feasibility
study of the project, female labour was employed during the project. Of the first 161
applicants for work at Mogorosi, about 20 were women. Incidentally, the first person
chosen by lottery was a woman.
At Moijabana, of the first 30 people, about six women volunteered although only well
after the quota had been filled. Where the recruitment was through the Kgotla alone,
no women were employed. The number of women volunteering for work was much
less than that of men and this led to deliberate recruitment drives aimed at the
employment of a greater number of women. This resulted in a significant increase in
the number of women employed. Between August and December 1981 the number of
women employed rose from 1 to 30. Women were expected to carry out the same
work as men although it was found that internal allocations were made which
assigned women to lighter tasks. Women were given the opportunity to train as Gang
Leaders.
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A study by the Rural Sociologist73 found that the employment of women in labour
intensive road construction was not contrary to local culture. Even men did not mind
if women were employed on the project. It was recommended that in the expanded
programme women should be given an equal chance of employment, as they needed
cash employment much as men.
It was also recommended that voluntary organisations, assisted by extension staff,
should also be used to disseminate information adequately. Particular attention had to
be paid to women being made aware that they were fully eligible for employment.
3.4.4. Socio-economic benefits
Field study
The Rural Sociologist also examined the socio-economic effects of the Pilot Project
on the impact group or the impact on agricultural activities, expenditure patterns and
household incomes.
In relation to agriculture evidence indicated that the Pilot Project did not have a
negative effect on crop farming, as the majority of labourers ploughed their fields
during the 1980/81 ploughing season.
In relation to expenditure most of the workers’ money was spent on food and clothes.
80% of the workers ploughed their fields during the 1980/81 ploughing season
indicating that some of the workers spent part of their money on ploughing. A few
workers hired or borrowed oxen.  Thus earnings from the project were stimulating
other income generating activities by the communities.
73 Alexander,1982
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Economic benefits of the expanded programme
The Labour Economist74 examined the economic benefits resulting from the
upgrading of the 1 365 km of the major non-gazetted tracks in the Central District.
The examination was in relation to the two types of selected betterment described (i.e.
Stage One, and Stage One and Stage Two combined) and it culminated in a number
of conclusions of which the major ones will follow.
The proposed programme would provide additional employment opportunities in the
rural areas. During construction, Stage One improvement would result in about 2100
man-years of unskilled labour and 100 man-years each of Assistant Gang Leaders and
Gang Leaders. In addition, the programme would require Technical Assistants, office
staff, Storekeepers and equipment maintenance personnel. The labour required for
maintenance after betterment would be about 0.2 man-years per year per average
running kilometre. On completion of the programme at least 270 maintenance
personnel would be employed. Stage One and Stage Two upgrading would result in
65% more employment created.
Unskilled labour cost would be about 70% and the total labour cost would be 78% of
the betterment cost (including tools and equipment but not office overheads and
senior supervision). The labour component of maintenance would be about 85%.
Therefore a substantial component of programme costs would remain in the rural
communities.
The programme would impart skills to members of the communities through training.
The improved roads would improve the availability of essential facilities to the rural
population and their access to larger villages and towns.
74 Vaidya, op.cit
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For a typical kilometre, if the average daily traffic (ADT) was 10 before track
upgrading, the total road-use benefits in the year after the upgrading were estimated
to be P236 for Stage One upgrading and P318 for Stage One and Stage Two
upgrading. Benefits had been assumed to grow at 5% per year in line with the
forecast growth in traffic of 5% per year.
Benefits of improved access to facilities were not estimated separately and were
instead captured in the estimated users’ cost savings. The benefits and distribution
effects of the programme were considered in the cost-benefit analysis.
Economic cost-benefit analysis
A cost-benefit analysis75 was carried out for the proposed upgrading of the 1 365
kilometres of non-gazetted tracks in the Central District. The evaluation was carried
out in relation to the two types of upgrading i.e. Stage One upgrading only and Stage
One and Stage Two upgrading. The evaluation was based on three assumptions about
policy objectives:
i) In the financial costs evaluation the estimated benefits were compared with the
actual financial costs of construction and maintenance
ii) In the economic costs evaluation, unskilled labour was shadow-priced at P1-50
per day
iii) In the economic costs and weighted benefits evaluation unskilled labour was
shadow-priced as in ii) above and road-user benefits to the rural poor were
weighted 2.5 times the nominal value.
At ADT = 10, Stage One improvement showed an adequate financial return (IRR =
8%), healthy economic return and a high return (IRR = 22%) with weighted benefits.
75 Ibid., 20
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With weighted benefits, an adequate return was obtained at ADT below 5% (i.e. IRR
= 9% at ADT = 4.9% and IRR = 6% at ADT = 4.4%).
At ADT = 10, Stage One and Two upgrading had a poor financial return (IRR = 1%)
and a barely adequate economic return (IRR = 6.4%) but a healthy return (IRR =
17%) with weighted benefits. With weighted benefits, an adequate return is obtained
at an ADT of 6 or less. The above evaluation showed a high sensitivity of benefits to
average daily traffic.
A further analysis was carried out for the proposed expanded programme and
although the returns were lower due to the larger geographical spread of the
programme the economic return and the distributional benefits made the programme
highly attractive for Botswana.
The high sensitivity of benefits to the average daily traffic was once again noticed for
weighted benefits and economic costs. A 5% higher ADT accounted for a 50%
increase in economic return.
Direct Benefits and Traffic Surveys
Direct benefits: The Pilot Project employed 631 different casual labourers between
July 1980 and May 1982. The average number of days worked was 79 translating to
an average wage of P 166 for casual labourers. Excluding those who worked less than
a month, 519 labourers remained, at an average of 94 days each and an average wage
of P197. Both wages were greater than the annual average rural income in Botswana
then.
Traffic Surveys: Traffic surveys were carried out near Mogorosi village before the
start of formation construction and again well after the completion of construction on
that section of the road.
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While the increase in the number of vehicles was significant the increase in the
number of trucks was dramatic (over 250%). Prior to construction only one truck
operated three times a week between Serowe and Moijabana. After construction the
same truck operated six times a week while at least three other trucks had begun to
ferry goods and people along the same route.
3.4.5. Investment in complementary rural infrastructure and linkages with other rural
development projects
For the benefits from investment in rural roads to be fully realised, there must be
adequate levels of investment in rural infrastructure as well as productive activities.
The Rural Development Consultant76 considered adequacy in terms of:
· The extent to which facilities existed
· The extent to which the then National Development Plan (NDP) would
address the shortfalls in infrastructure
· The extent to which rural infrastructure was prioritized in the current
development plans
The policy for rural development in Botswana had been in existence since its second
Development Plan (1970-75) and had since strengthened with the subsequent editions
of the Development Plan. Rural development and employment creation were major
themes of the then National Development Plan (NDP 5) between the period 1979 and
1985. NDP 5 had a number of continuing programmes for rural development
including the following:
· Rural Social Infrastructure (schools, health posts, water supplies, roads
etc)
76 Mould, 1981
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· Tribal Grazing Land Programme
· Arable Lands Development Programme
· Communal Area Development Programme
· Remote Areas Development Programme
· District Levels Planning
· Drought Relief Programme
The National Development Plan 5 made adequate provision for rural infrastructure
and strengthening of the operational and implementation capabilities of the District
Councils through training and enhanced manpower allocations. 75-80% of the rural
population was within 15 km of a health post indicating improved access to primary
health care facilities despite the existence of room for improvement in the quality of
service. Under NDP 5, primary school facilities and teaching staff were provided at a
reasonable rate to overcome the backlog in both resources. Rural access to piped
water had risen to 35-40% from 5% in 1974. The rate at which new supplies were
installed was to be maintained under NDP 5 and the capacity of District Councils to
operate and maintain village supplies was to be improved.
Generally there had been adequate investment in rural infrastructure and future plans
for both infrastructure and stimulation of productive activities was reasonable and in
harmony with the objectives of national development planning.
The upgrading and maintenance of rural roads using labour intensive methods would
go a long way to achieve the objectives of employment creation and rural
development as stated in national development planning. However the Rural
Development Consultant identified a number of problems in relation to the
integration of roads and other development projects.
There was the problem of District Councils lacking a simplified procedure for
selecting and ranking tracks for betterment. The feasibility study method was
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considered to be inappropriate and too costly for rural roads construction. It was
recommended that a long-term programme for track betterment should be prepared in
each District. The programmes would then be submitted to the Works Department
Committee and District Development Committees well ahead of construction for use
in drafting five-year rolling plans and annual plans in a way that would maximize
integration with other development programmes.
The suitability of the District Councils for the expanded use of labour intensive
methods to upgrade the non-gazetted tracks provoked some scepticism. After an
assessment of their performance in general and in relation to non-gazetted roads it
was concluded that they were the appropriate agencies to exercise responsibility for
the non-gazetted network. It was observed that the nature and scale of the proposed
undertaking would have serious organisational implications for the Ministry of Local
Government and Lands.
3.5. REPLICATION
One of the major objectives of the Pilot Project was to develop methods that would
later be turned over to all the districts for replication when the District Council Roads
Units had been formed.
After the project, it was considered that the proposed methods and organisational
structures were suitable for replication by the Central District Council on condition
that caution was exercised during execution. A basic template had been established
for the Central District, which might require modification for other districts because
of different conditions.
While there were many positive indicators for the potential of labour intensive
methods the following issues required attention before and during the expanded
programme:
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· The wage rate
· The labour legislation governing the wage rate, conditions of service and
payment method on both construction and maintenance
· Continued improvement of design standards, methods of work, organisation and
management procedures
· The maintenance of strict control and discipline throughout
· Adequate forward planning of work including budget, labour supply, route
selection and liaison
· Regular supply of adequate tools and equipment
· Regular provision of well trained, adequate quality personnel at all levels in the
management structure
· A public relations exercise at national, district and village levels to inform
people about the nature of the programme, the standard of upgrading required,
the methods of construction to be adopted and the eligibility of women for
employment
· The rate of expansion of the programme
It was observed that concentrated attention to the above issues would be required for
the successful creation of the District Council Road Units and the Technical
Assistance should assist in resolving the issues. A slow build-up of the programme
would allow the managerial and administrative infrastructure to grow with the
programme leading to a more self-sustaining programme. Less technical assistance
would be required for the programme in the long run. The creation of the DCRUs was
optimistic given the positive indicators identified during the Pilot Project and the
positive attitude of key officials towards the project and provided the
recommendations made would be heeded.
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3.6. CONCLUSIONS
· The Pilot Project demonstrated that labour intensive methods could be
successfully carried out in Botswana despite its sparsely distributed
population.
· At a wage rate significantly lower than the minimum wage in the public
sector, there was an adequate supply of a reliable and productive labour for
the development of a highly labour intensive programme of work.
· It was possible to develop a standard of work which was low cost, technically
sound, maintainable and strong enough to allow all-weather passage of two-
wheel drive vehicles.
· The project had demonstrated that the most suitable site organisation was
based upon gangs of up to twenty-five labourers under the strict control of a
trained Gang Leader.
· The haulage of road construction materials could be economically carried
through a system based on the use of donkey-carts.
· It was possible to develop a site-based training system for Gang Leaders.
Initial training for these staff took place on the Pilot Project site.
· For small scale and isolated operations as much attention had to be paid to
character as to technical competence in the training of supervisors.
· The best supply and control of tools was based on a toolbox kept at each site
under the care of the Gang Leader and transported from one site to another by
donkey-cart.
· If the various recommendations were implemented then the methods and
organisational structures developed during the Pilot Project would be
replicable by the Central District Council.
In sum, after experimentation with the various key issues as outlined by the
Terms of Reference, the Pilot Project revealed that labour intensive methods
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
80
could be applied in Botswana provided adequate attention was paid to certain
crucial issues which could otherwise jeopardize the application of these methods.
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4. THE EXPANDED PHASE (LG 34)
4.1. General
In 1982, following the evaluation of the Pilot Project, the Ministry of Local
Government and Lands decided that over the next 5 years the methods developed
during the project should be replicated throughout the country.77
The expanded programme started in earnest in March 1983 upon the arrival of the
ILO Training Advisor who was based at the RTC in Gaborone.78 While attempts were
made to expand the programme as rapidly as possible it was ensured that expansion
was a function of the build up of fully trained personnel. By 1987 DCRUs had been
established and operational in all the nine Districts of Botswana.
4.2. Objectives of the programme
The objectives of the LG 34 were in line with the major themes of Botswana’s 5th and
6th National Development Plans (1976-1985): employment creation and rural
development. The objectives included the following:
· Employment creation for the rural poor
· Use of labour intensive methods to build good quality low cost roads
· To create employment opportunities for women
· To establish District Council Road Units
77 McCutcheon,1985:3
78 Ibid.,5
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4.3. Construction
4.3.1. Overall Organisational Structure
The organisational structure adopted for the expanded programme was such as
required to control activities which were small scale and dispersed yet fully integrated
into the existing local and national government structures.
The programme was institutionally located within the Ministry of Local Government
and Lands at national level. The Permanent Secretary for Rural Affairs was
responsible for the overall monitoring of the programme and reporting to the
Minister. He reported on progress, impact and sustainability of the programme. The
District Roads Engineer carried out planning and coordination of the programme at
national level. At the local level, the Council Secretary was in charge of the
programme and was the contact point between the programme and the District Roads
Engineer and other external officials. He managed the programme through the
District Engineer and Technical Officers. The District Engineer and Technical
Officers planned and technically administered the programme at the local level.
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Figure 4.1: Organogramme of the LG 34
4.3.2. Gang: labourers, Gang Leader and Senior Gang Leader
The work of a gang of 25 labourers was strictly controlled by a trained Gang Leader.
The labourers were recruited locally and employed on a casual basis. Before work
started in an area liaison was established between the programme and the village
Kgotlas and Village Development Committees. Emphasis was made on the eligibility
of women for employment.
The starting time for work varied from 5.30 AM in mid-summer to 8.00 AM in mid-
winter. Work was either on a task or daily rate basis, with the latter applied to
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activities for which it was difficult to set a task and the length of the working day was
8 hours. For task based activities workers could go home on completion of a task and
the length of a working day for task based activities was about 6 hours. Preference
was given to task based work because of its significantly higher productivity.
Workers were required to complete a full day’s work in order to be eligible for
payment. Absence without leave for three consecutive days was taken as resignation.
Workers were free to take as much time off as they needed to attend to their own
affairs (particularly agriculture) provided they informed the Gang Leaders.
It was not found necessary to provide transport for casual labourers who were
prepared to walk up to 10 km from their homes and still be on time for work. Where
workers occasionally formed spontaneous camps around the work sites arrangements
were made to provide water to these camps.
A Gang Leader performed the following duties:
· Choice of final alignment
· Setting out of work
· Recording the daily muster roll
· Daily issue and receipt of tools
· Control of the work
· Reporting on the work carried out every day
The Gang Leaders did not have the authority to recruit or dismiss workers. In relation
to these matters the Gang Leaders could only make a recommendation to the TA.
Gang Leaders were assisted by Assistant Gang Leaders who were selected from
amongst workers who had demonstrated reliability and ability to work. They
demonstrated working methods to new workers. Gang Leaders did not have to start
with completely inexperienced workers at each village. In the absence of a Gang
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Leader, Assistant Gang Leaders marked the muster roll, daily tool record and
oversaw bush clearing. Liaison was made with the Headmen through, which free
accommodation was obtained for Assistant Gang Leaders at every village.
In 1984, a scheme of service and career structure was submitted to the Department of
Unified Local Government Service (UGLS) for approval. Two grades of Gang
Leader were proposed for the Industrial Class categories Group II and Group I.
Ordinary Gang Leaders would be in Group II while Senior Gang Leaders would be in
Group I.
Part of the reason for the introduction of Senior Gang Leaders was the increase in the
amount of construction along those routes where complete construction took place. It
was considered that ordinary Gang Leaders would be replaced by casual Assistant
Gang Leaders along routes where many gangs would be working close to one
another. Up to four Assistant Gang Leaders would be controlled by a Senior Gang
Leader living on site.
Along those routes where selected betterment was predominant and gangs were
relatively isolated the grade of Gang Leader would depend upon the competence of
the Gang Leader and the nature of the work.
The above trend led to a greater number of casual labourers being employed for each
Permanent and Pensionable or Industrial Class post and a reduction in overhead costs.
These internal developments along long lengths of construction resulted in ratios that
were similar to those in the KRARP (labourers: Senior Gang Leaders: TA = 300:4:1).
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4.3.3. Sub-unit
The TA was formally responsible for the work of four to six Gang Leaders. Where
Senior Gang Leaders were concerned the TA was responsible for the control of two
to six of them. Thus the TA was formally responsible for the work of 100-50
labourers. The minimum academic qualifications for a TA were a Junior Certificate
and the successful completion of the two-year supervisor’s course at the RTC. The
duties of a TA were as follows:
· To prepare detailed annual plans for the routes for which he/she had been
given responsibility.
· To liaise with community structures concerning the LG 34 programme, in
particular stressing the labour intensive nature of the work, the alignment, the
standard of construction and the eligibility of women for employment
· Recruitment of labour
· To prepare the weekly plan for each Gang Leader and issue the record forms
· To issue tools to new work sites and collect them when work had been
completed
· To control the muster roll and ensure that the daily reports were compiled
· To ensure that the plans for the next day were ready and collect the completed
weekly reports
· To check if work was being done correctly
· To uphold safety standards
· To collect broken tools and issue replacements
· To solve disciplinary issues between the casual labourers and Gang Leaders
and report (to the TO) those between himself/herself and the Gang Leaders.
· To prepare the monthly progress reports
· To supervise preparation and payment of wages during the absence of the TO
· To supervise the maintenance personnel
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The prime responsibility of TA was the construction of technically sound roads.
He/she was expected to spend at least three days of each week on site actively
engaged in detailed technical and organisational support and supervisory work.
4.3.4. District Council Road Unit (DCRU)
The TA of a sub-unit was directly responsible to a Technical Officer (TO) (Roads)
who was in-charge of a DCRU. In addition to the construction sub-units and
maintenance operations the DCRU housed a section devoted to the payment of casual
labour wages and running a central store for the District. The STO was responsible
for the work of at least two TAs and thus for the work of at least 300 casual labourers.
The Senior Technical Officer (STO) had the following duties:
· Preparation, in each January, of the detailed annual plan for the DCRU. The
plans contained information regarding the routes to be constructed, the
amount of construction required along each route, the required number of
labourers and industrial class employees, tools, equipment and vehicle
requirements.
· Initial surveying of new routes with respect to alignment and selected
betterment: centrelines of routes were marked out at least six months ahead of
construction to allow time for any objections to be voiced
· Close supervision of the activities of the TAs and the monitoring of
production
·  Liaison between the DCRU and other sections of the Works Department
particularly the Accounts and Vehicle Maintenance Departments
· Supervision of the activities of the Store keeper, in particular the procurement
of new tools and equipment
· Supervision of the office administration for the DCRU- in particular the
preparation for and payment of casual labourers
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· Liaison with the head of the Works Department (District Engineer/ CTO), in
particular:
a) Assisting in the preparation of the rolling year programme
b) Preparation of regular (monthly) reports on progress and other reports
requested by the head of the Works Department
· Settling disciplinary disputes between Gang Leaders and supervisors and
reporting other disciplinary issues to the head of the Works Department
· Close supervision of the maintenance supervisors in the district
· Checking the monthly sub-unit reports and compilation of the DCRU report
for submission to the CTO.
· Monitoring the progress of the unit by plotting the progress of the work days,
production and expenditure against the annual plan
4.3.5. Head of the Council Works Department (District Engineer/ CTO)
The head of the Works Department reported to the Council Secretary for the
operations of a DCRU. The CTOs were the main points of formal contact between the
LG 34 programme and other Council officials and informal contact between the
programme and officials from various Ministries and donor agencies. They were the
source of information regarding the labour intensive nature of the work and the
standard of construction required by the programme. Thus CTOs were expected to be
fully conversant with the aims and objectives of the programme in order to perform
their official duties.
The CTOs prepared the monthly progress reports and presented them to the Council
Secretary for the attention of the District Roads Engineer (DRE). They also
monitored the flow of funds as shown on the monthly progress reports. The flow of
funds from the Ministry was supposed to be regular amounts at regular intervals. By
knowing the budget and monitoring expenditure the CTO would be able to judge
whether or not additional funds would be requested before the due date.
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Each year in February, the CTO prepared Project Memos based on the annual plan
completed in January by the STO (Roads). The project Memos were sent to the
MLGL. In September each year, the CTO prepared an estimate of recurrent
expenditure for the following financial year.
The CTO was also engaged on the preparation of the rolling five-year plans. Council
members proposed motions of the roads to be constructed and if the motions were
approved at a full Council meeting they were forwarded to the Works Committee.
The CTO, assisted by the STO (Roads), prepared a priority list of the roads, using
established selection criteria.
The priority list was then submitted to the DRE, who in consultation with the CTO
(works) and the STO (Roads) and using information from traffic surveys made the
final decision on the list. These three senior officers then came up with District roads
inventories and the five-year rolling plans including indicative forward plans for the
following financial year. The STO (Roads) then carried out the detailed plans
required for each route and presented them for discussion at the annual
DRE/DCRU/RTC programme meeting.
At regular intervals the rolling five-year plan was submitted to full Council for
approval. Any significant variations to the plan were subject to approval by a full
Council.
4.3.6. The District Roads Engineer (DRE)
The DRE was located within the MLGL and responsible to the Under Secretary
(Rural) for the LG 34 programme. As the District Councils were largely autonomous
from the Ministry, there was no direct link between the DRE and any of the Council
officers. Thus the DRE could instruct neither the CTO nor the STO (Roads). The
DRE could only advise the Council Secretaries through a savingram from the
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Permanent Secretary (MLGL). However within the Ministry, the DRE had some
direct influence on events and thus influenced that portion of funding which the
Councils received from the MLGL.
However, in practice, through good personal relations the DRE related more directly
to the DCRUs and impacted on their activities. The duties of the DRE in relation to
the LG 34 programme were as follows:
· To compile project memoranda from the Districts into a national project
memorandum and steer it through the correct channels to ensure that sufficient
funding was available for the following year’s work
· To arrange for the regular disbursement of funds to the districts: in principle a
quarter of the budget was dispatched to the districts every three months
· To monitor progress on the programme through the monthly reports received
from the Council Secretaries
· To compile a monthly summary of progress and a quarterly report
· To advise (through the Permanent Secretary, MLGL) the Council Secretaries
regarding the LG 34 programme
· To ensure that the six-monthly expenditure report was sent through the correct
channels to the MFDP
· To provide a rolling five-year  forward plan for the LG 34 programme
· Field visits to check progress on the ground
· Liaison with the training programme and the UGLS regarding establishment
of posts, promotions etc.
· Liaison with other relevant ministries, MFDP, MWC and MHA.
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4.3.7. Types and standards of roads constructed
Earth roads
An important part of the mandate of the Pilot Project was to explore low-cost, good
quality road construction and selected betterment to keep costs as low as possible.
The Pilot Project thus developed a low-cost and good quality road which was
economically justifiable in view of the expected traffic volumes. The width and cross
section of the road adopted were almost similar to those used in the highly successful
KRARP. See the figure below. The project estimated that 20% of the route would
require Stage One upgrading using a 4.5m carriageway. If the traffic volumes
warranted, then a further 20% of the route would require Stage Two upgrading using
a 4.5 m carriageway.
Figure 4.2: Road Section (Pilot Project)
However there were complaints regarding the standard of construction particularly
concerning the width of the road and steepness of the side drains. They stemmed from
the fundamental misunderstanding of the low cost minimum standard required by the
Government and the fact that the low traffic volumes could not justify greater
expenditure. The low standard was instead attributed to the use of “backward” labour
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intensive methods and led to frequent requests for graders. In discussions it was
argued that graders were modern, quicker and cheaper and produced a better quality
product than labour intensive methods.
It began to appear that the future of labour intensive work in Botswana would be
jeopardized by the false allegations against the use of labour intensive methods.
Again the routes were of a more secondary nature than the “access to farm” type in
the KRARP. In addition, the status of those using the roads was higher than those
using the KRARP roads and sufficient for their complaints to influence those in such
decision making bodies as the parliament.
It was thus decided that the width of the carriageway should be 5.5 m throughout and
the slope of the side drains was reduced. See the figure below. The introduction of the
new cross section increased by nearly 10%, the cost of selected betterment Stages
One and Two. It was considered that the additional cost of constructing 5.5 m as
opposed to 4.5 m carriageway should be borne in the interest of continuing a labour
intensive programme in Botswana. The new cross section was introduced at the
beginning of 1983.
Figure 4.3: Road section (expanded LG 34)
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Technical standards were also improved and back sloping was introduced throughout.
A new method of setting out was introduced, which used profile boards in such a way
that the longitudinal profile had been improved as had the side and off-road drainage.
As a result of these changes there was a subsequent reduction in publicly expressed
dissatisfaction as well an improvement in morale amongst the Gang Leaders and
labourers. The use of profile boards for setting out gave the programme a more
professional appeal and silenced the critics to a large extent.
Neither the increase in width nor the increase in technical standards decreased the
proportion of expenditure devoted to the employment of casual labourer.
Western Botswana
As the programme expanded into some parts of western Botswana it was evident that
not all the methods and standards developed during the Pilot Project and applied in
most parts of eastern Botswana could be applied in this part of the country. Western
Botswana is characterised by such conditions as the presence of heavy Kalahari sand,
shortage of water and construction material and sparsely populated settlements, which
are far apart.
In the light of these difficult conditions a system of bush clearing and track upgrading
was developed, which was still highly labour intensive. On the other hand further
exploratory work was continued and other types of upgrading were introduced.
Spoor graded tracks: As mentioned above, large parts of Botswana are sparsely
populated with vast distances between small settlements. Normal earth roads would
be too costly and slow to construct. Spoor graded tracks were constructed to provide
access to such areas. These were cheap and fast to construct and could sustain a few
vehicles a day while providing an acceptable ride quality.
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Spoor graded tracks are two graded wheel tracks along a bush-cleared corridor. A
Spoor Grader consists of a number of short blades mounted on a heavy steel frame.
Figure 4.4:Section through a spoor graded track
Gravel surfacing: Gravel surfacing was applied where the road was constructed on
soils of a poor quality. Calcrete was used as the surfacing material and applied over
the whole width of the carriage way in layers of 10-15 cm
Calcrete McAdam roads: This type of road was constructed in areas covered with
heavy Kalahari sand. The top layer of loose sand was removed and a road foundation
was constructed from hand-packed calcrete boulders. The foundation was then topped
with a mixture of sand and calcrete as surfacing. The road was strong and provided a
good riding quality but was expensive to build.
Figure 4.5: Section through a calctete McAdam road
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4.3.8. Construction output and productivity
Construction output
As the programme progressed the length of road constructed per annum increased
every year until the fiscal year 1994/95 when it dropped to 150 km of earth road. The
highest annual output was 207 km in 1991/92.
Table 4.1 Length of road constructed per year
Year 80/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 Total
Km 39 55 89 76 142 140 176 159 177 207 206 205 150 1821
According to Table 4.1 above, the length of earth road construction per year increased
every year until 1992. Then it started to drop due to difficulties for the programme to
attract and retain labour as a result of the low wage paid.79 During the fiscal year
1994/95 there were indications that the labour turnover was higher, again pointing to
an inability to retain labour. At sites visited by a Technical Review Mission team in
1995 there were no full construction teams.
However, by July 1995 the programme had constructed about 1 819 km of earth road.
As for the Districts of Ghanzi and Kgalagadi 1000 km of track improvement and
spoor grading had been done by the fiscal year 1992/93.
79 Brudefors et.al,1995
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Productivity
An important indicator of productivity is the work input in worker days per km or the
cost per km.
Table 4.2 Work input per year (worker days)
Year 80/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95
Worker-
Days
1900 1200 1700 3200 2550 2200 2000 2250 2000 1750 1900 2000 2150
According to Table 4.2 above, the work input per kilometer in terms of worker days
was an average of 2000 wd/km during the period from 1980 to 1995. This was
accepted to be an efficient utilization of labour.
Table 4.3 Cost/km per year (P/km)
Year 84/85 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 94/95
Cost/km/yr 9 260 12 831 16 172 15 442 15 187.5 18 382.4 20 000
As shown in Table 4.3 above, the cost of constructing a kilometre of earth road was
within P 20 000 from 1984 to 1995. This was a bargain from the perspective of the
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (1997).
4.3.9. Source and structure of programme finance and expenditure
During the expanded programme, NORAD funded the construction activities,
purchase of equipment, training and technical assistance. Maintenance of the roads
constructed under the programme was funded through domestic recurrent expenditure
under vote D-36. This vote also covered the cost of replacement of tools and
equipment purchased by the LG 34 funds.
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Table 4.4 Budget and expenditure for construction
Year Budget (Pmillion) Expenditure(Pmillion)
80-82 ( Pilot phase) - 2.5
82-85 - 1.7
88/89 3.2 2.8
89/90 3.4 3.3
90/91 4.1 3.3
91/92 5.1 -
92/93 5.6 4.9
93/94 5.6 5.4
94/95 5.8 3.7
Source (MLGL, 1980-1995)
Table 4.5 Budget and expenditure for maintenance
Year Budget (Pmillion) Expenditure(Pmillion)
86/87 - -
87/88 0.4 -
88/89 1.0 0.9
89/90 1.2 1.2
90/91 1.5 1.7
91/92 1.8 1.8
92/93 2.0 2.1
93/94 2.4 -
94/95 2.8 1.5
Source (MLGL, 1980-1995)
From the two tables above, it is evident that for both construction and maintenance,
expenditure increased every year until 1995 when the programme began to
experience problems with the recruitment and retention of labourers.
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4.4. Maintenance
4.4.1. General
Maintenance was the responsibility of the DCRU within the District Council Works
Department. Explorations were made to identify the most effective maintenance
system and organisation.
4.4.2. Background
The World Bank (1981) reported that the estimated economic returns for a proposed
road maintenance project are higher than the estimated cost for a proposed road
construction project.80 It reported again that a maintenance programme requires a
considerable amount of time to establish. All the maintenance development projects
that the bank was involved in took more than 10 years to establish and none of them
was foreseen that it would take more than 10 years. Thus maintenance is an important
part of an infrastructure development programme and must be treated as such.
For the LG 34 the maintenance methods employed by the KRARP were considered.
On the Kenyan programme maintenance workers were contracted to keep a particular
stretch of road in order, about 1.7 km per worker in 1980. Workers were paid the
equivalent of twelve working days if the maintenance work was adequate. Given the
close proximity of construction and maintenance works in the LG 34, maintenance
workers were hired just like construction workers; hired by the day and paid by the
month.
Upon the arrival of the first rainy season it was evident that emergency maintenance
needed to be incorporated into the maintenance system. It was decided to employ 1
80 IBRD, 1986
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person per kilometre full time. This was in excess of the maintenance work
requirement on the Kenya programme but it just had to be done that way in the light
of recent public outcry about the quality of the roads.
It was certain from the beginning that maintenance would require a different
organisation from construction. Thus there was a need to define a maintenance
organisation and as the programme went on and the physical gap between the
construction and maintenance activities widened, this need became even more
compelling.
The following is a summary of the maintenance systems explored. The exploration to
define maintenance methods overlapped both the pilot and the expanded phases of the
programme and the first method, length men system, was entirely tried during the
Pilot Project.
4.4.3. The length men system
Under this method maintenance operations commenced immediately upon the
completion of formation construction and prior to surfacing. A length of road was
allocated to maintenance workers chosen from amongst workers who had proven to
be reliable, technically competent and hard working. The length of road allocated to
workers depended upon such conditions as terrain, soil type, traffic density, number
of drifts and thickness of bush. At one end of the scale 1 person was responsible for 1
km of completely constructed road while at the other end 1 person was responsible
for 10 km of track along which only bush clearing was required.
Maintenance personnel were required to develop an awareness of the need to
maintain each section in good shape and develop pride in their work. The following
comprised the maintenance activities for completely constructed roads:
· Filling in potholes and depressions
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· Maintenance of camber by reshaping the carriageway
· Drainage maintenance: removal of debris from drains and replacement of
stones washed away from the drainage drifts
· Grass cutting and bush clearing
· Erosion prevention
· Road sign maintenance
· Emergency maintenance works: repairs after heavy rains whether or not the
rains occurred after hours or during weekends or holidays.
Along sections where formation had not been constructed maintenance activities
involved the following:
· Bush clearing
· Maintenance of a smooth running surface
· Works to avoid water logging in the roadway
Maintenance workers were equipped with the necessary tools. For constructed
sections a set of maintenance tools comprised a wheel barrow, a spade, a mattock, a
grass slasher, a hand rammer, a pick-eyed axe and a water bag.
During the expanded programme it was acknowledged that the level of routine
maintenance was not adequate due to a number of factors:
· Maintenance had not been given adequate attention on the Pilot Project
· Lack of supervisory personnel for maintenance
· Maintenance workers lacked an understanding of what was required of them
and did not work hard
· Botswana’s climate meant that for at least six months of the year there was
very little to do except replace the material pushed away from the centre of
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the road. On the other hand, for the remainder of the year, there were frequent
occasions where there was too much work to be adequately carried out by one
person
4.4.4. Roving Gang Leaders
A section of road was divided into three maintenance zones, each under the
responsibility of a Maintenance Gang Leader, who was in turn responsible to a TA.
The Maintenance Gang Leaders were stationed at a village along their respective
maintenance routes. Two huts were secured for each Gang Leader, one at each end of
the maintenance route.
The Gang Leader took daily site visits to oversee the work of maintenance labourers
who were distributed such that each was assigned 1 km of constructed road. This
system collapsed in 1984 due to lack of senior supervisors to control the Maintenance
Gang Leaders.
4.4.5. Complementary organisation of routine maintenance
This system was based upon small teams of maintenance personnel working under
the daily supervision of a Gang Leader. The Gang Leader was required to have a
good understanding of construction and maintenance and the ability to work
unsupervised. The Gang Leader recruited workers from each village along the route.
The workers were recruited from among previous construction labourers. Each
village was allocated a section of road.
The Gang Leader carried out routine and periodic maintenance work along the road.
Improvement work was carried out according to annual plans and the instructions of
senior personnel. Emergency maintenance was also carried out. The Gang Leader
could order work, but senior personnel were available for advice on the scope of
emergency work.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
102
4.4.6. Tools and equipment
These were issued to the Gang Leader for each road and were stored in a secure hut in
each village under the care of a village Headman. Maintenance tools included
wheelbarrows, spades, picks shovels, mattocks, axes, slashers and rakes.
4.4.7. Frequency of maintenance
The frequency of maintenance was typically determined as follows:
· 1 labourer was required to maintain 3 km of road per year
· Mandays = 1/3 x 200 per km » 67 m-d/ km/yr
· For a 15 km section: 15 x 67m-d/yr » 1000 (1005) man-days
· For a team of 10 labourers = 1000/10 = 100 days work on each section
Short periods of work were more frequent and provided more frequent pay packets
for the work force. Longer periods saved the time lost in moving site but provided
less frequent pay packets. Thus a balance had to be struck between the two extremes
of length of working time in determining the frequency of maintenance works.
4.4.8. Amount and cost of maintenance required
The amount of maintenance work required was estimated at one person per 3 km. The
maintenance system comprised routine maintenance incorporating a periodic
maintenance component (resurfacing), keeping the road at a high standard. It was
assumed that maintenance would take about 4% of the number of days required for
construction. The number of days required for the construction of earth roads was
2250 per km. Then 4% would amount to 90 days/km/yr. Assuming half of this for
periodic maintenance (33 days), then routine and periodic work would total 100
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days/km/yr. Including tools (P75) and overheads (P125), 100 days/km/yr would result
in a maintenance cost of P 5000/km/yr.
From the above review it can be seen that maintenance operations during the
expanded programme were not carried out on the basis of entirely one method. It was
either the length men system or the system of labour gangs under a Gang Leader or a
combination of the two.
4.5. Employment
One objective of the programme was to generate employment opportunities for the
rural poor. Three categories of staff were employed during the programme. These
comprised the Permanent and pensionable staff recruited and employed by the UGLS
of the MLGL. The UGLS was responsible for the establishment of posts, promotions
and transfers concerning this category of staff.
There was the category of industrial class employees, who were managed by the
District Councils. These staff included Gang Leaders, Drivers, Pay clerks and Store
keepers.
The last category was casual labourers, who were employed on a short term basis and
were paid daily. Casual labourers constituted the bulk of the work force and the
following analysis of employment mainly focuses on the casual labour content.
As the programme expanded country-wide the labour force increased progressively
and so did the percentage of women casual labourers. This can be seen in Tables (4.6
and 4.7) below.
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Table 4.6 Employment for casual labour
Year 81/82 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 92/93 94/95
Labourers 235 250 750 1445 1818 2118 2980 2810 3200 3646 2730
Table 4.7 Proportion of women labourers
Year 81-82 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 92/93 94/95
%
Women 8 22 22 27 28 37 40 43.3 40
Table 4.8 Employment in July 1994/95
Construction Maintenance Total %  LG 34
Worker days 380 000 340 000 720 000
Labourers 1440 1290 2 730 1.3
Rural employment
83 400 3.3
Local Government
employment 15 221 18
Rural Local
Government
employment
10045 27
Table 4.9 Comparison of LG 34 with national economy(1995)
National economy Employment:
234 500 GDP (Pm): 11 444.5 GDP/EMP: 48 803.8 100 %
LG 34 Employment:
2 730 LG 34 Exp (Pm): 3.4 (LG 34 exp)/EMP: 1245
(1245/48 803)
2.6 %
According to Tables (4.8 and 4.9) above, the LG 34 contributed a significant
proportion (27%) to rural local government employment in July 1995. A comparison
with the national economy for the same period reveals that a unit of expenditure on
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the LG 34 generated more employment opportunities than a unit of expenditure on
the national economy.
Table 4.10 Employment for Industrial Class workers (1990/91)
Number
Staff Construction Maintenance
Senior Gang Leader 16 -
Gang Leader 81 -
Maintenance Team Leader - 23
Table 4.11 UGLS employees
1990/91 1995
Staff Posts Vacancies Posts Vacancies
RE 1 0 3 -
CTO (Roads) 0 - 5 -
STO( Roads) 7 4 10 -
TO(Roads) 13 7 21 -
STA(Roads) 12 6 19 -
TA(Roads) 15 0 20 -
Table 4.10 above shows that a Senior Gang Leader was in charge of at least three
Gang Leaders. According to Table 4.11, the number of permanent staff positions on
the programme increased as the programme progressed.
4.6. Wages
As the programme progressed and expanded country-wide the wage rate for casual
labourers waned in proportion to the Industrial Class minimum wage in the public
sector. The context within which this came about will be briefly discussed below.
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After a thorough analysis of prevailing wages in the public and private sectors and
due consideration of the nature of labour intensive work, the wage rate was, with the
approval of Government, pitched at P2.10 in May 1980.81 It amounted to 75% of the
Public Sector minimum wage.
However, the project ‘architects’ had made a big mistake. They forgot to have the
wage pegged to the minimum wage in the public sector from the onset. When they
later tried to save the situation, it was too late. The government did not entertain any
notion of the wage being raised. They preferred to keep it as stable as possible while
other wages progressively went up. Government only allowed slight increases to the
wage, which were only made after they were long overdue. This situation made the
wage level so stagnant that at times it was barely on par with wages paid to workers
on the Drought Relief Programme.
Thus, while wages in the public and private sectors continued to rise, the LG 34 wage
was almost stationary and dropped, in proportion to the Public Sector minimum, from
75% in 1980 to about 40% in 1995.The programme began to lose workers to the
Drought Relief Programme and recorded a decline in the annual road construction
outputs and expenditure.
Table 4.12 Wage rate history
Wage/Year 1980a 1980b 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 93 94 95
LG 34
Wage(P) 2.10 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 3.00 3.6 3.96 4.24 4.66 5.17 5.79 5.79 5.79 6.30
Min A3 (P) 2.80 4.1 4.42 4.77 5.25 5.57 6.68 7.35 7.86 8.65 9.6 10.76 14.61 15.78 16.57
LG34/A3
(%) 75.0 51.2 47.5 44.0 47.6 53.9 53.9 53.9 53.9 53.9 53.8 53.8 39.6 36.7 38.0
A3: Public sector minimum wage
81 Vaidya, 1983
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The above Table shows that, over time, the wage rate for the LG 34 fell in proportion
to the public sector minimum wage as the two had not been pegged from the onset.
4.7. Management Reporting Systems
The LG 34 established a proper monitoring and reporting system to provide reliable
information for planning and cost control. The system was functional in all the
DCRUs.
The Gang Leaders compiled daily and weekly reports for their respective sites and
submitted them to the Technical Assistants, who compiled the reports for all the sites.
The Technical Officer (DCRU head) then compiled the monthly reports for
submission to the MLGL, where they were compiled and filed on computer.
The above reports were used in the compilation of monthly reports on construction
and maintenance expenditures, construction and maintenance output in terms of
lengths of road constructed and maintained. Labour input and cost were also reported
on.
The reporting was part of a monitoring and control system whereby actual
performance could be compared with the plan and the necessary adjustments and
corrections made. It also aided future programme planning through the production of
a reliable database.
4.8. Training
4.8.1. General
Formal training was an integral part of the LG 34 and was carried at three levels:
supervision of a sub-unit and a DCRU (Technical assistant and Technical Officer)
and site supervision (Gang Leader). Informal on-the-job training was also given to
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Storekeepers, Pay clerks and Welders. All formal training was the direct
responsibility of the Roads Department’s Roads Training Centre in Gaborone. A new
section called Labour Intensive Methods was created at RTC in 1985 and was
responsible for all the formal training in labour intensive methods. In 1985, field
training was moved from Serowe to a new organisation called the Field Training Unit
(FTU), in Molepolole. The FTU was under the Labour Intensive Methods section of
the RTC and was responsible for the training of Gang Leaders and the practical
training of Technical Assistants and Technical Officers. The Labour Intensive
Methods section was initially coordinated by the ILO Training Advisor and later by a
Chief Technical Officer.
Figure 4.6 : Organogramme of the RTC
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4.8.2. Technical Officers
The minimum entrance requirement for the RTC technician’s course was the General
Certificate of Secondary Education. The TOs would also attend further short courses
devoted to technical and organisational matters specific to running a labour intensive
programme.
4.8.3. Technical Assistants
The DCRUs were entitled to 25% of the places in the site supervisors’ course. The
minimum entrance qualification was the Junior Certificate and passing an entrance
examination. Students were reviewed at the end of the first term and were
discontinued if they were not up to standard. The course included a general
introduction to labour intensive methods and field work with a DCRU. Upon
completion  they attended further short courses on technical and organisational
matters specific to running a labour intensive DCRU.
4.8.4. Gang Leader training
Candidates were required to possess a minimum of standard 7 certificates and pass an
entrance examination. The course was run entirely on site and comprised both class
and practical work. The course lasted three months followed by three months of close
supervision on site before the Gang Leaders returned to their DCRU’s for six months
probation.
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Table 4.13 Training modules for Gang Leaders
Subject No. of Modules
English ( Practical and Communication) 3
Calculation 5
Drafting & Plan Reading 2
Surveying 4
Road Building Materials 7
Road Construction 5
Road Maintenance 2
Construction Management 3
Total 40
4.8.5. Pay Clerks and Store Keepers
These staff were trained on-the-job and their training was not formalised. This was
one aspect of training that was not satisfactory and calls were made for it to be
formalised and be included in the activities of those authorities normally responsible
for the training of Council Pay clerks and Store keepers. It was recommended that on-
the-job training should only follow from the formal training.
4.8.6. Welders
Through the cooperation of certain local enterprises, a number of former labourers
received on-the-job training as welders and repairers. The companies paid visits to the
construction sites where they welded and repaired the donkey-carts. Liaison with
these companies was sustained to ensure continued cooperation.
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4.8.7. Training output
Table 4.14 Training output (Industrial Class)
Intake Graduated
Period
Course Total % Women Total % Women
GL
81-85(Serowe) 109 21 73 21
85-87(FTU) 40 40 31 35
1988 13 62 13 62
1989 25 80 22 86
1990 11 45 8 50
1991
SGL
1985-87(FTU) 14 2 14 14
1988 6 3 5 60
1989
1990
1991 11 45
TML
1989 15 53 11 64
1990 27 59 21 71
1991
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Table 4.15 Training output (UGLS employees)
Intake Graduated
Course
Total RD DCRU Total RD DCRU % Women
TOs
81-83 16 14 2 -
84-86 26 3 14 11 3 0
87-89 23 3 12 11 1 17
89-91 25 2
90-92
93
TAs
1983 16 16
84-85 17 16
85-86 20 12
86-87 27 17 13 4 12
87-88 28 23 5 16 12 4 19
88-89 22 17 5 14 11 3 21
90-91 26 20 6 26 20 6
According to Tables 4.14 and 4.15 above, the training of technical staff at the RTC
and its FTU produced a large number of technical personnel for the LG 34. By 1990,
166 Gang Leaders, 32 Maintenance Team Leaders, 6 Technical Officers and 18
Technical Assistants had graduated and joined the LG 34. The above Tables also
show that the proportion of female trainees also increased and over time the number
of female trainees was higher than the number of male trainees.
Although the training output did not meet the actual demand by the programme, this
did not cause the programme to suffer from a shortage of technical staff. The shortfall
in training output was insignificant and did not hamper the programme.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
113
4.9. Other Issues
4.9.1. Selected betterment
As the programme expanded there was a trend towards selected betterment of longer
stretches of route, and this constituted at least 42% of the route previously estimated
for Stages One and Two upgrading. Part of the reason was the acknowledgement that
the network was of a secondary nature.
Selected betterment was a difficult concept to tie down.82 Once a section of road had
been upgraded its old condition was forgotten and the remaining road appeared worse
than the constructed section.
Another factor that led to longer sections being upgraded during the expanded
programme was the high sensitivity of weighted benefits to the level of traffic (ADT)
for Stages One and Two upgrading. From a cost-benefit analysis, the Labour
Economist determined that for weighted benefits and economic costs, a 5% increase
in ADT resulted in a 50% higher Internal Rate of Return (IRR).83
Traffic surveys carried out in 1983 showed that ADT levels had increased. Of the 17
roads surveyed in the Central District only four had an ADT less that six.  Seven of
the roads had ADT greater than 10 while it was expected that traffic along other
routes would blossom once the roads had been constructed. At ADT 10 Stages One
and Two combined had a high Internal Rate of Return (IRR=17) with weighted
benefits. Adequate return was obtained at an ADT of only six.
82 McCutcheon,op.cit
83 Vaidya,op.cit.
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Thus the Labour Economist’s cost-benefit analysis and the traffic survey results of
1983 showed that along 75% of the routes the traffic levels warranted 50% of the
routes to be upgraded to Stages One and Two. For routes where the ADT exceeded
10 almost complete upgrading was warranted. The above analysis justified the
tendency for the increased proportion of completely constructed routes during the
expanded programme.
The combined effect of the increased standard and length of route constructed would
increase the cost from the P 2 065/km, estimated during the Pilot Project, to figures
shown in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16 Cost per kilometre of constructed road (P/km)
Pilot Project estimates Effect of new cross sectionLength
constructed Not gravelled gravelled Not gravelled gravelled
20 916 1234 1125 1443
42 1398 2065 2137 2804
100 3100 4860 4346 5934
318GraveL
Total 4764
The new section throughout to engineered earth standard plus 20% of the route
gravelled would cost P 4 764/km (1982 prices).
4.9.2. Selection criteria
Background
There were more non-gazetted tracks in the Districts than could be upgraded during a
five-year period. Therefore there was a need to develop a selection criterion for the
roads in order to come up with a priority list of roads for upgrading.
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Procedure for obtaining priority lists
During the expanded programme a simplified selection criterion was developed and
the procedure was as follows:
· Councillors tabled motions at full Council meetings requesting for certain
roads to be constructed
· Approved motions were forwarded to the Works Department for
implementation
· After assessing the priorities for construction a rolling five-year plan was
prepared
· The priorities were assessed by screening to see which roads would be
reasonably considered and by ranking the roads according to the following
criteria:
- Population density in the catchment area
- Average Daily Traffic
- Estimated cost of the route
This simple assessment coupled with the democratic processes of the Councils
provided an accurate list of priorities.
4.9.3. Forward planning
Planning values
Selected betterment: A lower standard of construction was required for selected
betterment than complete construction. The Pilot Project found that selected
betterment required 1600 worker days per kilometre (without back sloping). With
back-sloping, 1 km of earth road required 2000 worker days.
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The average amount of construction was 3 km per gang in eastern Botswana. This
was calculated from the 5000 days per gang and the 1600 day/km. A six-gang DCRU
sub-unit was expected to complete 18 km of construction including back sloping.
Complete construction: For a DCRU sub-unit of about 150 labourers, the estimate
per year (excluding drifts) was (30 000/ 2250) 13.5 km.
4.9.4. Preparation of the five-year rolling plans
Complete construction
The following example on how to prepare the rolling five-year plan is based on a case
where one route at a time was dealt with. If only one sub-unit existed in a District the
rolling plan was prepared by taking the priority list and dividing by 13.5 km. In this
case one route would be completed before moving to the next.
A surfacing unit comprised 15 labourers. They did spot surfacing along constructed
sections. The amount of surfacing was estimated as follows:
· Working days available:  21x200 = 4200 days
· Working days per km : 420 ( +  120 cart days)
· Surfacing per year:  4200/420 = 10 km
Selected betterment
In working out the amount of work for selected betterment allowance was made for
movement between sections. In addition the following considerations were made:
· Formation construction: four days/week, one week between sections
· Surfacing : three days/week, one week between sections, 50% cart availability
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The preliminary inventory of work required along each route was prepared. The time
for construction was then estimated using the basic work rates quoted above for
selected betterment and allowing for hiatus. The rolling five-year plan was prepared
by working down the priority list. Surfacing was assumed to follow a year after
construction.
4.10. Haulage
4.10.1. General
As it has already been mentioned in the description of the Pilot Project, circumstances
in Botswana warranted a serious investigation of the potential of using donkey-drawn
haulage. In particular the investigation concentrated upon defining the type of cart
and the system of organisation within which the donkey-cart teams would operate. A
comparison was made between the financial costs of the donkey-cart based system
and the alternative of the tractor and trailer system.84
4.10.2. Technical
The investigation revealed that the most appropriate cart was the two-wheel tipping
cart of 0.5 m3/ load drawn by a team of four donkeys. The carts were manufactured in
Botswana.
84 McCutcheon,1985
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4.10.3. Organisation
Work studies were carried out on the carts in order to develop an efficient system of
haulage. The system was based upon the number of tasks to be completed for the
carts. For each haulage distance each cart would carry out a number of trips each day.
Disruptions were minimised by balancing the operations in order to keep the number
of people employed more or less constant. For example, where few carts were
required for surfacing, work was balanced to ensure that stones for drifts, sand for
topping etc were hauled to keep the fleet busy.
4.10.4. Financial analysis
Financial comparison was made between the donkey-cart system and the tractor-
trailer system at low gross utilisation. A low gross utilisation was assumed for the
tractor system since the operations were of a dispersed nature and small scale. The
donkey-cart system was financially competitive up to at least 2.5 km. Haulage
distance was often shorter than 1 km, offsetting the effects of the occasional haulage
distance of over 2.5 km on the normal programme. The cart system was therefore also
more efficient in economic terms.
Thus donkey carts played an important role in the expanded programme. They were
used to transport construction materials, tools and water.
4.11. Tools and equipment
4.11.1. General
During the expanded programme the tools and equipment were the same as those
which were used on the Pilot Project. They were still stored in a tool box kept at each
site and transported by donkey cart.
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In the western Districts of Ghanzi and Kgalagadi a trailer-drawn spoor grader was
introduced.
4.11.2. Control of tools and equipment
Tools and equipment were purchased through the Stores Department of Council. A
toolbox completely stocked with a set of tools and equipment (for 25 construction
labourers, or 15 surfacing labourers and 6 cart drivers) was issued to each site.
An inventory of the tools was kept in each toolbox and a copy was kept in the
Council stores. Broken tools were repaired or replaced with new ones. The DRCU
Store keeper carried out inventories of the tools at regular intervals
4.11.3. Manufacture of tools and equipment
The tools and equipment were manufactured in Botswana by both private and
parastatal enterprises. These included the Botswana Enterprise Development Unit
(BEDU), Madiba Brigade, N.Stoneham (Ltd), J.T. Industries and DEK (Ltd).Typical
tools and equipment were jembes, gabions, spoor graders, carts, animal-drawn rollers
and water bowsers.
4.12. Evaluation
4.12.1. Internal
Employment
One of the objectives of the LG 34 was to generate employment opportunities for the
rural poor. This objective was achieved to a large extent. As the programme
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expanded, the number of casual labourers employed progressively increased (See
Table 4.6 in section 4.5 of this chapter).
From 235 casual labourers employed during the Pilot Project, the casual labour force
increased to at least 3000 labourers in 1990. With this, the LG 34 had achieved the
NDP 6 objective to create 3000 jobs by 1990.
In July 1995 the LG 34, under LG 117, constituted a significant proportion of rural
employment. It employed about 2 730 casual labourers, accounting for 3.3% of total
rural employment and 27% of rural local government employment (See Table 4.8 in
section 4.5).
A comparison with national employment in July 1995 reveals that the LG 34
generated more employment opportunities per unit of expenditure than the national
economy (See Table 4.9 in section 4.5).
The LG 34 had a specific objective to generate employment opportunities for women.
The programme implemented effective recruitment strategies to target women,
getting more of them into the programme both as casual labourers and supervisors.
The proportion of women casual labourers increased from 8% in 1980 to about 40%
in 1995 (See Table 4.7 in section 4.5).
The proportion of women trained as site supervisors also increased as the programme
went on. In fact women dominated men in the Gang Leader cadre of staff. Their
proportion increased from 21 % in 1985 to about 86 % in 1990.
Good quality low cost roads
The primary purpose of the LG 34 was to upgrade and maintain the non-gazetted
District roads labour intensively. The programme opened up, all year round, access to
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these areas by constructing and maintaining good quality roads. The main activity
was the construction of earth roads. The length of earth road constructed each year
progressively increased until 1995 (See Table 4.1 in section 4.3.8). By 1995 the
programme had constructed a total of about 1 821 km of earth road at an average cost
of P 20 000/km/yr. On average, the labour input was about 2000 worker days only
per year.
The construction of good quality low cost roads was a cornerstone for the success of
the LG 34. This earned the programme international recognition and the government
of Botswana declared the programme a national asset. This prompted statements such
as the following by BIDPA. The construction and maintenance of nearly 2000 km of
relatively high standard road at an average cost of under P 25 000/km was a bargain
from an economic point of view.85
Therefore the LG 34 succeeded in relation to achieving the objective to produce good
quality roads at a low cost.
Building institutional capacity for the District Councils
The LG 34 also aimed to create institutional capacity for the District Councils to
enable them to construct and maintain their non-gazetted network of roads. The
Councils did not have this capacity prior to the programme.
The LG 34 developed and established this capacity within the Councils. By 1987
Road Units were established in all the nine District Councils and were constructing
and maintaining good quality roads. The programme had thus met the objective to
create Road Maintenance Units within the District Councils.
85 BIDPA, 1997:331
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4.12.2. External evaluation
Although it had a few shortcomings, the LG 34 complied, to a large extent, with good
practice in labour intensive work.
Piloting
The LG 34 had adopted the four-phased approach to programme implementation and
implemented a Pilot Project to investigate the technical feasibility and economic
efficiency of labour intensive methods in Botswana, prior to expansion. The project
experimented with all aspects of selected betterment and maintenance of rural roads,
including technology, methods of construction, wage rates, payment in cash or in
kind and employment of women. The project came up with a number of findings on
the above issues and recommended that the methods be replicated. The replication of
the methods during the expanded programme was supported by the firm foundation
laid by the preceding Pilot Project.
Centralisation and decentralisation
There was a balance between the centralisation essential for the success of lower level
operations and the centralisation required for the overall planning and coordination of
the programme at national level.
Implementation was decentralised to local authorities (District Councils) and the
beneficiary communities (through their VDCs) while the overall programme policy
planning and coordination was centralised in the MLGL.
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Institutionalisation and training
The LG 34 had a strong and fully incorporated formal training component. Training
was carried out at three levels: Technical Officer (TO) responsible for the supervision
of a District Council Road Unit, Technical Assistant (TA) responsible for the
supervision of four to six Gang Leaders, and Gang Leaders responsible for site
supervision. Informal on-the-job training was also given to Store Keepers, Pay-clerks
and Welders.
Institutional adjustments were made to existing institutions and new institutions
created in order to create training infrastructure for the programme. Internal
adjustments were made to the Roads Training Centre resulting in the creation of a
Labour Intensive Methods section and the establishment of a Field training Unit in
Molepolole. The above institutions produced trained technical staff for the
programme, Gang Leaders, Technical Assistants and Technical Officers. These staff
were crucial (especially the Gang Leader) to the success of the programme.
A careful screening process was followed in the selection of candidates for training.
The screening process involved a requirement for certain minimum qualifications and
sometimes pre-qualification examinations. As much attention was paid to character as
to technical competence in the selection of trainees. This thorough process ensured
that only the suitable candidates were trained as site supervisors and other technical
staff.
The training of site supervisors was crucial due to the nature of conditions in
Botswana. They were such that the operations were of a small scale nature and
dispersed. This meant that site supervisors would work for longer times without
supervision by their superiors.
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The success of the LG 34 derived much from the robust training programme
incorporated.
Financial commitment and political support
The Programme enjoyed sustained financial support from the initial donor, NORAD,
until 1997 when the donor’s commitment ended.
The programme also received strong political support from its early stages until the
latter stages when it began to be implemented with drought relief.
The long term financial commitment and political support were crucial to the success
of the LG 34. At times, in the early stages, the odds were against labour intensive
methods but the enthusiasm by the political leadership prevailed and the programme
forged ahead.
4.12.3. Problems and shortcomings
Despite the good performance of the LG 34 in relation to most of its objectives and
international good practice, the programme had a few shortcomings, especially in its
latter stages.
Wage rate
As it has already been mentioned, the wage rate was pitched at P 2.10/day at the start
of the piloting phase of the LG 34. That was after a thorough assessment of the then
prevailing economic situation and due consideration of the nature of labour intensive
work. Thus in terms of conditions in 1980, the wage rate was appropriately set at P
2.10 per day.
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However, over time, the wage rate was outstripped by the upward movements by of
both the cost of living index and the minimum industrial class wage in the public
sector. The wage had not been pegged to the public sector minimum. The LG 34
wage dropped from 75% in 1980 to 40% in 1994, in proportion to the public sector
minimum. It dropped to a level where it was on par with wages on the Drought Relief
Programme. In 1995 labourers on the LG 34 worked 7.75 hours a day for P 6.30
(P0.82 / hr) while their counterparts on the Drought Programme worked 6 hours a day
for P 6.00 (P 1.00/hr). Drought workers were better off.
Thus workers in a programme that was generating productive employment
opportunities while producing good quality assets were paid not differently from
drought relief workers. This situation seriously undermined the performance of the
LG 34. Workers left the LG 34 en masse to join the Drought Relief Programme
where they would be paid the same wage under much less supervision. The LG 34
started to record lower performance in terms of road construction output and the
quality of workmanship.
In 1992, the LG 34 was combined with the inefficient LG 38, an essentially drought
Relief programme. This further dampened the performance of the LG 34 and
strengthened its new drought relief image, further diluting its efficiency. The strict
discipline enforced, high productivity maintained and constant technical supervision
on the LG 34 progressively went down and the programme degenerated into drought
relief.
Government support for the programme also went down. The programme was
eventually wound up upon the withdrawal of its foreign donors. It had now ceased to
be a productive development programme and apparently the government did not see
the need to continue it.
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Localisation
The LG 34 failed to localise senior positions in the programme, preventing the crucial
handing over of the programme to local engineers. This was due to a critical shortage
of qualified local persons coupled with the reluctance to train local personnel for the
programme, on the part of the Government.
As at March 1993 (after 13 years) the two most senior engineering positions on the
programme were still in expatriate hands (The District Roads Engineer and Assistant
Roads Engineer). The most qualified locals on the programme were those of
Technician Certificate level, who were crowded in lower middle programme
management.
In comparison with the KRARP, the number of Kenyan engineers employed in the
KRARP increased from zero in 1974 through to 2 in 1978 to 23 in 1985 ( out of a
total 29). In respect of localisation the LG 34 faired poorly against the successful
Kenya programme.
Donor withdrawal
NORAD withdrew financial and technical support to the programme in 1996 on the
pretext that Botswana’s economy had reached a level where it could sustain itself.
Botswana experienced remarkable and consistent economic growth recording the
highest per capita growth of any country, over 7 % on average. The GDP per capita
stood at $ 4 278 in 2003.86
But the good economic performance has not been accompanied by a matching degree
of socio-economic transformation. There are parts of the country where poverty is so
86 World Bank/MFDP, 2004
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endemic that some households survive on state destitute grants. Botswana recorded a
drop in its Human Development Index while it was experiencing a rapid economic
growth in 2001.
Table 4.17 Human Development Index trend for Botswana
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
HDI 0.509 0.573 0.626 0.674 0.666 0.614
In the light of this wide gap between economic performance in terms of per capita
growth and socio-economic development one is compelled to question NORAD’s
withdrawal on grounds of economic independence for Botswana. If that was a
genuine reason for withdrawal then NORAD’s analysis of the economic situation in
Botswana was superficial and needs to be reconsidered..
This is more so in light of the fact that the withdrawal of NORAD support marked the
demise of the LG 34.
4.13. Conclusions
4.13.1. Achievements
Internal achievements
Employment: This objective was achieved to a large extent. As the programme
expanded, the number of casual labourers employed progressively increased. From
235 casual labourers employed during the Pilot Project the casual labour force
increased to over 3000 labourers in 1990. With this, the LG 34 had achieved an NDP
6 objective to create 3000 jobs by 1990.
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In July 1995 the LG 34, then under LG 117, employed about 2 730 casual labourers.
This accounted for 3.3% of total rural employment and 27% of rural local
government employment.
A comparison with the national economy for July 1995 reveals that the LG 34
generated more employment opportunities per unit of expenditure than the national
economy.
The LG 34 had a specific objective to generate employment opportunities for women.
The proportion of women casual labourers increased from 8% in 1980 to about 40%
in 1995.
The proportion of women trained as site supervisors also increased as the programme
went on. In fact, women dominated men in the Gang Leader cadre of staff. Their
proportion increased from 21% in 1985 to about 86% in 1990.
Thus the District roads programme succeeded in achieving the employment creation
objective.
Good quality roads: The primary purpose of the LG 34 was to upgrade and maintain
the non-gazetted District roads labour intensively. The length of earth road
constructed each year progressively increased until 1995. By 1995 the programme
had constructed a total of about 1 821 km of earth road at an average cost of P 20
000/km/yr.
The construction of good quality low cost roads was a cornerstone for the success of
the LG 34. This earned the programme international recognition and the Government
of Botswana declared the programme a national asset. Therefore the LG 34 succeeded
in relation to achieving the objective to produce good quality roads at a low cost.
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Institutional capacity building: The LG 34 also aimed to create institutional
capacity for the District Councils to enable them to construct and maintain District
roads. By 1987, Road Units had been established in all the nine District Councils and
were constructing and maintaining good quality roads.
External achievements
The LG 34 complied, to a large extent, with good practice in labour intensive work.
Piloting: The LG 34 adopted the four-phased approach to programme
implementation and implemented a Pilot Project to investigate the technical
feasibility and economic efficiency of labour intensive methods in Botswana prior to
expansion. The subsequent replication of the methods was supported by the firm
foundation laid by the preceding Pilot Project.
Centralisation and decentralisation: There was a balance between the centralisation
essential for the success of lower level operations and the centralisation required for
the overall planning and coordination of the programme at national level.
Institutionalisation and training: The LG 34 had a strong and fully incorporated
training component carried out at three levels: a TO responsible for the supervision of
a DCRU, a TA responsible for the supervision of four to six Gang Leaders, and a
Gang Leader responsible for site supervision of a gang of up to 25 labourers.
Institutional adjustments were made to existing institutions (RTC) and new
institutions (FTU) were created in order to create training infrastructure for the
programme. A careful screening process was followed in the selection of candidates
for training. As much attention was paid to character as to technical competence in
the selection of trainees.
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In sum, the success of the LG 34 owed much to the robust training programme
incorporated.
Financial and political support: The Programme enjoyed sustained financial and
political support for the better part of its existence and this contributed to its success.
4.13.2. Problems and shortcomings
Wage rate: The wage rate on the District Roads programme was not pegged to the
minimum wage in the public sector. Over time it was outstripped by the public sector
minimum and the cost of living. It dropped to levels where it was on par with drought
relief wages. This situation seriously undermined the performance of the programme
in terms of productivity and quality of work. Workers left the LG 34 en masse to join
the Drought Relief Programme, where they would be paid the same wage under much
less supervision. The programme began to be treated much as drought relief.
In 1992, the LG 34 was combined with the inefficient LG 117, further dampening its
performance and strengthening its false drought relief image. Government support for
the programme also weakened.
The above developments contributed to the demise of the LG 34.
Localisation
In respect of localisation the LG 34 faired poorly against the successful Kenya
programme. The LG 34 failed to localise senior positions in the programme,
preventing the crucial handing over of the programme to local engineers. As at March
1993 (after 13 years) the two most senior engineering positions on the programme
were still in expatriate hands (The District Roads Engineer and Assistant Roads
Engineer).
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In the KRARP, the number of local engineers increased from zero in 1974 through to
two in 1978 to twenty three in 1985, out of a total of twenty nine.
Donor withdrawal
NORAD withdrew financial and technical support to the LG 34 (1996) on the pretext
that Botswana’s economy had reached a level where it could sustain itself. However,
the withdrawal of NORAD support marked the collapse of the LG 34.
The good economic performance was not accompanied by a matching degree of
socio-economic transformation. Botswana recorded a drop in its Human
Development Index (HDI) while it was experiencing a rapid economic growth in
2001.
Against that background one is therefore compelled to question NORAD’s
withdrawal on grounds of economic independence for Botswana. If their withdrawal
was indeed based on a genuine conviction about the economic status quo in Botswana
then NORAD’s analysis of the economic situation in Botswana was superficial and
should be reconsidered.
However, the achievements of the LG 34 outweighed its shortfalls and the
programme was successful. Other programmes in Botswana and elsewhere should
emulate it while taking note of its few shortfalls.
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5. RURAL ROADS PROGRAMME (RRP), LABOUR INTENSIVE PUBLIC
WORKS SCHEMES (LG 38) AND THE LABOUR INTENSIVE
DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMME ( LG 117)
5.1. Rural Roads Programme (RRP)
5.1.1. Introduction
The Rural Roads Programme was initiated in 1972 by the Government of Botswana
through the Ministry of Works and Communications. It was funded by NORAD. Its
aim was to improve rural roads through the use of labour intensive methods. The
programme began with a Pilot Project which investigated the following:
· The type of equipment and methods to be used
· The extent of labour intensive methods
· The size of construction units
· The maintenance methods and their organisation
Pilot activities were carried in the eastern and western parts of the country to establish
methods which were suitable for the different physical conditions in the two regions.
5.1.2. Implementation
Planning and construction
District Councils were requested to submit their lists of roads to be constructed to the
Ministry of Works and Communication (MWC). The MWC drew up the construction
plans and constituted two construction teams which started work in 1972. By 1975,
four construction teams were operational.
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Table 5.1 Roads constructed
Road Length (km) Year
Molepolole-Lethlakeng 62 Completed in 1975
Kanye-Ramatlabama 85 Completed in 1976
Sebina-Maitengwe 75 Started in 1975
Sebina-Ramokgwebana 90 Started in 19/75
Sehitwa-Shakawe 270 Started in 1975
Sefophe-Bobonong 55 -
Malolwane-Gaborone 55 -
Mahalapye-Kalamare 45 -
Kalkfontein-Karakubis 30 -
Unit Organisation
Construction operations were organised in units composed of labourers, Site
Supervisors and Works Inspectors. Each unit employed various items of machinery as
shown below.
Labour gang:  200 men
Machinery: 1Bulldozer
  1 Motor grader
  15 Tractors
  14 Tipper Trucks
  6 Water Tankers
  1 Towed Roller
  2 Cement Mixers
  1 Motor Bike
20 Group Leaders
  5 R.S.Os
  1 Works Inspector
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The construction units operated under the overall responsibility of the Roads
Engineer who was based in Gaborone. The Roads Engineer was in charge of the
overall programme design and planning. He controlled the construction units through
the Works Inspectors who were resident on site and directly reported to him.
Figure 5.1: Organogramme of the RRP
5.1.3. Problems and Shortcomings (RRP)
There was a lack of administrative back-up for the Roads Engineer who was based at
Head Office in Gaborone. In addition to technical matters, he was also responsible for
financial administration to ensure that the projects were allocated funds on time and
hence he did not maintain sufficient contact with District authorities and construction
teams on site. This negatively affected the programme’s efficiency as it lacked
sufficient technical support.
The programme experienced difficulties and delays in obtaining materials and
machine spares for plant maintenance. This increased the manpower and machine idle
times leading to inefficiency and high unit costs of production.
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The programme did not have performance incentives (i.e. task or piece work wages)
leading to low productivity by the workforce.
The programme was not adequately designed and piloted from the onset.
Construction work was started before any prior embryonic training of technical
supervisory staff and the development of sound organisational and construction
methods. No training was later introduced to the programme as it continued and, it
suffered from a critical shortage of supervisory staff.
5.1.4. Conclusions (RRP)
The RRP was intended to be a labour intensive programme but was not planned as
such from the on-set. The implementing institution did not have the capacity to
handle a labour intensive programme. There was thus a need for institutional capacity
building in the form of training and organisational restructuring. There was a need for
proper design and planning for the programme. All these needs were not provided for
prior to implementation. As a result the programme became inefficient and
problematic. The resultant perception within the Roads Department was that labour
intensive methods were inefficient and too expensive and hence they should not be
used again.
The programme was stirred towards the capitalization route and more machinery was
put into the construction operations. However the high capital content brought with it
another problem. The institution did not have the capacity to cope with the high
systems demand from the more capitalized operations. Machines broke down and
spares were expensive and arrived late from South Africa. This resulted in low plant
availability and utilization and drove up the unit costs of production. Thus the
‘superior technology’ was again becoming a problem for Roads Department
rendering the programme unsustainable. The programme was eventually wound up.
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The Rural Roads Programme, was therefore inefficient and unsustainable. The
programme eventually failed and as result the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning and NORAD decided to try again to fund a labour intensive roads
programme which led to the formation of LG 34.
5.2. Labour Intensive Public Works Schemes: LG 38
Against the background of socio-economic problems already mentioned in the
introduction to Chapter 1, in 1979, the Government of Botswana initiated and then
implemented a labour intensive public works scheme (LG 38) to complement other
initiatives to further the aims of rural development.
5.2.1. Objectives:
· To create realistic employment opportunities for the rural poor
· To drought-proof the economy
· To stimulate productive development activities
Institutional framework and activities undertaken
The LG 38 was established in 1979 by the Government of Botswana in collaboration
with the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the programme
donor. The programme was institutionally located within the Ministry of Local
Government and Lands and implemented by the District Councils. The District
Councils were supported with technical assistance by the technical departments of
relevant Ministries. The Department of Architecture and Building Services and the
Roads Department were some of these departments. Infrastructure constructed
included rural feeder roads, rural water supply works and small dams.
The projects were identified at local level by the Village Development Committees
which then submitted their priority lists of projects to the Councils. After assessment
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of the proposed projects, the Councils incorporated them into their development
plans. Based on the plans councils then prepared their budgets and submitted them to
the MLGL for approval. When the budgets had been approved the Councils
submitted Project Memoranda to the MLGL requesting for funds to implement the
projects.
The selected projects were such that:
· They did not conflict with arable agriculture and in particular not divert labour
from agricultural activities
· They did not conflict with self help projects
Labour was recruited from the villages where the projects took place and recruitment
was through Kgotla meetings organised through liaison with the village Headmen and
VDCs. The wage rate was initially fixed at P1.00 per day and the labourers also
qualified for food rations if the project sites were far from their villages. The wage
was set at a low rate in order to prevent competition with existing rural productive
activities. It was however recognized later that the rate might need to be raised in
order to make the projects more attractive to the workers.
5.2.2. Implementation problems
Although some projects were implemented, employment created and some works
constructed, the LG 38 experienced a number of problems:
· Both Central Government and the District Councils had no capacity and
experience in planning , designing and implementing labour intensive projects
· The projects placed heavy demand for administrative and supervisory
manpower upon the District Councils which they could not meet. This put a
limitation to the performance and expansion of the programme.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
138
Due to these technical and institutional limitations on the part of the Councils many
of them were unable to submit detailed project proposals for approval and funding.
As at June 1981 only four projects had been approved:
· Mochudi bush clearing
· Mabule airstrip de-bushing
· Ramatea firebreak and road improvements
· Selokolela well digging
Other project proposals had been rejected on the grounds of:
· Lack of supervisory capacity by the Districts Councils
· Vagueness in terms of performance targets and project responsibility
This programme was thus inefficient in the delivery of infrastructure due to the above
implementation problems. An evaluation of the programme had recommended that
the programme be wound up as it was neither cost effective nor able to produce
assets.87 It was eventually merged with the Labour Intensive Drought Relief
Programme(LG 117) in 1982.88
5.3. Drought Relief Labour Intensive Public Works Programme (LG 117)
5.3.1. General
The Drought Relief Labour Intensive Public Works Programme( LG 117) was a cash-
for-work programme, which aimed to provide temporary employment on local
development projects: road maintenance, construction of small dams, erosion control,
fencing and the construction of rural staff housing. The programme was initiated in
87 Gooch & McDonald, 1981
88 Food Studies Group, 1990: 11
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1980.89 As it has already been mentioned in the foregoing section, this programme
was merged with the LG 38 in 1982. It is not clear as to why the two programmes
were merged and the opinion of the author is that they were merged so that the weak
LG 38 could pick up momentum from the then powerful and fast track LG 117.
Although records are not available to substantiate this opinion, the fore-going remains
highly probable as the reason for the merger.
5.3.2. Implementation
The basic principles of projects were as follows:
· Projects were identified by the Village Development Committees
· The target labour cost component was set at a minimum of 70% of total cost
· Projects were intended to benefit the wider community and not individuals
Projects were identified by the Village Development Committees and implemented
and administered by the District Councils through Drought Relief Technical Officers
(DRTO) who were volunteers from the United States and the Netherlands. The
programme was funded by the Food Resources Department of the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning.
Workers were initially paid a wage of P 2 per day. The wage was progressively
increased and by the financial year 1988/89 it was P3 per day. During the same
period a total of 14 810 projects were delivered and 295 856 temporary jobs created.
Employment was rotational so that the job opportunities could be more widely
distributed among the needy.
89 “Personal communication, McCutcheon to author: 02 March 2006
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The programme was considered a success, in terms of relief delivery, as it became an
important source of income support for the many drought victims especially women
who took 80% of the jobs created.
Table 5.2 Expenditure on LG 117 by category (1986-1989) P (000)
Total Average Percentage
LG 117 Wages 24 956 8 319 63.4
Project Materials 6 491 2 164 16.5
Wages and Salaries 1 940 647 4.9
Transport 5 311 1 710 13.0
Other 833 278 2.1
39 351 13 118 99.9
According to Table 5.2 above, the bulk of expenditure on the LG 117 went towards
the payment of wages.
Table 5.3 Number of LG 117 jobs created and cost per job (1984-1989)
FY Total Cost P(000) Employment Opportunities Cost per job  P
1984 7 130 41 040 174
19845/86 8 356 42 099 199
1986/87 8 791 45 207 195
1987/88 15 746 61 309 258
1988/89 14 814 46 401 322
Table 5.3 shows that the number of employment opportunities created increased with
the rise in expenditure on the programme over the years. The cost per job created also
increased partly as a result revised wages.
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Table 5.4 Expenditure for LG 38 and LG 117 (1980-90) P (000)
80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90
LG 38 5 138 3 121 40 187 1 144 521 1 141 706 256
LG 117 5 793 8 000 10 577 9 460 16 123 14 862 13 028 49
953
The data in Table 5.4 above indicates that the combination of LG 38 and the LG 117
gave momentum to the former as the bill for the LG 38 increased dramatically from
P138 000 in 1982 to about P 3 million after the merger with the LG 117.
5.3.3. Problems and short-comings: LG 117
· Lack of technically qualified supervisors led to the construction of low quality
infrastructure
· Lack of basic equipment led to the construction of low quality infrastructure
e.g. in the construction of Kanye dam: fill material for the dam wall was not
mechanically compacted resulting in excessive seepage through the dam wall
and subsequent structural failure
· Lack of formal training for technical supervisory personnel
· Lack of an incorporated maintenance programme
· Lack of technical assistance support
The LG 117 was torn between getting relief money to the people quickly and the need
to carry out thorough preparatory work to enable the programme to produce good
quality infrastructure.The balance tipped towards the delivery of relief and
consequently proper planning, design and documentation were skipped resulting in
the production of poor quality products.The productivity of labour was low compared
to that experienced on the successful LG 34 roads programme. As at July 1987,
workers on the LG 34 were paid P 3.60 per eight-hour working day and their
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productivity for excavation was 4-5 m3 /day. On the relief programme workers were
paid P 2.25/day and worked only six hours per day but their productivity (0.25-0.75
m3 /day for excavation ) was insignificant compared to that of workers on the LG 34.
Table 5.5 Comparison of wages and productivity for excavation between the LG
38 and the LG 117 (1987)
Wage Rate P Productivity for excavation m3 /day
LG 34 3.60 4-5
LG 117 2.25 0.25-0.75
% Difference 60 500
Table 5.5 above shows that the percentage difference in productivity for excavation
was disproportionately higher than the percentage difference between wages for the
two programmes.
5.3.4. Need for a proper public works programme
In addition to the above-mentioned problems there was a growing recognition that the
rural unemployment problem in Botswana was not solely drought-induced. It was
rather structural with a number of variables. This gave rise to the need for an on-
going national public works programme that would deliver relief while creating
productive employment through the construction of good quality infrastructure.90
In 1985 the Government of Botswana commissioned the ILO to investigate the
possibility of implementing labour intensive pilot activities and make proposals for
suitable test projects. The terms of reference for the consultancy included the
following:
90 ILO/UNDP, 1985:71-75
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· Rehabilitation of Kanye dam
· Labour intensive test activities down stream of Kanye dam
· Labour intensive test activities for pan improvement in the Sesung area
· Identifying possibilities for a long term special public works programme in
Botswana
The ILO mission carried out the consultancy and concluded that there was scope for
creating an on-going nation-wide public woks programme. The mission team
recommended that, as part of the initial steps to develop the programme, the LG 117
be used as a pilot project (with technical assistance support) to run over three years.
The mission recommended that the rehabilitation of Kanye dam be part of the pilot
activities. The dam was leaking after the height of its wall had been increased by a
project under the LG 117. Other proposed activities included control works for soil
erosion downstream, resulting from the dam leakage, water resources development,
horticulture, sanitation and afforestation.
The test activities were to be implemented as part of the pilot project to convert the
LG 117 into a proper labour intensive public works programme. They were
implemented and as at July 1986, the Kanye dam rehabilitation project had been
completed and the others were in progress. The author could not locate documents
containing the details of completion of the other activities but it is clear that the pilot
activities did not lead to an expanded public works programme. The LG 117 was later
merged with the LG 34.
5.3.5. Merger with LG 34
As part of further attempts to operationalise a labour intensive public works
programme, in 1992, the LG 117 was merged with the successful District Roads
Programme (LG 34) giving rise to a new public works programme under the funding
vote LG 117. However, drought hit Botswana again and for the entire duration of the
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NDP 7 (1991/92-1996/97) the LG 117 was essentially implemented as a drought
relief programme again frustrating the “public works proper” spirit.
For the entire NDP 7 period, the LG 34 component of LG 117 was starved of funds as
most of the funds went to the drought relief component ( the first LG 117).91 The new
LG 117 went on until 1996 when NORAD terminated its support for the LG 34
component (road component). This marked the end of the LG 117 and the dawn of
the LG 1107, the Current Nation-wide Public Works Programme. The LG 1107 was
introduced “on board” the National Development Plan 8 (1997/98-2002/02).
The NDP 8 also introduced the Urban and District Roads Programme (LG 1115).
This programme was supposed to be implemented as a continuation of the LG 34
component of the LG 117. NORAD, the ILO and other interested parties had made
urgent calls for continuation of the LG 34 and further demanded that the programme
be separated from drought relief work.
However these calls were not fully heeded, as the LG 1115 is not a labour intensive
programme. It is rather an essentially capital intensive programme. Thus, currently,
there is no official programme of labour intensive road construction and maintenance
(as the LG 34) in Botswana. The LG 34 component of the LG 117 was wound up
upon the withdrawal of NORAD in 1996. This was confirmed by a senior official of
the Ministry of Local Government.92
In conclusion, the LG 117 was significantly implemented as a drought relief
programme and its district roads component (LG 34) was starved of funds. After the
combination with drought relief work, the LG 34 started to record drops in annual
road construction output and expenditure which resulted from the inefficiencies of the
91 MFDP,1998:72
92 Theko Fako: Director: Department of Local Government and Development of the Ministry of Local
Government, Botswana: Personal Communication to author, February 2005
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drought relief activities.At the end of the drought period (in 1996) the LG 117 was
dissolved giving rise to the LG 1107, the current public works programme. A detailed
discussion of the LG 1107 is presented in chapter 6 of this report.
5.3.6. Evaluation (LG 38)
Internal evaluation
The implementation of the LG 38 was inefficient, rendering the programme a failure.
Some District Councils could not even submit sound project proposals as they lacked
technical personnel to design, plan, document and implement projects. Thus most
projects could not be started because proposals were rejected.
It is therefore inconceivable to think of the LG 38 as having achieved its objectives. It
might have created some jobs from the few projects that managed to get off the
ground but these were too few to enable any programme to achieve employment
objectives. Furthermore, the few products created were of a poor quality.
The LG 38 had failed to meet its objectives. This was, in the author’s opinion, the
reason why the programme was merged with the Drought Relief Programme (LG
117) and later with the LG 34.
5.3.7. Problems and shortcomings for the LG 38
· There was no specific organisation of technical and administrative staff for
implementing the LG 38, as it cut across all sections of the District Councils.
This lack of direct responsibility for the programme rendered it inefficient in
terms of implementation.
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· The LG 38 was also not linked to any training programme and experienced a
critical shortage of trained technical staff. District Councils often failed to get
their Project Memoranda approved because they did not have appropriate
technical personnel to design and implement projects.
· The programme had not been preceded by a pilot project to create the
necessary infrastructure for its expansion. It lacked sound organisational and
construction methods.
· The LG 38 was supposed to be a labour intensive programme but in the event
it was implemented as a drought relief programme. It delivered relief to
drought victims but it did not produce any valuable infrastructure.
· The LG 38 was not given proper and full time technical support. It relied on
unreliable and unsuitable technical input from other Government departments
which were not directly involved in the programme. It did not even have
expatriate ILO staff based in Botswana.
· The programme was not treated as proper engineering: no project design,
planning and documentation.
5.3.8. Problems and shortcomings ( LG 117)
· This programme was initially intended to be drought relief and thus had no
emphasis on generating productive employment, leading to poor quality
infrastructure
· Efforts to convert the LG 117 into a proper labour intensive public works
programme ( eg. merger with LG 34) failed as the programme continued to be
marred by recurrent drought relief activities
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· The programme was not linked to a dedicated training programme and hence
experienced a critical shortage of technical skills
· It did not have continuing technical assistance
· The LG 117 failed to capitalise on the good practice established by the LG 34
even after the merger between the two programmes.
5.4. Overall Conclusions
5.4.1. The Rural Roads Programme (RRP)
This programme was inefficient and was eventually wound up. It had been
intended to be a labour intensive programme but in the event it became rather
capital intensive and more problematic.
5.4.2. The LG 38
· The LG 38 failed due to its high inefficiency
· The inefficiency stemmed from the lack of a linked training programme, lack
of proper technical support, lack of a proper organisation and qualified
technical personnel
· The programme was also limited by the lack of piloting to develop the
necessary embryonic training of supervisory staff as well as establishing the
appropriate construction and organisational methods
· The LG 38 was not differentiated from drought and this contributed to its
demise
· The programme was inefficient and yielded poor quality assets
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5.4.3. The LG 117
The LG 117 lacked a training component and a supply of trained technical staff,
leading to the production of poor quality assets. It failed to tap on the experience of
its District roads component (LG 34). The LG 34 was a meticulously designed and
efficiently implemented programme. It had accumulated trained technical staff and
developed good organisational methods. These resources were not made use of when
the LG 34 was brought under the LG 117 because the LG 34 component was starved
of funds and became dormant. The trained technical staff of the LG 34 component
started to leave the LG 117, leading to a lack of continuity of technical personnel. The
foreign technical assistance personnel of the LG 34 component were also
underutilized during the LG 117. This rendered the programme highly inefficient
since these staff were expensive.
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6.  THE CURRENT LABOUR INTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS
PROGRAMME (LG 1107)
6.1. Introduction
The Botswana Government implemented a Drought Relief Labour Intensive
Programme (LG 117) from the early eighties until the mid ninenties. The
Government then commissioned a consultancy to evaluate the drought programme
with a view to draw lessons from the programme for the purpose of drought-proofing
the rural economy and developing more efficient future responses to drought.93 The
consultancy team produced a report recommending the introduction of an on-going
national public works programme as a measure to integrate drought preparedness into
the government’s long term economic development planning.
For many years, in Botswana, poverty had been thought to be the sole result of
drought. Botswana initiated and implemented the Drought Relief Programme (LG
117) in order to provide temporary relief from what was perceived to be drought-
induced hardship.94 However, by 1990 there was widespread consensus that poverty
in Botswana was structural and not caused by drought alone.
A Presidential Commission constituted in 199095 to review the national incomes
policy substantiated this. “A certain amount of poverty is here to stay,” noted the
commission, which made a recommendation for a nation-wide labour intensive public
works programme at high levels in the poverty stricken rural areas.
93 Food Studies Group,1990:viii
94 BIDPA,1997:182
95 Presidential Commission on the Review of Incomes Policy,1990:1-30
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In its White Paper on the Commission’s report the Government generally accepted
the recommendation, adding that the programme must be cost competitive, efficient,
free from pure transfer elements and distinct from drought relief.96
Indeed a Cabinet Memorandum was prepared in late 1991 to implement the
recommendation for an on-going labour intensive public works programme based on
a study by Andrews and Manamela (1991) which had estimated that between 20 000-
28 000 additional jobs could be created depending on the wage rate paid.97
Thus the Government had recognized the need for and undertook to implement a
nation-wide labour intensive public works programme totally different from drought.
However drought was declared again and  the Labour Intensive Drought Relief
Programme (LG 117) was implemented until 1996, just before the start of
implementation of the National Development Plan 8 (1997/98-2002/03).
Against the foregoing background the current LG 1107 was initiated and
implemented in 1998. The objective of the programme is to generate employment
opportunities by using labour intensive methods and simple tools to construct and
maintain public facilities. The programme has two components: a permanent
component and a drought relief component. The LG 1107 is essentially a drought
relief programme. It almost stopped during non-drought years. Its permanent
component which is supposed to be on going is too weak. It suffers from a critical
shortage of resources; technical personnel, funds and capital. The programme is only
accelerated during drought years by the more powerful drought component. Thus the
LG 1107 is in effect not entirely a labour intensive public works programme. Most of
the activity is related to the drought relief component and this section will deal
96 Ibid.,194
97 Andrews & Manamela,1991:vi
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mainly with the relief component. But before concentrating on the relief component,
the permanent component will be first summarized.
6.1.1. Permanent component
The institutional framework for the permanent component of the LG 1107 comprises
the MLGL, at national level, which is responsible for the overall management and
coordination of the programme. The MLGL approves the annual District budgets,
requests for funds from the MFDP and manages the disbursement of funds to the
Districts. The MLGL is also responsible for the implementation of national policy
regarding the LG 1107. The division of MLGL responsible for the LG 1107 is the
Department of Local Government and Development.
At the District level, the District Councils in collaboration with the Village
Development Committees and Headmen implement the programme. All the District
Council departments participate in the programme as long as they have identified
projects that can be implemented labour intensively. Thus there are no specific units
within the District Councils, which are responsible for the LG 1107; it cuts across all
the departments. It shares the same human, capital and institutional resources with the
so-called ‘normal capital projects’ of the District Councils.
The permanent component of the labour intensive public works programme operates
the same way as the drought relief component except that it is implemented during
non-drought years and operates at a low key.
6.1.2. Relief component
A large part of funds provided under this programme goes to the drought relief
component which has become the main hub of activity within the LG 1107. It is
supported with more resources (funds, personnel and vehicles) than the permanent
component. The government’s rationale for building the drought relief component
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into the LG 1107 was to make the programme an economic barrier to the effects of
recurrent drought.
Institutional framework
The overall responsibility for the drought programme, at national level, lies with the
Rural Development Council (RDC) assisted by the Inter-Ministerial Drought Relief
Committee (IMDC). The RDC is an institution of the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning. It is accountable to the Cabinet for the performance and
implementation status of the Drought Relief Programme. It reports to Cabinet on a
quarterly basis.
The MLGL is responsible for managing the drought programme’s actitvities within
the scope of its portfolio responsibilities, including the coordination of such activities
at the local level. The Ministry has the responsibility to report on a regular basis to
the RDC through the IMDC and the secretary to the RDC.
At the district level, District Drought Committees, under the chairmanship of District
Commissioners, coordinate drought relief activities at the local level. The day-to-day
implementation and management of drought relief projects is done through the
Drought Technical Committees comprising all heads of departments/units/sections.
The drought relief component is intended to provide short-term employment during
drought years and the wages are set at a supplementary level, for a six-hour working
day. The wage level has been set such that the programme is self-targeting. The
programme is designed to maximize the use of simple tools, unskilled and semi-
skilled labour to construct and maintain public facilities.
The relief component constructs such facilities as health posts, teachers’ quarters,
extension staff housing, school buildings, firebreaks, drift fences and bush clearing.
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The relief component is used to accelerate the normal public works programme
during drought years. In the absence of any Presidential Directive on the type of work
to be done, this component involves projects which have been identified and
prioritized through the normal development planning process, and according to policy
these projects should be implemented in a manner that satisfies both relief and
development requirements.
Monitoring and reporting
All local authorities and government departments directly involved must ensure close
monitoring of their projects, and monitoring should include regular and timely
reporting. The reports should at least contain details on the physical and financial
status of projects, number of beneficiaries by gender and any problems or issues
arising from implementation. In the author’s opinion reporting has been erratic and
not detailed. Corrective action has been lacking as old implementation inefficiencies
and shortcomings seem to be carried over to new projects.
Drought personnel
The key drought personnel comprise the Drought Coordinator, Accountant, Technical
Officers, Accounts Clerks, Supplies Officers, Drivers and Lorry Attendants. These
officers are appointed by the District Councils.The key staff are preferably seconded
from other Council departments to implement drought relief projects. This ensures
accountability and continuity after the drought period.
Staff may also be sourced from the open market to complement in-house staff if the
workload so dictates. These staff are hired on contract and depending on their
performance and remaining workload their contracts may be revised.
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Beneficiaries
In the LG 1107 a beneficiary is classified as any able bodied person who has been
adversely affected by the effects of drought and is willing to render his/her services to
the programme in accordance with all the working conditions as stipulated by the
programme.
Workers are identified at Kgotla meetings through the assistance of Social and
Community Development Workers, Village Development Committees (VDC),
Village Extension Teams (VETS) and the village Headmen.
Wage rate and hours of work
The wage rate for casual labourers and supervisors on the labour based drought relief
component are determined from time to time and as at 2003/2004 these were P10 and
P16 respectively.
Casual labourers work six hours from Monday to Friday. Workers may work on the
programme for as long as it continues provided they continue to be eligible for relief.
Employment is on a monthly basis and each month’s term is considered as a new
appointment.
Rotation of workers
In cases where more workers are available than could be employed at a time they are
employed mainly on a rotational basis through half-day shifts. This is meant to evenly
distribute the benefits to the drought victims. Rotational employment also ensures
that labour legislation is not contravened.
If workers have casual employees’ status there is flexibility on the part of the
programme in terms of labour management. In cases where for some reason work
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cannot proceed, workers may be laid off temporarily until a resolution has been made.
Thus wages would not be paid for work not done.
Project identification and selection
In the absence of specific instructions from the Office of the President the projects
implemented under the drought relief component are drawn from the District
Development Plans (DDPs). This is meant to ensure that the projects implemented
are those from the normal development planning process. The selection of projects is
carried out through the District Development Committees in collaboration with local
community structures such as the VDCs and Community Development officers.
For non-gazetted settlements where permanent structures are not sanctioned selection
is biased towards agricultural related activities, maintenance of public facilities, bush
clearing for forthcoming projects or the production of materials such as bricks to
supply projects elsewhere within the same District. Due to budgetary constraints
priority is given to projects carried over from the previous year.
When the projects have been identified and the communities have been informed and
mobilized the local authorities and other stakeholders have to acquire plots and the
building plans from the Land Board. Soon as these are ready the District Councils are
then informed and handed over the sites for implementation of the projects.
Procurement and storage of materials
Building materials are sourced from the open market through the invitation of
quotations and selection of suitable suppliers. An upper limit is imposed above which
the quotations would not be considered. This narrows down the spectrum of
quotations and makes the selection process faster and projects can be started
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expeditiously. This is more critical for drought projects since they are planned on the
basis of one year.
The responsibility for the storage and safe keeping of materials for projects in each
village lies with the VDCs which are also the project overseers at village level. They
keep proper records of the materials delivered and issued.
Use of contractors
Building projects are a common feature of the programme, requiring the services of
qualified builders, preferably individual contractors. These individuals are hired on
proper building contracts or agreements.
Depending on the magnitude and complexity of the projects the VDCs and the Kgosis
identify and recommend to Council suitable local builders to execute the contracts.
The builders are required to express their interest through communication to the
VDCs. Once the contracts have been awarded and the works started the VDCs
monitor the builders and the casual labourers.
The evaluation of tenders and award, works inspections and payment for the works
are the sole responsibility of Councils. Builders from outside the local villages are
also eligible for work as long as they are citizen.
Employment of skilled and semi-skilled contractors
One way to ensure the construction of good quality assets is the employment of semi
skilled and skilled individual contractors to execute the construction works. The good
construction materials must be used and contractors must satisfy project
specifications.
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Project supervision
To ensure that projects are built according to design and specifications Drought
Relief Technical Officers carry out regular inspections of the works. These
inspections are also carried out to measure and quantify the works in order to prepare
valuations for payment.
If projects for the Central Government are implemented then expertise is also drawn
from the Department of Building and Engineering Services (DBES) of the Ministry
of Works. This is the in-house technical department of Central Government, which is
responsible for the technical and otherwise management of most Government
building and engineering development projects.
Daily labour supervision
Each project site has a site supervisor who accounts for and monitors the materials
delivered and issued. In addition, the supervisor maintains the labour attendance
register. The register is the document for the record of the number of days worked by
each individual worker and forms the basis for the payment of wages.
Income generating projects
The construction of such facilities as VDC Guesthouses, Day Care Centres and
Community Halls also forms part of the projects. These are income generating
facilities for the communities and where they are viable they are prioritized. They are
sustainable if they generate sufficient income for their operation and maintenance.
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Transport
The drought programme is complemented with a fleet of vehicles to be used for site
inspection trips, haulage of materials and other business of the programme. If
additional vehicles are required they are sourced from other Council and Government
departments or hired from the private sector.
6.2. Problems and shortcomings
6.2.1. Employment
The LG 1107 succeeds in delivering relief to the drought victims but failed to
generate productive employment in an efficient way. Its labour force is unproductive
and the quality of workmanship is poor leading to poor quality products.
6.2.2. Piloting
There have been many pilot projects in Botswana (and programmes) but the
formulation of LG 1107 did not take into account any lessons learned from the
previous programmes and Pilot Projects. There has been lack of continuity of local
and international personnel between the LG 1107 and the previous programmes in
Botswana.
6.2.3. Training
The LG1107 is not linked to any training programme for site supervisors and other
technical staff. As a result, it suffers from a shortage of trained site supervisors and
senior technical personnel.
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6.2.4. Government support
The LG 1107 ranks low on the Government’s list of priority programmes. It is only
remembered during drought years and this is the only time that it is allocated
adequate funding.
6.2.5. Institutionalisation
In addition to the fact that the programme is not linked to any formal training
programme, the LG 1107 does not have a specific organisation of staff within the
Councils which is responsible for its management and implementation. It cuts across
all departments of Council and if such departments do not have projects they wish to
implement labour intensively, the programme becomes inactive. The LG 1107 is a
fringe activity and not part of the main business of the District Councils.
6.2.6. Delays in land acquisition
Projects are sometimes delayed or not implemented at all because land could not be
secured or is available but not serviced. This is more common in the urban areas
where there is an acute shortage of serviced land.
6.2.7. Wage rate
The wage rate on the LG 1107 is too low to attract and retain labour. People prefer to
remain unemployed or opt for other temporary activities with a higher income. This
has led to a situation where women and the very poor dominate the programme,
sometimes resulting in sluggish project implementation.
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6.2.8. Lack of coordination between the two components
During drought years the few projects under the permanent component are abandoned
or progress slowed down as the labourers move to the more resource-endowed
drought relief component. The two components are thus not coordinated and compete
against one another for labour.
6.2.9. Lack of implementation guidelines
The LG 1107 has been run without any guidelines. It is difficult for the implementing
agencies to adopt a common systematic approach for programme implementation.
6.2.10. Delays in delivery of materials
Projects are delayed due to the late delivery of materials. This is more common in the
remote areas of the country where suppliers are not keen to deliver and buyers have to
organise their own transport. Councils experience problems from the shortage of
heavy-duty vehicles to deliver small packages of materials to individual settlements
and villages.
6.3. Conclusions
The LG 1107 is not linked to a training programme and hence its projects suffer from
a shortage of trained senior and supervisory staff. This has led to inefficiencies and
the production of poor quality infrastructure.
The programme is practically implemented as a response to drought. This
compromises proper project design and planning which also leads to the production
of low quality assets.
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Its wage is also too low to attract and retain labour. The programme has a high labour
turnover and the majority of its labour force is women and elderly people. Young and
able-bodied men leave the programme to seek alternative employment.
District Councils do not have specific and permanent organisations of staff charged
with the implementation and management of the programme. This lack of clear
responsibility for the programme leads to poor implementation.
The LG 1107 has been a waste of Government money and other resources which
have been invested in the programme to make it an on going nation-wide public
works programme. It has fallen short of generating productive employment
opportunities and good quality assets and has become unsustainable. It is essentially a
drought relief effort.
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7. THE LABOUR INTENSIVE ROAD MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME (
LIRMP)
7.1. Introduction
The use of labour-intensive methods in public works programmes during drought
periods has been an important aspect of the rural poverty alleviation strategy in
Botswana. Although the broad economic and social benefits of labour-intensive
methods are generally appreciated growing unemployment (which was 21% in 1998)
necessitated renewed efforts by Government to maximise the use of labour-intensive
methods in all projects where it is technically feasible and economically efficient.
Government policy stipulated that each Ministry should identify budgeted and
planned maintenance and other recurrent activities as well as development projects
that should be implemented using labour-intensive approaches.98 The policy further
stipulated that labour-intensive components of the social safety net should take the
form of permanent programmes to be specifically targeted to the poor.
The importance of and need for the participation of an expanded citizen private sector
in the economy was also recognised and several schemes for assisting citizen
entrepreneurs, including citizen contractors, were incorporated into national policy.
However, despite the importance attached to the development of emerging citizen
contractors and the assistance schemes that have been available to them, the citizen
contracting industry remained largely embryonic. Thus, there continued to be a need
for additional support to enable particularly the smaller citizen contractors to take full
advantage of the opportunities provided by the National Development Plan 8.
Within the NDP 8 a large road construction programme was planned which would
result in an increase in the paved road network from 5500 km to over 7500 km. Most
98 Government of Botswana,1998:10
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of these roads were to be secondary and access roads, and suitable for labour-
intensive methods. The large road construction programme offered a unique
opportunity to combine the development of small citizen contractors with the
alleviation of poverty through employment in labour-intensive methods. This
required appropriate policies, planning, design, and contract packaging and
implementation mechanisms.
In the decade preceding the 1990’s, the construction industry in Botswana had been a
major contributor to the growth of the country’s GDP contributing approximately
20% to the economy.99 Some 87% of the expenditure on infrastructure was provided
by the public sector, co-ordinated largely by the Ministries of Works, Transport and
Communications and Local Government, Lands and Housing.100 However, the
construction industry had failed to generate a reasonable impact on the rural
population in terms of job creation and rural development. Therefore, the building of
citizen capacity and the generation of job opportunities through an enhanced labour-
intensive programme was considered to be of paramount importance.101
It was against this background that the Botswana Roads Department embarked on a
programme which is aimed at enhancing the use of labour-intensive methods in road
works.
99 Roads Department,2002:2
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid
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The programme had three main components comprising:
i. The review of procurement policies and the incorporation and monitoring of
labour-intensive components in all road works. This includes a weighting in
the technical evaluations in favour of labour-intensive methods in consultancy
proposals and the mandatory specification of certain construction activities
which are considered suitable for labour-intensive methods such as bush
clearing and grubbing, culvert construction, drainage excavation and other
activities.
ii. The training and development of awareness of key stakeholders, including
small contractors, in labour-intensive methods and the reservation of certain
labour-intensive components of projects for small contractors. For example
the sealed access roads leading to all major settlements within 10 km of all
new road developments are reserved for small contractors.
iii. Use of Labour-intensive methods for three full-scale road construction
demonstration projects and three maintenance demonstration projects using
emerging and small contractors.
The exploration of alternative ways of organising maintenance using small-scale
contractors and consultants for the management and supervision of the works was a
radical departure from the practises that were familiar in Botswana. Thus a Pilot
Project was implemented in order to investigate the potential of using small scale
citizen contractors for labour-intensive routine maintenance.
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7.2. Pilot Project
7.2.1. General
In June 1999, the Roads Department appointed Roughton International to undertake,
as a demonstration project, the training and establishment of citizen contractors in
routine road maintenance using labour-intensive Methods. The company did not have
any previous experience in labour intensive work. The company however employed,
as one of its technical managers, a former technical officer on the LG 34.102 It  is
however ironic that this person was not involved in the Pilot Project. The
maintenance engineer, who was also responsible for training was an expatriate with a
civil engineering discipline.
The project was aimed at establishing systems and procedures for the increased out
souring of routine maintenance using citizen labour-intensive contractors with the
aim of eventually widening the programme to cover a larger extent of the national
road network.
Three routine maintenance demonstration projects were identified by Roads
Department as follows:
· Section 1: Dibete-Mahalapye 85 km
· Section 2: Nokaneng-Sepupa 117 km
· Section 3: Lobatse – Ramatlabama 50 km
102 Personal Communication:Joseph Raphalane(Former Technical Officer on the LG34) to Author, February 2006
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The project comprised the following:
· Pre-contract services including, project design, the selection and pre-training
of potential, emerging and small contractors and tender documentation
· Provision of supervision and on-the-job training.
· Provision of post-contract services.
The maintenance works stage of the project commenced in July 2000 and was
scheduled for completion in June 2001. However there was a delay in the start of the
Nokaneng project which resulted in the extension of the projects to December 2001.
7.2.2. Project objectives
· To come up with ways to increase the use of labour-intensive methods in the
maintenance of the national road network using the private sector.
· To increase efficiency by developing citizen capacity to maintain the road
network while creating meaningful employment
· To establish methodologies, effectiveness and cost-efficiency for organising
routine maintenance employing consultants in maintenance management and
supervision.
7.2.3. Maintenance environment in which the project was undertaken
Routine maintenance of the road network by Roads Department was undertaken in-
house in three maintenance regions located in the northern, western and southern
parts of the country. Regions north and south are headed by Works Superintendents
while region west is headed by a Senior Roads Engineer assisted by a Chief
Technical Officer and a Roads Engineer. Work was undertaken by force account with
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a provision for hiring additional casual labour as required. The wage rate for casual
labour was the public sector minimum wage for casual labourers. Plant and major
machinery used for maintenance works were provided by the Government’s Central
Transport Organisation (CTO) on a non-commercial basis.
Overall maintenance planning and budget control was the responsibility of the
Principal Roads Engineer I, who reports, directly, to the Chief Roads Engineer and
indirectly to the Director of Roads. The regions administered the regional routine
maintenance budget for force account. The regional maintenance head could engage
small contractors to undertake routine maintenance work. Periodic maintenance
contracts were administered by the headquarters in Gaborone with the exception of
re-gravelling works, which were undertaken by the regions.
Partly due to the demonstration nature of the Pilot Project it was administered from
the Roads Department’s headquarters through the Co-ordinator for labour-intensive
methods.
The Roads Department maintains a progressive Road Management System (BRMS)
which includes a Pavement Management System (PMS) used for network periodic
maintenance planning and a Routine Maintenance Management and Planning System,
(ROMAPS), used for routine maintenance planning and budgeting. The latter was
used during the planning stages of this project.
In line with Government policy, the Department aims to increase private sector
participation in road maintenance activities whilst strengthening its project
management capabilities. Thus the Pilot Project formed a core part of the
Department’s intended future.
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7.2.4. Contractor development policies in Botswana
The employment of small scale citizen contractors in the construction of public works
would go a long way to develop citizen entrepreneurial capacity and employment
creation. However this has been a challenging task and most of the small citizen
companies remain on the periphery of the industry. In recent years the Government
has developed a number of schemes to encourage the participation of small citizen
contractors. These include:
· Reservation of certain categories of work
· Relaxation of tendering procedures and reduced performance bonds
· Simplified contract documents and specifications
· Price preference on certain domestically funded projects including contract
advance ranging from 5 to 10%
· Assistance with professional services for tendering
The availability of these schemes has generally not led to significant improvement in
the capacity of the citizen contracting industry and there is increasing realization that
more concerted and co-ordinated efforts are required, including training.
Problems faced by citizen contractors
Fragility: Small contractors represent an emerging class of entrepreneurs with little
previous experience of the highly competitive construction industry. They lack a
sustained pool of resources required to acquire and undertake work.
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Training: Small contractors lack skills in contractual matters and thus need to be
assisted to acquire these skills. The training should entail all the aspects of
construction management including estimating and tendering, project planning, cash-
flow analysis and site operations.
Performance bonds and bank guarantees: Small contractors have difficulties
meeting this requirement.
Capacity: Small contractors lack the necessary capacity to handle big projects
because of the financial ceilings placed for the various sizes of contractors in terms of
their resources and experience. Thus in order to accommodate small contractors, large
projects must be broken down in to smaller packages.
Cash flow and access to materials: Poor financial management is a common feature
and often results in cash flow problems for small contractors. Suppliers tend to quote
higher prices for basic materials for small contractors than for big contractors and this
creates financial problems for small contractors.
Continuity of work and commitment to the industry: Because of the inability to
undertake larger projects with longer periods of engagement small contractors
frequently suffer from lack of continuity of work leading to an inability to build a
track record and accumulate sufficient construction fleet.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
170
Status of small contractors
At the beginning of the project it was estimated that there were about 60 registered
small and emerging contractors in Botswana ranging from a few contractors able to
undertake medium sized road construction work to what has been termed
‘Opportunity Category’ (OC) contractors. Table 7.1 below shows the government
tender board categorisation of contractors depending on size and ability to undertake
work.
Table 7.1: Registered contractors (2002)
Category Work Value Total Number of
Registered Contractors
Number of Citizen
Contractors
Opportunity (OC) <P600,000 150 150
Grade A <P2,000,000 24 24
Grade B <P10,000,000 19 6
Grade C and above P10,000,000 18 3
A large proportion of the small contractors tend to undertake building construction
work and those engaged in road works are predominantly in the area of gravel road
maintenance with little involvement in paved road maintenance or capital
construction works.
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7.2.5. Contractor development strategy adopted
Target group of contractors, registration and eligibility
Government regulations dictated that only the small contractors who were already
registered with the government procurement authority would be eligible for
participation in the project.
Contract packaging
In order to allow the A and OC-grade contractors to participate taking into account
the financial ceilings, the Dibete - Mahalapye road was split into three sections of
25.2, 28.4 and 33.8 km lengths intended for OC-grade contractors. The Nokaneng –
Sepupa road was awarded to a B grade contractor who was required to split the work
into three sections (36.2 km, 43.2 km and 34.8 km lengths) and sub-contract two sub-
sections of the road to OC-grade contractors.
The Lobatse - Ramatlabama road was retained as a single project suitable for an A-
grade contractor. The road had been recently resealed and the quantity of routine
maintenance work would not exceed the financial limits of an A-grade contractor.
Training needs
An assessment was made of the training needs of contractors and this formed the
basis for the pre-contract training programme. Training focused more on financial
and construction management than technical aspects.
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There was a need to start the projects expeditiously in order to capitalise on the
opportunities presented by the NDP 8 programme and hence the training was not as
extensive as it should have been to impart the appropriate skills to the contractors.
7.2.6. Project implementation
Community consultations
High importance was attached to community consultation and this was started early
in the project and was carried out by Roughton International’s Resident Sociologist.
Preliminary consultations in the villages: Meetings were held at each village and
the project was explained to the people stating that it was a Pilot Project meant to
train and establish small citizen contractors for routine road maintenance using labour
intensive methods. The institutions involved in the project were also spelt out.
Observations on social conditions in the villages: Fieldwork was conducted in all
the villages along the alignment of the thre trial sections, in conjunction with the
consultation exercise. After Kgotla meetings had been addressed, the people who
were interested in becoming either contractors or employees of the contractors were
invited to register their interest.
It became apparent at this stage that there was a large reservoir of available labour in
the villages, and that there were more women than men seeking work. At Palla Road,
a village with an estimated population of 765 people and a further 609 at lands and
cattle posts, 70 work seekers were registered an hour before starting the Kgotla
meeting. At Gumare, 105 people were registered in two hours on the day after the
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Kgotla meeting out of a population of 7 293, despite the fact that a large scale
Drought Relief Programme was on-going in the village. A high proportion of single
mothers registered for work. This group constituted the largest disadvantaged group
in rural Botswana.
Sample survey of work seekers: In order to have an impression of the socio-
economic circumstances of the job-seekers, a sample survey was conducted of the
people who turned up for recruitment. 33 individuals of whom 17 were men and 16
were women were surveyed. While this was a small sample and men were over
represented, it was believed that in general it gave a valid picture of the circumstances
of work seekers. Out of the sample, eight (24%) had no education, five (15%) had not
completed primary school, seven (21%) had completed standard 7 and thirteen (39%)
had done Form 2.
The mean age of the sample was 36 years, with a maximum of 62 and a minimum of
19. Only four (12%) of the sample had no dependants, the mean number of
dependants of the work seekers was 3.75, with a maximum of 12.  The work seeker
was the head of the household in 23 cases (70%). Most applicants stated that they
were fit for heavy work. Only five (15%) had a health problem. Every applicant
stated that they could work away from home for a full week.
Wealth and income levels among the sample were low.  While 15 applicants (45%)
declined to estimate their monthly income, none claimed a monthly income in excess
of P600. Of the 18 individuals who estimated their income, half earned under P200 a
month, while five (28%) earned between P200 and P400 and 4 (22%) earned between
P400 and P600 a month.  Most people did piece jobs and a few sold veld products or
other goods for a livelihood. 11 people (33%) said they got remittances from relatives
who were working. Other activities such as shoemaking, traditional beer brewing and
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livestock rearing were sources of income for 15 individuals (45%). Only six work-
seekers (18%) owned cattle and 15 (45%) owned small stock.
However, a high proportion of the sample, 28 people (85%) had some work
experience. Most had worked for a civil engineering or building contractor while
others had worked for a District Council (mostly on the LG 34) or a Government
department).
Availability of labour: It was concluded that there was an adequate supply of labour
along the Pilot Project routes. The communities were informed that the project was
not going create employment for every unemployed person and that the jobs created
were going to be temporary and not permanent. The recruitment dates were
announced at the meetings and the people were informed that women were also
eligible for employment. Contractors were furnished with copies of the workers’
register for each village and were required to recruit all labour except skilled
specialists in the villages along the project roads. Contractors were required to
manage their tasks so that women with young children or other dependants could be
employed, e.g. by employing such women on tasks which were within walking
distance of their homes or by transporting them to and from their village each day.
Information to the communities: The communities were informed that the project
was to be implemented on three demonstration sections of road. Each section would
be divided into lengths of between 25 and 40 kilometres and one small-scale citizen
contractor would be selected, given appropriate training and awarded a maintenance
contract for each length through bidding.
Contractors were required to have the ability to execute the work on time and to a
satisfactory standard and also to manage their business so that they could pay their
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workers and make profit for themselves. It was stated that those with a previous
business experience had an advantage.
It was emphasized that there was going to be competitive bidding and not all those
who submitted tenders were going to get work. After contracts had been awarded, the
successful tenderers would receive further training in accordance with their needs to
enable them to do the work properly and manage their business successfully.
The communities were also told that at the end of the initial contract period, the
maintenance contract for each length would be re-tendered. Both winners and losers
in the first round of tenders would be allowed to tender again as well as other
potential contractors who would show interest.
Final contract packaging: In order to enable the A and OC-grade contractors to
participate the roads were split into shorter sections. This packaging ensured that the
projects were brought within the stipulated financial ceilings for contractors bidding
for public jobs.
7.2.7. Procurement and pre-contract activities
Pre-selection of contractors
All potential and registered OC-grade contractors were invited to attend pre-
qualification meetings in the location where the work was to be done. The response
resulted in 79 un-registered and 28 registered OC-grade contractors attending the
meetings.
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Candidates were individually interviewed and a questionnaire was completed to
record the interviewers’ impressions as well as information about the candidate’s
level of education, experience, availability of transport etc. Written tests were given
to check on the candidates’ entrepreneurial skills and ability to perform simple
arithmetic calculations relevant to running a simple contract. The results of these
exercises were marked giving a score to each candidate.
It was found that 12 of the 123 candidates from the potential contractors were suitable
to be trained as contractors and that 18 of the registered OC-grade contractors were
suitable.
The contractors were assessed and allocated grades which designated their capability.
The ownership of heavy plant such as graders, dozers and loaders was not taken into
account, since the work was to be labour-intensive. It was considered that only five
A-grade contractors were required to tender for the single project designated for A-
grade contractors. This allowed a realistic chance of winning a project while
providing reasonable competition to ensure value for money. It also gave four A-
grade contractors a chance to participate in classroom training and pre-tender
workshops. These could then participate in other future projects.
Tendering, evaluation and award
A detailed analysis was carried out on all the A and OC-grade tenders. The results of
this evaluation showed that the bids received from Gops and Sons, Shumba Projects,
I&S Building Construction and Civil Engineering, and DHB presented the most
viable option for the completion of the project to the Client’s best interests. The
tenders submitted by the OC-grade contractors were generally of a higher quality than
those submitted by the A-grade contractors. One explanation for this was that OC-
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grade contractors paid more attention and followed the procedures and techniques
acquired during the pre-tender training and the A-grade contractors tended to rely
more on prior knowledge relating mainly to machine based methods.
7.2.8. Contract documentation
It was deemed necessary to adopt a form of contract that would be easily understood
and applied by the small contractors who lacked a detailed understanding of
contractual issues. It was also essential that the form of contract was not over
simplified so that Government resources and interests would not be exposed to
contractual abuse. The projects adopted a short and modified version of the FIDIC
form of contract. The documents comprised the following:
· Information to tenderers
· Instructions to tenderers
· Conditions of contract
· Conditions of particular application
· Technical specifications and bills of quantities
· Form of tender
· Form of performance bond
· Form of agreement
7.2.9. Conditions of the road projects
The road projects were:
· Dibete to Mahalapye
· Lobatse to Ramatlabama
· Nokaneng to Sepupa
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The link from Dibete to Mahalapye was constructed in the 1970s and had been
subjected to heavy traffic, about 1700 ADT. The pavement was failing seriously with
a high prevalence of potholes. It required strengthening or reconstruction. The road
reserve is the standard of 61 m total width and is fenced on both sides for the major
part of its length. The fence was broken in various places giving rise to intrusions by
domestic animals.
During the preparation of this project the North South pipeline was constructed which
caused the north-bound side of the road reserve to be substantially cleared of
vegetation. This made the maintenance task easier in places where the vegetation had
not regenerated. This road had a bad record of animal-vehicle collisions.
The Lobatse - Ramatlabama link forms the major link between Lobatse and South
Africa. The pavement was in fair condition having been resealed just before the
project. The population density along this road was slightly less than that on the
Dibete to Mahalapye road and traffic was of the order of 1500ADT.
The Nokaneng-Sepupa road is 112km long and was built over ten years ago. It
traverses a dry area of sparse population and sparse vegetation.  The area is in the
migration track of many animals so the road is not fenced for long sections. The
average daily traffic was of the order of 400 vehicles per day. The road provides
access to Namibia through the Caprivi region.
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7.2.10. Contractor Performance
From a visual inspection of the roads it was clear that in all cases the maintenance
was effective, with the reserves well cleared of vegetation and a limited amount of
repairs to the pavement done.
7.2.11. Contract management and administration
Technical management
The contracts were managed by the Engineer (Roughton International) on behalf of
the Roads Department, the Client for the project. The technical management
comprised the consultant’s team of site supervisors supported by a Maintenance
Engineer, Team Leader and additional senior technical input from head office.
Site level management: Technical management on site was provided by supervisors
of technician grade allocated to each project site. These individuals were responsible
for the daily supervision of the contract, ensuring that the works were measured and
undertaken in accordance with the specifications. On a weekly basis the consultant’s
site supervisor checked the weekly programme of works with the contractor. The
contractor had ultimate responsibility for undertaking the work but was regularly
assisted by the supervisor in formulating plans and strategies.
The following is the organisational framework for the Pilot Project. Roads
Department were the parent institution and housed the project. The Norwegian Public
Roads Authority (NPRA) was involved in the project as party to the Institutional
Cooperation agreement with Roads Department, which gave rise to the road
maintenance programme. NORAD, ILO and the British Department for International
Development (DFID) were involved as members of the Task Force for the wider
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programme. Representatives of these foreign organisations attended regular meetings
of the Task Force and provided assistance for impact studies, tender documentation
and technical audits.
Figure 7.1: Project Organisation
Headquarters level technical management: The consultant’s team allocated to the
supervision of the project comprised a full time Maintenance Engineer and a part time
Team Leader. The Team Leader was scheduled to provide support in the initial stages
of the contract until such a time when the systems and procedures were established.
The demands of the supervisory work and the training were such that it was not
practical for the Maintenance Engineer to undertake this function without fulltime
support given the additional administration associated with the contractor’s bank
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accounts. Sites were visited regularly during the supervision phase by the
Maintenance Engineer to undertake training and inspection, as well as to conduct
regular monthly meetings with the supervisor and the contractors’ agents. The
Maintenance Engineer was side-tracked from this supervisory role by the absence of
the Team Leader and the requirement to undertake the financial management function
of the contracts.
Financial management
The five contracts were managed on behalf of Roads Department by the Consultant.
The management task entailed the scrutiny of interim certificates, and administration
of the contract dedicated bank account. Having a company bank account was a
requirement of the contract. It was imposed by the client due to fear of
misappropriation of funds by the contractors.
All payments to the contractor were made into this account. Any withdrawals from
the account required the authorisation and signature of the Maintenance Engineer.
The contractors were required to provide a cash flow forecast showing forward cash
needs allowing for the operation of a petty cash account for each contract. All
contractors, except one, failed to do this. As a result, contractors had to seek approval
from the engineer each time they needed to make a financial transaction.
The Maintenance Engineer was required to receive and then deposit into the bank
accounts, cheques for all interim payments by the client. This was a time-consuming
process and necessitated the employment of a dedicated clerk.
The other principal financial management task on the contract was the scrutiny and
approval of interim payment certificates. Contractors failed to adapt the standard
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format for preparing their claims and this made it difficult for the Engineer to check
their figures.
7.2.12. Data collection and reporting
Requirements of the Terms of Reference
The terms of reference specified the reporting from the sites to comprise the
following:
· Contract brief, contract value, commencement and completion dates
· Consultant’s agreement brief
· Description of activities
· Progress charts
· Expenditure records
This information was to be summarised in quarterly reports and further supplemented
with new findings and recommendations relevant to the objectives of the project. In
addition to the routine reporting, a series of special reports were required as the
project progressed.
Actual reporting
The monthly reports prepared under the project covered all the items required in the
Terms of Reference together with details from Site Monitoring forms, which recorded
statistics relating to actual and planned productivities for the tasks (See Tables A( 6-
8) in the appendix for site monitoring forms).
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7.2.13. Management and organisation
General
The project was part of a wider labour-intensive methods programme initiated by the
Roads department. A key aspect to the success or otherwise of a project of this nature
is the institutional and management framework within which the project is
undertaken. In recognition of its institutional constraints, the Roads Department
engaged the assistance of the British Department for International Development
(DFID) through an adviser to provide the initial impetus. The department also
incorporated the programme within its Institutional Co-operation Agreement with the
Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) funded by NORAD and the
Government of Botswana. The ILO was also involved in the Pilot Project through
ASIST. It conducted feasibility studies for the project and prepared the tender
documents. It also carried socio-economic impact studies of the project. The ILO
representative was based in Harare, Zimbabwe and visited the project regularly. He
was a civil engineer specialising in labour-intensive technology. The ILO
representative was a member of the programme management Task Force.
The Task Force met quarterly to review progress and provide general direction to the
programme. In addition NORAD, through NPRA, provided a co-ordinator and an
adviser to work closely with the Roads Department’s coordinator for labour-intensive
methods on a more regular but intermittent basis. The overall programme strategy and
project specific strategy including the Terms of Reference were developed by the
Task Force.
The Roads Department, through its co-ordinator, undertook day to day management
of the project in direct liaison with Roughton International. The project was thus
essentially a partnership between the public and private sector with the aims of
enhancing job creation and the devolution of routine road maintenance operations
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from the public sector to the private sector as well as to develop the citizen contractor
base in Botswana.
The figure on the following page shows the institutional framework for the wider
labour-intensive routine road maintenance programme.
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Figure 7.2:Organogramme of the programme
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7.2.14. Training
The project was undertaken within the framework of NDP 8, which necessitated a
rapid mobilisation of the contractors to participate in the roads programme. Therefore
it was not possible to undertake extensive pre-contract training as would have been
desirable in order to achieve the benefits accruing from a well trained group of
contractors.
As a result it opted to undertake a limited amount of pre-bid training in which the
business managers of the contractors were introduced to business management and
contract management issues. This was followed by on-the-job training where the
senior site staff were trained on the management of site works.
Pre-bid training for the first bidding
Following the needs assessment, a pre-bid training programme was organised in
December 1999 in Gaborone. This was attended by pre-qualified contractors for the
initial round of bidding. A total of six A-grade contractors and thirteen OC-grade
contractors attended the pre-bid training. The programme ran for three days covering
technical and business management issues.
Further training courses were scheduled in the regional centres (Mahalapye,
Francistown and Maun) for eligible contractors who could not travel to Gaborone for
the first training session.
The pre-bid training course consisted of modules on costing and bid preparation.
Under the costing umbrella issues covered were the cost of labour, small plant, tools,
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equipment, overheads and profit. Bid preparation dealt with contract documentation,
site inspection, bid pricing, bid submission, contract award, work planning and
productivity. The course was presented by the consultant’s Team Leader using pre-
prepared workbooks. The contractors generally concurred that the training was useful
though insufficient.
Pre-bid training for the second bidding
Following the first round of bidding no contract was awarded for the works on the
road between Nokaneng and Sepopa and the contract was re-tendered in February
2001. Prior to this, two more training sessions were organised, each for A-grade and
OC-grade contractors.
The session for A-grade contractors focused on interpretation of tender invitation
documents, bid preparation, site works and business management. The course was
however not well attended due to initial time misunderstandings on the part of
contractors.
The session for OC-grade contractors was attended by 20 contractors who fully
participated. Their educational qualifications ranged from Secondary School
certificates to Bachelors Degrees in civil engineering. Some of them were barely
literate and numerate. This wide range of abilities made the delivery of the course
very difficult. The less qualified candidates experienced most difficulties in learning
and often slowed the programme. However strategies were devised to overcome this
and, at the end the contractors had generally grasped the basic principles of the
subjects.
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The candidates viewed the content presented as of high value and useful for running
their businesses and preparing bids. They felt that the training could have been more
effective had it been made longer.
On-the-job training
Site supervisor level: On the job training started in July 2000 and was provided by
the consultant’s supervisory staff in liaison with the senior staff of the contractors.
This training was directed at issues concerning the running of the sites and the
keeping of records. It did not yield satisfactory results due to a number of problems.
The contractors’ senior site staff did not have prior exposure to labour-intensive
methods. Few of them had attended the pre-bid training sessions. They were thus
trying to learn new skills in an operational environment where they had responsibility
for performance.
The consultant’s site staff comprised technicians and engineers. Technicians were
generally not successful in transferring skills to the contractor’s staff. The
consultant’s role as a trainer was complicated by the fact that do not generally cope
well with the skills transfer required, unless he was also the project engineer and
manager. He did not have executive authority on site over the Contractor. The
Contractor did not work under the Engineer in a direct supervisory relationship
enabling the contractor to learn good practise under authority. This would have
enabled the Contractor’s foreman to benefit from on-the-job training under a
trainer/supervisor in an operational environment.
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7.2.15. Labour content
Employment created
Table A9 shows that the project generated 66 211 worker-days of employment. More
men were employed than women, although more women (742) had been registered
than men (661) for employment during the initial community consultation. The
reason for this is not clear but it could have been due to socio-cultural aspects.
Possible contributory factors include bias by the contractors or the Kgosi’s (through
whom labour was recruited) to male labour. A large proportion of the female
population who had registered for work were unmarried women with children. They
could have been precluded due to maternal duties.
Table A10 in the appendix lists all the various project tasks undertaken by each
contractor together with the breakdown of labour per task. The amount of labour used
per km showed a considerable variation, with a difference of 601% between the
greatest ((I&S) and the least (Sedudu). The author could not directly deduce (from the
available data) the reasons for the high disparities in terms of labour input and
productivity. What is clear is that Sedudu was of a higher grade (Grage B) than I&S
(Grade OC). It is likely that, by virtue of their higher grade, Sedudu were more
efficient in terms of labour utilisation and hence more productive than I&S.
Furthermore, the two road sections were different in terms of maintenance
requirement. The section awarded to I&S (Pallaroad – Mahalapye) is heavily
trafficked and seriously deteriorated in comparison to the section for Sedudu
(Nokaneng – Sepopa). Thus, I&S had more difficult work to do than Sedudu.
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For the purpose of the following analysis it has been assumed that the population of
Botswana is approximately 1.2 million of which 21% are unemployed (252 000).
Half the population has been assumed to be available for work (excluding those over
60 years and under 15 years of age).
As it has already been mentioned, 66211 worker days of labour had been employed at
the end of the project. Assuming 22 working days per month, full year’s employment
is equal to 253 (22 x 11.5) days. The worker days translate to 262 worker years of
employment for the 18 months project, which maintained 252 km of road for about
P5.6 million. This was equivalent to 174 people working full time for each year
(12/18x262). The total labour input represents 0.03% of the population available for
work or 0.07% of the unemployed population.
Expanding the project to cover the paved network of 9500 km would give
employment (full time equivalent) to 7 446 people, being 1.2% of the working
population or 2.95% of the unemployed. A further expansion to cover the whole
network of 23 000 km, which includes District roads would provide employment to
3% of the working population or 7.15% of the unemployed. This would provide 18
000 worker years of employment per year. Table A11 in the appendix gives projected
figures for the expanded programme.
The socio-economic impact of this would be substantial on the local communities.
The inward investment on salaries would amount to P109 million circulating in the
citizen economy and giving rise to significant sustainable improvement in
livelihoods.
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The labour content of the investment
The proportion of labour cost was calculated as a ratio of the total labour cost to the
total value of the Pilot Project. The total labour cost was calculated as the product of
total man- days and the average task rate. A task rate of P23 was used.
% Labour = (16211*23*100)/5 634840 = 27 %
This was not a good score for the project given the nature of the work involved. Road
maintenance is an infrastructure sector with a low capacity building and skills
requirement and a high labour intensity. It results in a situation where labour takes a
significant proportion of the investment.
The LBRM Pilot Project faired poorly in comparison with the KRARP, for which the
proportion of labour cost was 56 %.
However, it must be noted that although the work belongs to a traditionally labour
intensive infrastructure sector, it was a Pilot Project, which involved, for the first time
in Botswana, the training and development of small-scale citizen contractors.
Although the actual figures were not available the author is of the opinion that a
significant proportion of the investment went to overheads in training and
development.
7.2.16. Labour productivity
Actual labour productivity
The average labour productivity for the various tasks on the project showed a
significant variation across the sites (See Table A12 in the appendix). Physical
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conditions and site management accounted for the variation in productivity. A
comparison for grass cutting across the sites showed the highest productivity (by
Shumba) to be three times the lowest productivity (I&S). Site conditions and the
wages paid were the same for the two contractors and the difference in productivities
could be attributed to site management.
The rate of grass cutting by Gops, at 887 m2 /man-day, was within the norm while
that of contractor I&S was low at 380 m2 /man-day. For this task the target standard
productivity was 500-1000 m2 /man-day. Productivity standards were designed
through consultation with experts (ILO & NORAD) in the field of labour intensive
construction and reference to both local and international literature on works of this
nature.
The productivity rates for grass cutting were within the norm if cognisance is taken of
the fact that they were averages over a site with varying conditions. All contractors in
the south paid wages on the same scale and variations in productivities could not have
been due to remuneration.
7.3. The expanded phase
The Pilot Project was completed in late 2001 and declared successful by the Roads
Department as it had just presented a working model for organising labour-intensive
routine road maintenance using small scale contractors managed by a consultant. The
project had maintained about 252 km of gazetted road to a satisfactory standard. This
was confirmed by the following comment by the director of the department. “My
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department has experienced that labour-intensive methods used in road maintenance
work are cost effective and the end result is good.”103.
The project had created 66 211 worker-days of employment of which 40% went
towards the employment of women. About 27% of the total cost of the project was
labour wages. A socio-economic study carried out in one of the project areas revealed
that the project had improved the quality of life of the participants and the community
at large. The wage incomes from the project had increased the demand for goods by
the participants, stimulating investment in both informal and formal commercial
activities to meet the boosted demand and creating more employment opportunities.
Most notable was the sharp drop in the rate of fatal road accidents resulting from
vehicle-animal collisions. This type of accident was reduced by at least 50% and
motorists were safer and freer.
Against the background of these positive results from the Pilot Project, the
Government decided that it must be expanded to cover more of the road network.
As it has already been mentioned, for gazetted road maintenance purposes, Botswana
is divided into three maintenance regions: north, south and west. Each one of these
regions has a regional maintenance office responsible for road maintenance there. For
the expanded programme the responsibility for maintenance was relinquished to the
regional offices as opposed to the Pilot Project, which was implemented, by the head
office.
103 Roads Department, 2003:1
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The expanded programme is being implemented in stages and was started in
November 2002 in the south region. The initial length to be maintained in this region
was from the Dibete cordon fence gate to the Ramatlabama border gate and from
Gaborone to Molepolole. The expanded programme maintains some 511 km of
primary paved road through the use of citizen contractors using labour intensive
methods.
The roads were split into 16 shorter sections to suit the various categories of
contractors and their financial ceilings. Each one of the sections constitutes a contract
assigned to a contractor for maintenance.
The management consultant is Lesedi Consulting in association with Norconsult AS.
The consultant is charged with pre-contract activities, contract administration and the
provision of training and advisory support services to the contractors.
7.4. Evaluation
7.4.1. Internal evaluation
Pilot Project
The Labour-intensive Routine Road Maintenance Programme is still in its early
stages of expansion and has not yet generated any reliable results sufficient for an
evaluation. However the impressions from the Pilot Project have been positive. The
Project succeeded in working out a model for the use of small scale citizen
contractors for labour-intensive routine road maintenance. Amongst the project’s
achievements were the following:
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· It generated about 66 211 worker days of employment
· Maintained about 252 km of gazetted road network reducing road accidents
and increasing driver confidence and safety
· Developed and demonstrated a methodology for the increased use of private
sector expertise by using private consultants to manage and train the small
contractors
· Trained a number of small scale contractors, some of who are now able to
confidently bid for work
The expanded phase
The expanded phase has achieved the following:
· As at November 2003, 42 contractors had been trained and developed
enabling them to bid for future work. The same type of training has been
provided during the expanded programme as was provided during the Pilot
Project.
· As at February 2005 the project employed a total of 11 571 labourers (28%
women) and had created 262 230 worker-days of employment. Wages
accounted for 23% of payment.
7.4.2. External evaluation
· The programme has been preceded by a Pilot Project during which contractors
were trained and mentored
· The programme is located in a proper institutional framework; housed within
the Roads Department, professionally managed by private sector consultants
and technically supported by foreign agencies (Norconsult and the British
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Department for International Development)
· Decentralisation of implementation to the Roads Department’s regional
offices and the centralisation of overall planning and coordination in the
Roads Department head office
· Workers are covered by the national employment regulations and are paid the
equivalent of the statutory minimum wage in the public sector
· The programme enjoys a strong political backing and has been prioritised in
the current National Development Plan (NDP 9).
7.4.3. Problems and shortcomings
· The programme is not yet linked to a formalised training programme. Site
supervisors are trained on-the-job.  On the job training should only be used as
top up to a prior thorough training consisting of alternate class and field work
for at least a year.
· The lead-in phase was not allowed sufficient time. There was a hurry to
implement quickly to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the
NDP 8. This breached the necessity to invest sufficient time in design,
planning and documentation.
· The appointed management and training consultant, Roughton International
did not have prior experience (as a company) in labour intensive work. The
company however employed a former technical officer on the LG 34 but he
was ironically not involved in the Pilot Project. The maintenance and training
engineer was an expatriate with a civil engineering discipline. In the author’s
opinion the project should have not been headed by an expatriate engineer
while there was somebody with unquestionable local experience in labour
intensive work. Furthermore, Roughton International did not have experience
in labour intensive work at company level and they should not have been
appointed to lead the Pilot Project.
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· No attempts were made to recruit and employ the technical staff (Technical
Assistants and Technical Officers) who had been trained and worked on the
LG 34. These people were a ready-made resource and their involvement
would have improved the programme in terms of organisational and technical
matters.
· No lessons were drawn from the experience of LG 34 prior to implementing
this programme. The programme was trying to re-invent the wheel when some
good practice had been established during the LG 34. Thus, there was a lack
of continuity in terms of both personnel and practice between this programme
and the LG 34.
7.5. Conclusions
The LIRMP is still in its early stages of expansion but it has created a positive
impression. The Pilot Project to the programme has developed and demonstrated a
model for organising routine road maintenance through the use of small scale
contractors using labour-intensive methods. The project maintained about 252 km of
gazetted road network generating about 66 211 worker days of employment within 18
months
For the first time in Botswana it was demonstrated that private sector consultants
could be effectively used to manage small-scale contractors carrying out maintenance
work labour-intensively. Roads Department promptly authorised the replication of the
pilot activities over the country.  Replication is still ongoing and maintenance has
been extended to about a further 500 km of gazetted road network in the southern
maintenance region.
DocumentsPDFComplete
Click Here & Upgrade
Expanded Features
Unlimited Pages
198
Finally, it is important to note that with a wage bill of 23 % of total cost, this
programme is not labour intensive. It is rather conventional road maintenance. The
programme is, however, promising in terms of developing small scale contractors and
increasing the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure development.
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8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1. Introductory Summary
High unemployment, poverty and rural under-development have led some developing
nations to implement programmes of labour intensive work. The programmes provide
the opportunity to simultaneously alleviate these socio-economic problems while
creating infrastructure. The theoretical basis for the programmes has been the large-
scale research by the ILO and the World Bank, which had proven the technical
feasibility and economic efficiency of labour intensive methods for a wide range of
construction activities under certain socio-economic conditions.
Botswana has experienced and continues to experience high unemployment and
poverty, especially among its rural population. The country’s recent impressive
economic performance has not been able to provide all the answers to these problems.
Recognizing the need to generate employment opportunities outside economic
growth as well, the Government of Botswana (GOB) has since 1972 implemented
programmes of labour intensive work. The programmes have had varying degrees of
performance as will be seen in the following sections.
8.2. Conclusions
8.2.1. The Labour Intensive District Roads Programme (LG 34)
The LG 34 began with a Pilot Project in 1980 to investigate a number of aspects and
establish appropriate construction and organisational methods as well as developing
and implementing the embryonic training programme for supervisory personnel. On
completion, the project was evaluated and declared successful. It recommended that
the methods it had developed could be replicated over the country, opening the door
to the start of large-scale implementation of the LG 34 in 1982.
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Internal achievements
Employment: The programme achieved its objective to generate employment
opportunities for the rural poor. As the programme expanded, the number of casual
labourers employed progressively increased. From 235 casual labourers employed
during the Pilot Project the casual labour force increased to over 3000 labourers in
1990. With this, the LG 34 had achieved the National Development Plan 6 objective
to create 3000 jobs by 1990.
In July 1995 the LG 34, then under LG 117, accounted for a significant proportion of
rural employment. It was employing 2 730 casual labourers, 3.3% of total rural
employment and 27% of rural local government employment.
A comparison with the national economy for July 1995 reveals that the LG 34
generated more employment opportunities per unit of expenditure than the national
economy.
The LG 34 had a specific objective to generate employment opportunities for women.
The proportion of women casual labourers increased from 8% in 1980 to about 40%
in 1995. The proportion of women trained as site supervisors also increased as the
programme went on. In fact, women eventually dominated men in the Gang Leader
cadre of staff. Their proportion increased from 21% in 1985 to about 86% in 1990.
Thus the District Roads programme succeeded in achieving its objective to create
employment.
Good quality low cost roads: The primary purpose of the LG 34 was to upgrade and
maintain the non-gazetted District roads labour-intensively. The length of earth road
constructed each year progressively increased until 1995. At maximum performance,
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the programme constructed about 200 km of earth road per year. By 1995 (after 15
years), the programme had constructed a total of about 1 821 km of earth road
(against an initial target of 200km/year) at an average cost of P 20 000/km/yr.
However, the LG 34 was not confined to earth roads only. It also constructed about
1000 km of spoor graded track.
The construction of good quality low cost roads was a cornerstone for the success of
the LG 34. This earned the programme international recognition and the Government
of Botswana declared the programme a national asset. Therefore the LG 34 succeeded
in relation to achieving the objective to produce good quality roads at a low cost.
Institutional capacity building: The LG 34 also aimed to create institutional
capacity for the District Councils to enable them to construct and maintain District
roads. By 1987, Road Units had been established in all the nine District Councils and
were constructing and maintaining good quality roads.
In sum the LG 34 succeeded in achieving most of its key objectives.
External achievements (Conformity to good practice)
The LG 34 complied, to a large extent with good practice in labour intensive work.
Piloting: The LG 34 adopted the four-phased approach to programme
implementation and implemented a Pilot Project to investigate the technical
feasibility and economic efficiency of labour intensive methods in Botswana prior to
expansion. The subsequent replication of the methods was based on the firm
foundation laid by the preceding Pilot Project.
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Centralization and decentralization: There was a balance between the
centralization essential for the success of lower level operations and the centralization
required for the overall planning and coordination of the programme at national level.
Institutionalization and training: The LG 34 had a strong and fully incorporated
training component carried out at three levels: a Technical Officer responsible for the
supervision of a DCRU, a Technical Assistant responsible for the supervision of four
to six Gang Leaders, and a Gang Leader responsible for the site supervision of a gang
of up to 25 labourers.
Institutional adjustments were made to existing institutions (RTC) and new
institutions (FTU) were created in order to create training infrastructure for the
programme.A careful screening process was followed in the selection of candidates
for training. As much attention was paid to character as to technical competence in
the selection of trainees.
The success of the LG 34 owed much to the robust training programme it
incorporated.
Financial and political support: The Programme enjoyed sustained financial and
political support for the better part of its existence and this contributed to its success.
Problems and shortcomings
Wage rate: The wage rate on the District roads programme was not pegged to the
minimum wage in the public sector. Over time, it was outstripped by the public sector
minimum wage and the cost of living. It dropped to levels where it was on par with
drought relief wages. This situation seriously undermined the performance of the
programme in terms of productivity and quality of work. Workers left the LG 34 en
masse to join the Drought Relief Programme, where they were paid the same wage
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under much less supervision. The programme began to be treated much as drought
relief.
In 1992, the LG 34 was combined with the inefficient LG 38, further dampening its
performance and strengthening its false drought relief image. Government support
levels for the programme also went down.
Localisation
In respect of localisation the LG 34 faired poorly against the successful Kenya
programme. The LG 34 failed to localise senior positions in the programme,
preventing the crucial handing over of the programme to local engineers. As at March
1993 (after 13 years) the two most senior engineering positions on the programme
were still in expatriate hands (The District Roads Engineer and Assistant Roads
Engineer).
In the KRARP, the number of local engineers increased from zero in 1974 through to
two in 1978 and to twenty three in 1985, out of a total of twenty nine.
Donor withdrawal
NORAD withdrew financial and technical support to the LG 34 (in 1996) on the
pretext that Botswana’s economy had reached a level where it could sustain itself.
But the good economic performance has not been accompanied by a matching degree
of socio-economic transformation. Botswana recorded a drop in its Human
Development Index (HDI) while it was experiencing a rapid economic growth in
2001.
Against that background one is therefore compelled to question NORAD’s
withdrawal on grounds of economic independence for Botswana. If their withdrawal
was indeed based on a genuine conviction about the economic status quo in Botswana
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then NORAD’s analysis of the economic situation in Botswana was superficial and
should be reconsidered. This is more so in light of the fact that the withdrawal of
NORAD support was followed by the demise of the LG 34.
However, the achievements by the LG 34 outweighed its short falls and the
programme was generally successful. Other programmes in Botswana and elsewhere
should emulate it while taking note of its few short falls.
8.2.2. The RRP and the LG 38
The Rural Roads Programme (RRP)
The RRP had been intended to be a labour intensive programme but in the event it
became rather capital intensive and problematic. It was not properly planned in the
beginning and important aspects like training were ignored. The programme did not
have adequate technical supervisory staff to supervise projects leading to high
inefficiencies. Its poor performance was blamed on labour intensive methods but later
attempts to capitalize the programme did not help either. It became more problematic,
expensive and was later wound up.
The LG 38
The LG 38 was highly inefficient due to its low productivity and poor workmanship.
The programme did not have an incorporated training programme and suffered from a
serious shortage of trained technical personnel to design, plan and supervise projects.
The LG 38 did not have a specific organisation within the District Councils. It was
thus not a direct responsibility of any unit or department of the District Councils, and
this contributed to its poor performance. The programme was later incorporated into
the then powerful but essentially drought relief LG 117.
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The LG 117
The LG 117 was intended to be and was implemented as a drought relief
intervention.The programme lacked a training component and hence a sufficient
supply of trained technical staff and these led to the production of poor quality assets.
It failed to tap on the experience of its District roads component (LG 34) after the
latter was incorporated into the former. The LG 34 was a meticulously designed and
efficiently implemented programme. It had accumulated trained technical staff and
developed good organisational methods. Under the LG 117 the LG 34 component
was starved of funds and became dormant. The trained technical staff of the LG 34
component started to leave the LG 117, leading to a lack of continuity of technical
personnel. The foreign technical assistance personnel of the LG 34 component were
underutilized during the LG 117. This rendered the programme highly inefficient
since these staff were expensive.
8.2.3. LG 1107
The LG 1107 is essentially a drought relief programme. The programme is inefficient
in its use of labour and yields poor quality products. It suffers from a critical shortage
of technical supervisory staff because it is not linked to any training programme. Its
permanent component is critically under-resourced and weak. The programme does
not have, within the Councils, permanent organisations of staff specifically charged
with implementing it. It has also generally become unpopular with the Council staff
and this is likely to spell doom for the programme.
8.2.4. The Labour-Intensive Road Maintenance Programme (LIRMP)
The LIRMP is still in its early stages of expansion but it has created a positive
impression. The Pilot Project to the programme developed and demonstrated a model
for organizing routine road maintenance through the use of small scale contractors
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using labour-intensive methods. The project maintained about 252 km of gazetted
road network (the initial target) generating about 66 211 worker days of employment
over 18 months.
It also demonstrated that private sector consultants could be effectively used to
manage small-scale contractors carrying out maintenance work labour intensively.
Following this first successful trial in Botswana, the Roads Department promptly
authorized the replication of the pilot activities over the country. Replication is still
on-going and maintenance has been extended to 500 km of more gazetted road
network.
However, it is important to note that with a wage bill of 23 % of total cost, the
expansion of programme is not labour intensive. This is rather conventional road
maintenance. The programme is, however, promising in terms of developing small
scale contractors and increasing the participation of the private sector in the sphere of
infrastructure development.
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Table 8.1 Comparison and evaluation of the programmes against the LG 34
Factor/Programme  LG 34 RRP LG 38 LG 117 LG 1107 LIRMP
Objectives Clearly defined
and realistic.
Mostly achieved
Not clearly
defined.
Not achieved
Not realistic
Not achieved
No defined
objectives
Realistic but not
achieved
Clearly defined
Achieved in the
short-term
Planning Long term
and short
term planning
No time
taken to plan
No technical
personnel to plan
Planning was ad
hoc
Constrained by
lack of technical
personnel
Constrained by
lack of time
Quality of work Good quality
roads
Improved rural
access
Poor quality
roads.
Deteriorated
quickly
Poor quality
products
(leakage at
Kanye dam).
No technical
personnel
Standard of
construction was
low as
programme was
essentiallly
drought relief
Poor quality
assets.
Lacks technical
supervision
Roads well
maintained and
road accidents
reduced
Training Long-term
training
programme (
GLs,TAs and
TOs produced)
No training
programme
No training
programme
No training
programme
No training
programme
Insufficient.
On-the-job training
only
Technical
Assistance
Long term
technical
assistance by
NORAD and ILO
None None None None No technical
assistance based
in Botswana.
Occasional visits
by ILO
representatives
Labour cost
proportion of total
cost (%)
 75 - 80 70 51 27
Reporting Detailed regular
reporting
(production,
financial,
expenditure etc)
No records No records Sketchy financial
and physical
progress
reporting
Sketchy
financial and
physical
progress
reporting
Reports on
expenditure,
physical progress
and impact studies
Piloting Preceded by a
meticulously
designed Pilot
Project
Piloting was
insufficient
No Pilot
Project
-- Not piloted and
was hastily
implemented
Preceded by a Pilot
Project
The above comparison matrix shows that most of the programmes deviated from the
good practice of the LG 34 in terms of the evaluation criteria shown above. In the
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opinion of the author, no lessons were drawn from the experience of the LG 34 or
international good practice prior to implementing most the other programmes and this
resulted in the failure of most of them.
8.2.5. Failure to learn lessons
Programmes that were implemented subsequent to the District Roads Programme LG
34 did not draw from the experience and good practice established by this
programme. They were trying to re-invent the wheel and that is essentially why some
of them have failed and the current ones are bound to fail.
8.2.6. Recommendations and lessons
i. A labour intensive work programme must be linked to a proper training
programme. The candidates selected for training need not only be technically
competent, they must also have the right character to enable them to
influence, motivate and control others. It has been observed that the skill of
site supervisors or Gang Leaders is crucial for the success of a programme
and thus their training programme must be effective. It must equip the
trainees with requisite numeracy and literacy skills as well as strong technical
grounding to enable supervisors to compute, measure, set out works and
interpret data. Measures should be put in place to monitor and evaluate the
training for quality and efficiency in terms of meeting its own objectives.
Monitoring and evaluation helps to answer such questions as: is the training
producing enough graduates? Are they competent? Is the training content
still relevant to the work?
ii. On-the-job training only is not sufficient. It must be preceded by alternate
(weekly basis) class and site training run for one year.
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iii. A programme of labour intensive work should be located within a well-defined
institutional framework and the organisational responsibility for the programme
must be clearly defined.
iv. Organisations wishing to carry out labour intensive work must be wary of the
must-implement-quickly syndrome. Careful preparatory work and institution
building must precede project implementation. (This ensures that
programmes do not end up like most of those that have been described in this
report).
v. Programmes of labour intensive work should have an objective to
progressively localise senior technical positions on the programme. This would
help to secure the programme when foreign technical assistance is withdrawn.
vi. Technical assistance personnel must be present on a continuous basis in order
to provide constant technical support to the programme until the local technical
capacity has matured.
vii. Sustained political support and financial commitment are crucial for the long
term survival of a labour intensive programme.
viii. In a programme of labour intensive work, the wage rate for unskilled workers
or labourers must be near or equal to the minimum wage for Industrial Class
workers in the public sector. The wage must also be pegged to the public sector
minimum wage. This helps to ensure fair compensation for the hardships
endured by workers on labour intensive projects. It also serves to distinguish
labour intensive work from drought relief work which does not produce any
valuable infrastructure.
ix. Workers must be afforded some minimum protection by special conditions of
employment to address such issues as hours of work, leave, payment
procedures and worker participation in trade union activities. Hours of work
should conform to provisions of the national employment legislation. Worker
should be entitled to paid sick and annual leave where their contracts of
employment last for over a specific period of time( e.g. one year)
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x. The regulations of conditions of employment in labour intensive work should
eventually be incorporated into the national employment legislation. In this
case it gains more recognition and wider application in areas where labour
intensive work features.
xi. Any attempt to develop small-scale contractors must adopt the programme
approach to implementation. The effort must take cognizance of the problems
facing small contractors in the industry and try to tackle them in order to create
an enabling environment for the development of small contractors.
8.2.7. Recommendations for further research
The wider labour-intensive routine road maintenance programme was kick-started
with the implementation of two Pilot Projects of labour-intensive work: Pilot Project
for routine road maintenance using small scale contractors and Pilot Project for road
construction using small scale contractors. Both projects were implemented to
completion and only the maintenance Pilot Project has been replicated over the
country. From the scope of this study it could not be determined whether the
construction Pilot Project is also replicable or not. It is therefore recommended that
further investigation be carried out on the construction project to find out if it can be
replicated over Botswana.
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APPENDIX A:
Table A1 : Productivities from activity sampling
Table A2: Surfacing: Number of trips per loading station for different haulage
distances
Haulage Distance
(Metres)
Trips/Cart Carts Trips/Day
<200 24 2 48
200-300 20 2 40
300-400 10 2 36
400-500 16 3 48
500-650 14 3 42
650-800 12 4 48
800-900 11 4 44
900-1050 10 5 50
1050-1150 9 5 45
1150-1400 8 6 48
1400-1600 7 6 42
1600-2000 6 6 36
Volume of  cart = 0.5 m3
Activity Productivities from work studies Average productivities from
production data
Bush clearing only 306.0 m2 /day
Bush clearing and de-stumping 134 m2 /day
Ditching 2.2 Fm3 /day 1.7   Fm3 /day
Sloping 3.5 Fm3 /day 2.13  Fm3 /day
Camber 44.6  m2 /day
Quarry excavation 5.3 Lm3 /day
Loading 7.7-16.9 Lm3 /day 2.6 Lm3 /day
spreading 14.1 Lm3 /day 8 Lm3 /day
     Mogorosi 1981
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Table A3: Task rates used and recommended
Activity Task rates used Task rates recommended
Medium ? light bush = 750 m2/dayBush clearing only  750 m2/day
No task set for dense bush
Bush clearing and de-stumping Medium ? light bush = 150 m2/day
No task set for dense bush
Ditching 3.75 Fm3/day Hard: 1.875 Fm3/day ( 15m)
Firm: 2.5  Fm3/day ( 20m)
Loose: 3.13 Fm3/day ( 25m)
Very loose: 3.75 Fm3/day ( 30m)
Sloping 3.75 Fm3/day Hard: 2.35 Fm3/day ( 25m)
Firm: 3.28  Fm3/day ( 35m)
Loose: 3.75 Fm3/day ( 40m)
Very loose: 4.29Fm3/day ( 345m)
camber 100 m2/day ( 25)
Quarry excavation 4.0 Lm3/day (hard)
6.0 Lm3/day (soft)
Hard: 4.0 Lm3/day (hard gravel)
Firm-loose: 6.0 Lm3/day (calcrete and
soft gravel)
Loading 12.0  Lm3/day 12  Lm3/day
Spreading 18 Lm3/day 18.0  Lm3/day
Mitre drains As for ditching
Interception ditches 5.0 Fm3/day 5.0 Fm3/day by a team of four
Table A4: Summary of cost planning data
Cost/km ( Pula)
Stage One Formation Stage Two Formation
2 696 1 797
Drifts 347 347
Surfacing 1 588 1 588
Total 4 631 3 732
Table A5: Summary of costs
Item Amount Cumulative total Cost/km
LOCAL EXPENDITURE
Excluding houses and
offices
270 213 270 213
Estimate for surfacing
remaining 11.5km
26 818 297 031 8 535
Houses and offices 65 987 363 018 10 432
Orders placed but not yet
delivered 17 275 380 293 10 928
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
(Labour, tools, equipment &
equipment included + 10 %
contingency)
420 000 800 293 22 997
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Table A6: Site Monitoring Form (a)
Contract Data
CTB no: Project: Contract length km:
Start date: Duration (mths): Completion date: Contract sum:
Contractor: Engineer's Representative:
Project Summary
A M J J A S O N D J F M
x
x x
For official use only
Road Class / Surface Project Category
Primary X
Secondary P
Tertiary & Access S
Bituminised T Male
Gravel B B G E Female
Earth & Sand Track Total
Weather conditions on site and Working Days during reporting period:
1) Excluding Weekends (normally Sundays) and Public Holidays
Notes:
Compiled by: Sign.: Date:
PROJECT MONITORING FORM
9/5/67/98-99 DIBETE TO MMAMABULA 16
07/01/2000 12 30/6/2001 597,410.69
GOPS&SONS (PTY)LTD CHARLES KAFURUKI
Reporting period Month Authorised Payments This mth To date
Fin. Year Pula 384,402.27
2000/2001 % of Contract Sum 64.3
Report based on: Records Estimates
Employment Data
Workerdays Wages
This mth To date This mth To date
157 3792 5,000.00 143,987.96
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
R
eh
ab
ili
ta
tio
n
S
ho
ul
de
r w
id
en
in
g
R
es
ea
l/R
eg
ra
ve
l
R
ou
tin
e 
M
tc
e
Gender distribution % Wages  in % of Total Payments
This mth To date This mth To date
65 61 20.8
35 39 15
100 100 35.8
No of days
worked
No of days
work stopped
Total no of
working days 1)Rainfall mm
28 0 28
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Table A7: Site monitoring form (b)
Activity
Employment and
Productivity Workerdays Wages Productivity Units/wd
This mth To date This mth To date This mth To date Target
Grass cutting nil 1007 nil 38,658.13 nil 700 900
Bush clearing 0 1070 0.00 17,275.23 0 50 100
De-littering 64 272 1,280 11,163.00 2.5 2.5 5
Drain cleaning 0 174 0.00 19,891.60 0 18 20
Cattle chasing 93 691 3720 36,120 8 8 10
Destumping 0 192 0 6,800 0 80 83
Culvert Cleaning 0 56 0 2,180 0 5 10
Surface repairs 0 120 0 6800 0 2 4
Shoulder Repairs 0 210 0 4200 0 10 20
Total 157 3792 5,000.00 143,987.96
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Table A8: Site monitoring form (c)
Table A9: Worker days
Contractor Total wd % Male % Female
Gops 8191 62 38
Shumba 11104 64 36
I & S 14207 62 38
DHB 16446 57 43
Sedudu 16263 62 38
Total 66211 61 39
Works Progress 1) Quantities in
Original BoQ
2) Approved
Variations
3) Adjusted
Total 1+2
Output
Unit
Compl. in % of 1)
Activity This mth To date This mth To date
GRASS CUTTING 944,909 0 832000 sqm 0 88
BUSH CLEARING 83 16000 0 16000 Lin-m 0 100
DE-LITTERING 420,000 35000 245000 sqm 8.3 66.3
DRAIN CLEANING 29,870 0 5430 m 0 18.2
CULVERT CLEANING 149 0 141.6 m 0 95
DESTUMPING 58 16000 0 16000 LN-M 0 100
CATTLE CHASING 16 16 128 KM 8.3 66.3
SURFACE REPAIR 37 0 35 SQM 0 94.6
SHOULDER REPAIRS 4800 0 2784 SQM 0 58
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Table A10: Labour employed on site
Gops and Sons Shumba projects I & S DHB Sedudu
Labourers/km 512 505 836 329 139
Length contract
road
16 22 17 50 117
Total Worker days 8191 11104 14207 16446 16263
Male Worker
Days
5088 7108 8835 9353 10096
Female Worker
Days
3103 3996 5372 7093 6167
Grass cutting 1875 1943 4531 7740 5630
Bush clearing 1336 1977 3036 846 7536
De-stumping 264 780 108 84 1258
De-littering 658 1673 1813 2417 726
Culvert cleaning 56 74 240 375 240
Drain cleaning 174 783 380 250 336
Shoulder repairs 234 560 216 0 28
Surface repairs 1538 530 353 0 1-3
Pavement repairs 0 240 0 0 56
Crack
repairs(fine)
0 48 0 0 12
Crack
repairs(wide)
0 25 0 0 0-
Edge repairs 256 68 0 0 0
Cattle chasing 1800 2397 3530 4334 0
fencing 0 0 0 310 0
Sign repairs 0 0 90 334
Table A11: Labour projections for the expanded programme (LIRMP)
Pr
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8
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le 
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s
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plo
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t
(4
0%
)
%
 o
f w
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kin
g
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p *
%
 
of
un
em
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d
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p*
*
Pilot Project 222 66211 261 174 68 0.03 0.090.07
Paved Road
Network 9500 2,565,219 9717 7445 2903 1.2 2.95
National Road
Network 23000 6,210,530 23525 18027 7030 3. 7.15
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Table A12: Labour productivity
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Unit m2  m2 l/sum m2 lm lm wd m m m2 m2 m3 m2 lm m3 wd lm no
Gops &
sons
887 12 61 37 3 31 40 0.19 n/a n/a n/a n/a 100 n/a n/a
Shumba 1178 11 28 93 3 1290 3 0.53 0.13 n/a 1.8 0.23 133 n/a n/a
I&S 380 6 157 101 1 10 52 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 196 n/a n/a
DHB 672 48 60 134 1 20 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 255 12 0
Sedudu 071 413 002 1081 16 93 121 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.5
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